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HHHE following discussion is based upon
several essays which lately appeared in
the &quot;New Englander.&quot; They have been ex
tended somewhat, and, for the sake of greatei
unity than essays which were at first inde
pendent of each other could have, their form
has also been altered. I have quoted copi
ously from Mr. Spencer for two reasons :
First, no candid writer, whose purpose is as
controversial as mine, will trust himself to
represent his opponent s doctrine without
the check, both of exact quotation and exact
reference
; and, secondly, because so contra
dictory and absurd are some of Mr. Spencer s
positions, that my unsupported statements
about them would not be believed.
Mr. Spencer claims to seek for truth. I6 Preface.
make the same claim
; and, believing most
heartily that Mr. Spencer has not found the
truth, I have ventured to say so. Still the
appeal is not to sentiment, much less to au
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one longer holds with the ancient skeptic,
that all things remain as they were since the
beginning. All alike admit that the universe, as
we know it, has had a beginning in time, and the
problem which all alike propose is, to account for its
origin and history. There was a time in the eternal
duration when the present order did not exist, and a
time when it began to be. How ? This is the question
which both science and religion attempt to answer.
Until within a few years Theism has been accus
tomed to conceive of creation as an instantaneous
work. &quot;The Creator spake, and it was done; he
commanded, and it stood fast.&quot; In a moment, as
the lightning flashes out of the dark night, so the
worlds were &quot;won from the void and formless in
finite,&quot; and each one started on its way, perfect after
its kind. By the word of the Lord were the heavens
made. At his command the light kindled, and the
oceans filled, and the whole earth swarmed with
life. But it is claimed that the long times ofio Review of Herbert Spencer.
natural history and geology, and the gradual intro
duction of higher forms, have thrown doubt upon
this conception. It is said that the law which holds
for all present development is true for creation also :
First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn
in the ear. Creation was not a single but a succes
sive work
; and, instead of being finished once for all,
its vast and mysterious operations are still going on.
Even yet the creative plan is not completed ; and, so
far from being at a distance, we are in the very
midst of creation s week.
It is hardly necessary to point out that evolution
in this general form is perfectly compatible with
Theism. All that Theism cares to know is, that
Mind is the primal cause and the eternal ruler of the
universe. Whether it hastens on to its purpose, or
whether it lingers upon its way, is a matter of com
parative inditference. When was it that the Spirit
of God brooded over nature to bring forth the living
from the lifeless ? Set up the date six thousand
years ago, or carry it back to that nebulous time
when the earth was without form and void, and dark
ness hung over the face of the deep ; one cannot see
that it makes any difference. When was it that the
seeds of life and mind were sown ? Was it after our
earth had taken on its final form ? or were they scat
tered upon that desert mist from which the world
has sprung ? How long was nature in fulfilling the
Divine command a week or an age? Has it ac-Review of Herbert Spencer.
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complished the work, or is it yet toiling at the task ?
Were the. lower forms of life created with the power
of evolving the higher or not ? Is organic existence
complex in essence, or is its variety but a harmonious
variation upon a single string
? It is no degradation
to the individual to be born ; why should it be any
more degrading to species to be born ? If it is not
degrading to teach that the individual reaches dis
tinctive manhood only through the darkness and
weakness of the birth-process and of unfolding in
fancy, I know not why it should be thought degrading
to teach that species, too, struggle up through lower
forms to their distinctive characteristics. I cannot
feel that Theism, or even Christianity, is at all con
cerned with the answer to any of these questions.
One view makes creation single, the other makes it
successive. One concentrates the creative act upon
a point of time, the other spreads it over unknown
years. One makes nature instantaneously obedient ;
the other keeps it toiling for ages at the Divine com
mand. Either view might be worthily held, and
each has many elements of peculiar sublimity and
grandeur. Religion cares only to insist that in the
beginning a Divine sower went forth to sow.
But there is another form of the evolution theory.
The thorough-going evolutionist, availing himself of
the doctrine of the unity of the forces, paces with
firm step through the animal and vegetable kingdoms,
and finally brings all things home to the parentage12 Review of Herbert Spencer.
of matter and force. He drives back beyond all
life, beyond all form, beyond even the^present
material elements, back to the raw and faint
beginnings of matter and force themselves. At that
distant point there are no such myths as life and
mind
; these are unimaginable ages down the future.
There is nothing there but little lumps of good, hard
matter. These are the fountain-head of existence,
and only need to be left alone long enough to trans
form chaos into creation. Mind is not the begin
ning and primal cause of things, but is the final
outcome of nature the highest point to which the
whirling atoms climb. This is what purports to be
the scientific book of Genesis. This is evolution as
it is held by the New School of Philosophy, of which
Mr. Spencer is one of the chief apostles.
Now let us note the true nature of the problem
which the New Philosophy attempts to solve. It
often happens that a few vague and general anal
ogies are allowed to blind the reason to the infinite
complexity of the problem, and it may even be
questioned whether many of the evolutionists them
selves properly appreciate the task they have to
perform. Their proposition, in plain words, is this :
All things have come, by a rigid mechanical se
quence, from the condensation of that primeval mist.
Not merely the forms and disposition of matter, but
life, and mind, and their various manifestations, have
all been evolved by necessary physical causation.Review of Herbert Spencer. 13
At first sight it would appear that thought and
emotion have nothing in common with the buzzing
of atoms ; but, in truth, these little lumps need only
to be properly combined to become self-conscious,
and think, and feel, and hope, and aspire ; and, if
they have come forward under the proper conditions,
they may even pray and worship. Whatever of
nobility, of heroism, and of high manhood there
may have been in the past, it was only a material
combination, and had an exact physical equivalent.
So completely is mind the result of organization,
that it is even held that if a brain could be made
exactly like that of Socrates, the owner would have
the memory, the thought, the consciousness of
Socrates. Two brains which are physically equiv
alent are also mentally equivalent. Construct, to
day, the brain of Plato as it was in his old age, and
that brain would remember its early association with
Socrates, the scenes at his trial and in the prison,
the composition of the dialogues, and all that the
real Plato actually experienced. Manufacture Crom -
well s brain, and it could give you an exact account,
from its own consciousness, of the battle at Naseby
and the triumph at Marston Moor. It could tell of
the Long Parliament, the condemnation of the King,
and the Lord-Protectorship. Any man s thought,
memory, consciousness, could be completely recov
ered by reconstructing his brain. If there had
been a spectator who could detect the position ofI4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the forces in that nebulous mass, he could have rea
soned mechanically and mathematically, to orbital
rings and solid globes, to man and his works, to
Homer and the Iliad, to Newton and the Principia,
to Milton and the Paradise Lost, to Shakspeare
and Hamlet. By simple deductive reasoning, that
spectator could have foreseen all our art, our science,
our civilization, and could have prophesied all that
is yet to come. He could have foretold all the folly
and suffering and sin of men, and could have writ
ten human history, while yet the race was unborn.
There is not a mote that trembles in the sunbeam,
nor a leaf that is driven in the wind, whose exist
ence and exact position he could not have foretold.
The problem would, indeed, have been a complex
one, and would have outrun the resources of our
mathematics, but still it would have been a purely
mechanical question. There is not a thought that
ever toiled, or that ever shall toil, in a human brain,
there is not an ache that ever wrung a human heart,
that was not potentially there. The physical com
binations that represent truth and honor, piety and
affection, were all latent there. Our longings for
knowledge were there
; and when we inquire after
the origin of things our thoughts but return to
their early home. Mr. Spencer, and his philosophy,
and the criticisms upon it, were there. The
dancing atoms whirled and whirled, until they be
came self-conscious, and thought, and reflected, andReviav of Herbert Spencer. 15
wrote their autobiography in the philosophy of Mr.
Spencer. I am not misrepresenting the theory.
Prof. Tyndall says of it :
&quot;
Strip it naked, and you
stand face to face with the notion that not only the
more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not
alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not
alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the
human body, but that the human mind itself emo
tion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena were
once latent in a fiery
cloud.&quot; *
Injhis evolution there
has been no guiding Mind, but only the working of
physical force. Mr. Spencer demands no purpose,
but only a power. One aim of his philosophy is to
show that a_n intelligent Creator is needless. He is
impatient of the doctrine that creation is the work
of wisdom, and calls it the
&quot;
carpenter theory.&quot; If
we consider the fact and function of reproduction,
which run through all organic nature, it would
seem that here is overwhelming proof of a purpose
to preserve the species ; but we are not allowed to
think so, on pain of being charged with &quot;fetichism.&quot;
If we think of the eye or ear as it forms in the
womb, it would seem that the power at work must
understand the laws of acoustics and optics, to form
these organs in such exact and complex accordance
with them. It would seem, too, that the formation
of these organs before they are needed indicates a
knowledge of future wants, and a purpose of supply-
*
&quot;
Fragments of Science,&quot; p. 159.16 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ing them
; but this belief also lies under the ban of
fetichism. We can hardly help believing that the
several organs were intended to perform those func
tions which they actually do perform ; but this
thought is only a species of the primitive fetichism.
The eyes are used to see with, but they were not
intended for seeing. The ears hear, but they were
not designed for hearing. We see and hear because
we have eyes and ears
; but we are forbidden to say
that eyes and ears exist in order that we may see.
The organs of reproduction serve to preserve the
species, but \hey were not made for any such end.
They were evolved and used for this purpose.
Every thing, no matter how complex and purpose-
tke in its adaptations, represents the working of a
power ; nothing whatever exhibits the fulfillment of
a purpose. &quot;The transformation of an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity into a definite, coherent
heterogeneity, which goes on every-where until it
brings about a reverse transformation, is consequent
upon certain simple laws of force.&quot;* Such is the
theory. To many it will seem to break down from
pure excess of absurdity. At present I make no
decision
; but I do insist that every one who is fond
of talking magniloquently about evolution should
know precisely what he has to prove.
Yet, strange as it may seem, Mr. Spencer denies
that his system is atheistic. The ground of the
*
&quot; First Principles,&quot; p. 495.Review of Herbert Spencer. 17
denial is his doctrine of an unknowable. But,
upon inquiry, it turns out that this unknowable is
merely the substance which underlies phenomena.
It has neither sense, intelligence, nor will. To
attribute these to it is a species of fetichism. Yet
Mr. Spencer dreams that he saves his system from
atheism by calling this thing God. We will not
quarrel about names. That which we know as mat
ter is set up as the cause of all things. This matter,
working according to mechanical laws, without intel
ligence or purpose, has produced the order of the
world about us. All spontaneous action is distinctly
repudiated. This is the doctrine
; and this is essen
tial atheism.
Mr. Spencer further denies that his system is
materialistic. The New Philosophy plumes itself
upon rising above the contest between the spiritual
ist and materialist, and pronounces the question to
be a war of words. The claim is the emptiest pre
tense.
&quot; That no idea or feeling arises save as a result
of some physical force expended in producing it, is
fast becoming a commonplace of science
; and .vho-
ever duly weighs the evidence will see that nothing
but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived
theory can explain its non-acceptance.&quot;
* That
mental force is but transformed physical force, is the
primary assumption. The mind itself is a
&quot; series
of states of consciousness
;&quot; and a state of conscious-
*
&quot; First Principles/ p. 280.1 8 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ness is a transformed nerve-current. Now note the
result. Without a nervous system there can be
no nerve-currents
; without nerve-currents there
can be no states of consciousness ; and without
states of consciousness there can be no mind. The
mind comes into existence with the organism, and
both perish together. During its existence, it is ab
solutely determined by external conditions
; for Mr.
Spencer denies volitional freedom in the most explicit
terms, and on the admitted ground that if freedom
be a fact it is fatal to his system. Now, it is rather
instructive, after such teaching, to be told that
&quot; the
explanations here given are no more materialistic
than they are spiritualistic.&quot; It is evident, however,
from the frequency and earnestness with which
Mr. Spencer makes this claim, that he really thinks
his petty word-distinctions save his system from
materialism. Yet, if the system which makes the
soul a product of organization that must, of course,
perish with the organism is not materialistic, it
would be hard to say what materialism is. Indeed,
this is the doctrine which most of the leaders of the
New Philosophy now openly avow, whether from
keener logical perception or from greater causes 1
cannot decide.
One more general criticism must be offered before
proceeding to a specific examination of this philos
ophy. Every system of evolution which is not
guided by intelligence is merely a new editionRevinv of Herbert Spencer. 19
of the time-honored theory of chance. In every
mechanical system, all the results depend upon the
first impulse, and between that primal motion and
its effects there is room for nothing but necessity.
However wide-spreading its effects may be, they
were all necessarily contained in that first motion.
Now, since to-day is determined by yesterday,
it
follows that all days were determined by the first
day ; and before this philosophy can assume to be
an explanation at all, it must account for that first
day. The implicit assumption of its disciples is,
that by the time we have reached the nebula, we
have come to a simple and unorganized form of mat
ter which needs no explanation. But here it must
be borne in mind that complexity and organization
do not cease where we fail to trace them. Upon
this point Prof. Tyndall speaks as follows :
&quot; It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that
between the microscopic limit and the molecular
limit there is room for infinite permutations and
combinations. It is in this region that the poles of
the atoms are arranged, that tendency is given to
their powers, so that when these poles and powers
have free action and proper stimulus in a suitable
environment, they determine first the germ and after
ward the complete organism. The first marshaling
of the atoms, upon which all subsequent action de
pends, baffles a keener power than that of the micro
scope. Through pure excess of complexity, and long20 Review of Herbert Spencer.
before observation can have any voice in the matter
the most highly-trained intellect, the most refined
and disciplined imagination, retires in bewilderment
from the contemplation of the problem. We are
struck dumb by an astonishment which no micro
scope can relieve, doubting not only the power of our
instrument, but even whether we ourselves possess
the intellectual elements which will enable us to grap
ple with the ultimate structural energies of nature.&quot; *
Prof. Tyndall here calls attention to a fact which
biologists and physiologists constantly overlook the
almost infinite complexity of what the microscope sees
as simple. Nothing is more common than to hear
physiologists, Mr. Spencer among the rest, speak of
germs as perfectly homogeneous, because the micro
scope detects no trace of organization ; and, indeed,
atheistic reasoning derives much of its plausibility
from this false assumption. If the complex animal
can be derived from the homogeneous germ, it is
not incredible that the complexity of creation should
be derived from the homogeneous nebula. But
Prof. Tyndall has taught us that homogeneity is
only in seeming ; that under the most homogeneous
surface there are structural energies of such com
plexity, that we must question whether we have the
mental elements which will enable us to grapple
with them. It was in that realm, inaccessible to
every thing but mind, that the wonders of creation
&quot;
Fragments of Science,&quot; p. 153.Review of Herbert Sp&amp;lt;-ncer. 21
were wrought out. The atheist s attempt to escape
into simplicity is fruitless. His very assumptions
forbid it. Because of the necessity which connects
cause and effect in every mechanical scheme, we
must conclude that all which exists now, existed
in its causes at any given time in the past. The
nebulous period really manifested no less intelli
gence and purpose than the present does ; the only
difference is, that what is explicit now was implicit
then. Going back to that nebulous time, we find
tendencies and laws and powers so balanced that
time alone is needed to give birth to the present
order. No matter how far back we go ; if we assume
that that nebula was the ruins of an earlier system,
which had in turn been born from an antecedent
nebula, still, at the earliest time, we find the exact
and complex adjustment of tendencies and powers
which must in time give birth to to-day. Looking
around upon that earliest nebula, we find that the
present was there
; and again we ask, What deter
mined that first day? what procured that primal
balance of poles and powers, which made it impos
sible that any thing but the existing order should be
born ? Here lies the mystery of creation ; nothing
is explained until this question is answered. It
must be either the work of wisdom or of chance ;
and if the work of chance, then all that has sprung
from it is the work of chance also. Mr. Spencer
denies that intelligence has any thing to do with22 Review of Herbert Spencer.
evolution
; it follows, then, that chance is the archi
tect of the universe. The vaporings about law and
order do indeed serve to give an aspect of freshness
to the threadbare arguments ; but they in no wise
alter the underlying philosophy. When we get tc
the naked form of Mr. Spencer s teaching, it is that
a cloud of atoms only need to be shaken together
long enough to hit upon the present order and har
mony of the universe. The New Philosophy is not
so new after all
; for, except in terminology, this is
precisely the doctrine which Democritus and Lucre
tius taught two thousand years ago. The only thing
which gives the new heresy greater plausibility than
the old, is the greater extension of the universe in
time. Who knows what might happen in eternity
?
To be sure, we do not find the atoms playing any
such tricks now
; but who knows what might not
have happened back yonder in the dark? Time
works wonders
; and so the evolutionist becomes
confused and giddy from the long cycles with which
he deals, and talks of &quot;untold
ages,&quot; as if time could
certainly correlate with intelligence. Because the
work of intelligence is not stolen outright, but by
piecemeal, the theft is allowed to escape notice. It
is the error of the old mythology over again. The
evolutionist gets the world upon the turtle s back
;
and then either he forgets to supply any footing for
the turtle, or else his faith becomes robust enough to
venture to stand alone.Revieiv of Herbert Spencer. 23
We are now able to determine the true nature of
the Spencerian doctrine of evolution. Whatever
Mr. Spencer s personal views may be, the doctrine of
his books is fatalism, materialism, atheism. These
words are not used as terms of opprobrium at all, but
as exactly descriptive of the system. There is no
personal God
; there is no immortal soul. There is
nothing but necessity without, and necessity within.
To be sure, this philosophy is fond of speaking of
progress, and talks, almost like a prophet, of the new
heaven and the new earth. But, nevertheless, the
progress ends in annihilation ; and all the wealth of
manhood and affection which has made history rich
and reverend, has dropped into darkness and per
ished. It is most instructive to hear materialism
boasting of the high destiny which awaits the race.
But it is not for the critic to get frightened at
results, but to ask for the credentials of the doctrine.
It does not follow that the theory is false because it
is materialistic and atheistic. We should indeed feel
saddened and degraded if it were established, but
that is no argument against
it. If the reasoning is
just, and the assumptions are well-founded, the doc
trine must stand, with all its dreadful consequences
These are the questions which we have now to
consider.24 Review of Herbert Spencer.
CHAPTER II.
LAWS OF THE UNKNOWABLE.
AyTR. SPENCER introduced his philosophy
-L*-&quot;- about ten years ago by the publication
of his &quot;First Principles.&quot; The volume is divided
into two parts
: the
&quot; Laws of the Unknowable,&quot;
and the &quot;Laws of the Knowable.&quot; Part I aims
to determine the true sphere of all rational inves
tigation, and, by so doing, to save the speculative
mind from wasting its strength upon barren and
essentially insoluble problems. The conclusion
reached is that we can know nothing but phe
nomena, and their relations of coexistence and suc
cession. Reality lies beyond the reach of our
faculties, and is essentially unknowable.
When this work first appeared it was received
with considerable applause, even by religious think
ers. Mr. Spencer admitted the reality of religion,
and insisted upon the existence of God. To be
sure, God, as the essential reality of the universe,
must be unknowable
; but still, as such reality, Mr.
Spencer insisted upon the Divine existence as the
most fundamental datum of science, as well as of
religion. In this respect the work was an agree-Review of Herbert Spenee/. 25
able change upon the open war, and scarcely un
disguised atheism, of such men as Comte. It had,
too, an aspect of humility. It set a limit to many
extravagant speculations by declaring the limited
nature of our faculties. These things moved many
theologians to look upon the work as a flag of truce
sent out from a hitherto hostile camp ; and they
failed to see that the concessions to religion
amounted to absolutely nothing, while the de
mands from it were such as to render true piety
impossible. Mr. Spencer s &quot;reconciliation&quot; was ef
fected by the destruction of one of the parties, and
his peace was that of death. A God who must
always remain x for thought and conscience has no
more religious value than a centaur or a sea-serpent.
Not that Mr. Spencer intended this result when
he introduced this Trojan horse ; but such is, never
theless, the outcome of the doctrine. In its relig
ious aspects this theory of nescience is as per
nicious as any in all speculation ; more so, even, than
the hardy, old-fashioned atheism, because it is
more decorous in appearance, and more specious
in argument, while the two are identical in the final
result. The first is a precipice, bold and naked,
over which one may plunge if he chooses, but not
unconsciously ; the second is the same precipice
covered over with snow, not strong enough to save
one from the abysses, but powerful by its seeming
safety to lure one to destruction.26 Review of Herbert Spencer.
In passing to an examination D Mr. Spencer s
reasoning I must bespeak the readers patience.
The discussion will lead us into many metaphys
ical recesses
; and the country through which we
take our way is surely as dry as Sahara, if, indeed,
it be not full as barren.
This know-nothing doctrine is as old as philoso
phy, but the philosophy of the doctrine has changed
with time. Formerly the difficulty was external,
now it is internal.
&quot; We cannot know any thing,&quot;
the old skeptics used to say, &quot;because as much,
and as good, evidence can be brought against any
proposition or belief as for it
; and hence the mind
must remain in eternal balance between two opin
ions.&quot; But the fault was in the evidence, not in
the mind. If there were any reality to know, the
mind was clearly competent to apprehend it
; but
is there any reality to know ? This was the ques
tion with them
; and they held that in every case
the contradictions of the testimony so embarrassed
the jury as to render necessary the Scotch verdict
not proven.
Now, all this has changed. The difficulty is no
longer external, but internal. The criticism of fact
has been exchanged for the criticism of faculty.
The nescientist no longer inquires whether reality
exists, but contents himself with the humbler ques
tion, whether we have any faculties for knowing-
it, supposing it to exist? As the result of hisReview of Herbert S fencer. 27
inventory, mental limits have been discovered, and
all knowledge of the real is said to be beyond
them. The grounds of nescience are much more
fundamental than the old know-nothings dreamed.
By the constitution of the mind itself we are for
ever prohibited from reaching reality. Phenomena
are all we know
; and these, when analyzed to the
bottom, can never give us things as they are, or
&quot;things in themselves.&quot; Between appearances, or
things as we know them, and the hidden reality
behind them, an impassable gulf is fixed.
This form of nescience began with Kant. He
taught that there are forms of thought and sensi
bility in the mind which determine the form of
our knowledge, something as a mold gives shape
to a casting. The matter of any thing, as an iron
ball, is one thing
; the form is quite another. So the
content, or matter of our knowledge, is given by the
thing ; but the form, which is entirely different, is
given by the mind itself. And as the same matter
can be molded into a thousand different forms, can
be round, square, triangular, etc. : so the same exter
nal reality can take on different shapes, according as
it is cast in different mental molds. Hence all our
knowledge is a composite, of which the two factors
are, the external thing, and the internal form. What
the thing is apart from this form, or what it is
&quot; in
itself,&quot; is, and must be to use the established phrase
&quot; unknown and unknowable.&quot; Moreover, as it is28 Review of Herbert Spencer.
conceivable that other orders of intelligence should
. differ from the human, we can never be sure that our
knowledge has universal validity. We think things
in the relation of cause and effect, of substance and
attribute, etc.
; but these relations are only forms of
our thought, and correspond to no reality in the
thing. We cannot help assenting to the so-called
intuitions, not because they represent the universal
truths of the universe, but because they constitute
the skeleton of the mind itself. They uphold the
mind and give law to its tendencies ; but so far from
revealing reality to us, they rather lead us away from
it. Their very necessity stamps them as mental
forms, and their utterances become untrustworthy
in proportion as they are sure. Hence our knowl
edge is of phenomena only, and is true only for us
;
at least, we can never be sure that it is true for other
orders of being. The windows of the human mind
are of stained glass, and the inhabitant within is
forever cut off from the white light of reality beyond.
These are the essential features of the Kantian
theory ; and the doctrine of relativity, upon which
Mr. Spencer relies for the support of his view, is but
a degraded form of the same. This later form of the
doctrine, as it appears in the works of Hamilton,
Mansel, and Spencer, has far less logical and meta
physical value than the earlier form as taught by Kant.
In Kant s works, one commonly finds both good
sense, and good logic. The arguments are not mere-Review of Herbert Spencer. 29
ly logical, but real. We may not admit their validity,
but at the same time we feel that they have a genuine
momentum, and are not a logical play on words. In
deed, if Kant could have saved his system from Ideal
ism, it would have been well-nigh impregnable. But
in passing to the relativity philosophy, one is sensible
of a marked change in this respect. There seems to
be a kind of intellectual shuffling going on
; a play







There is an air of jugglery and thimble-rigging
over the whole. This makes one regard many ot
the conclusions as he does the celebrated one, that
each cat has three tails, or that the minute-hand of
a watch can never overtake the hour-hand ; to dis
prove them may be difficult, but to believe them is
impossible. We certainly see the ghost according to
programme ; but we cannot rid ourselves of the con
viction that concave mirrors and magic lanterns are
at the bottom of the show. Kant shows us real ex
istences fighting, the relativist shows us shadows
These indulge in the most dazzling fence, and cleave
each other through and through ; but no blood is
drawn, and nobody is hurt.
Armed with a knowledge of our mental limits, Mr.
Spencer, following in the wake of Hamilton and
Mansel, proceeds to charge all our familiar concep
tions with involving contradictions and intellectual
hari-kari. A further analysis of our faculties reveals30 Review of Herbert Spencer.
to his searching gaze a pack of intellectual impostors
who, by some hocus-pocus, have contrived to shuffle
themselves into such universal acceptance, that most
men regard them as necessary truths. But these
villains are usurpers nevertheless
; and having the
bad taste to contradict our philosopher, they very
naturally excite his wrath. He at once brands them
as
&quot;
pseud-ideas,&quot; keeps them just long enough to give
evidence against themselves which is assumed to be
the only true evidence they can give and then turns
them out of doors. We notice that they are contin
ually smuggled in to help the prosecution, but are for
bidden to say a word for the defense. This is the last
feather. After being convicted of harboring
&quot;
pseud-
ideas,&quot; the mind feels the propriety of being humble
For the present our only hope is that, as these neces
sary truths, alias pseud-ideas, are such liars, they
may have lied when they spoke against themselves.
The authority for this summary ejection seems to be
that these truths cannot be pictured by the imagi
nation, and hence are &quot;unthinkable,&quot; and incon
ceivable.&quot; The test of the knowable is its ability to
come before the representative faculty. Whatever
can do this may be admitted to the rank of real
ity ; whatever cannot thus appear is banished into
the outer darkness of illusions and
&quot;
pseud-ideas.&quot;
Horsed upon this test of knowledge, Mr. Spencer
gallops gayly out of the a priori country, but, like
the famous John Gilpin, is carried farther than heReview of Herbert Spencer. 3 1
cares to go, before he dismounts. Can any thing be
more mocking to an exact thinker, than this claim
that nothing shall be admitted to the rank of knowl
edge, which cannot come before the representative
faculty
? What is the image of force ? or of cause ?
of law ? or of existence ? Yet these, and a multitude
of other ideas, all absolutely without the imagination,
do constantly enter into the exactest reasonings, each
keeping its own place without any danger, nay, with
out any possibility, of being confounded with any




enter is only illu
sion ? If we do, then science, as well as religion,
must vanish into the dreams of night. This test of
Mr. Spencer s reduces all knowledge to the scale of
sensation, and makes science itself impossible. For
observation and experiment constitute a very small
portion of scientific knowledge. The greater part is
only inference from observed facts, and depends upon
the validity of our belief in causation. Science
deals with forces, and causes, and laws, and space,
and time ; these words are forever upon its lips. But
what does the imagination know about forces, and
causes, and laws ? All these ideas are utterly with
out the imagination, and are strictly inconceivable,
in the sense that no mental image can be formed of
them. It follows, then, that science, which is built
entirely upon these ideas, is blank illusion, and must
be content to vanish, along with religion, into the32 Review of Herbert Spencer.
abysses of the unknowable. If involving unthink
able ideas warrants the banishment of religion, it
also warrants the repudiation of science. If Mr.
Spencer insists upon this test we need go no further.
Sensation is the measure of knowledge, and his phi





without mercy ; but in his
enthusiasm has, unfortunately, mowed off his own
legs. After we have gone further into Mr. Spencer s
work, we shall not be surprised at any thing in the
way of contradiction
; but at present it seems strange
that he should have adopted such a test without per
ceiving that it tells as powerfully against science as
against religion. Besides, too, it is plainly false
; the
conceivable, in his sense of the word, does not com
prise all the knowable
; indeed, the most certain
knowledge we have is what Hamilton has most hap
pily termed the
&quot;
unpicturable notions of the intelli
gence.&quot; Mr. Spencer says large numbers are incon
ceivable
; but that does not shake our faith in our
calculations. Great magnitudes fail of an adequate
conception, but our knowledge is none the less sure.
The infinity of space baffles and breaks down the im
agination, but is an assured fact of the understanding.
Self-existence, Mr. Spencer says, is an inconceiv
ability of the first magnitude, and all ideas into which
it enters must be sentenced to perpetual imprison
ment in the unknowable
; yet we have no surer
piece of knowledge than that there is self-existenceReview of Herbert Spencet. 33
somewhere. Whenever the intellect is steadied and
focussed for exact statement, it affirms, with the
utmost certainty, that all we see finds its support and
reality in an existence within it, or beyond it, which is
self-centered and abiding. The truths of the under
standing are not the truths of the imagination ; and
it is the neglect of this fact which lies at the bottom
of Kant s antinomies, Hamilton s contradictions, and
the general assortment of inconceivabilities which Mr.
Spencer tries to saddle upon our reason.
A good illustration of the value of this test, is
given in his criticism of the atheistic, pantheistic,
and theistic theories of the origin of the universe.
Mr. Spencer believes that there is a tone of truth
even in the falsest creed, and that every creed, if ana
lyzed, would be found to agree in something, even
with its seeming contradiction.
&quot; To doubt this
would be to discredit too profoundly the average
human intelligence.&quot; Hence, if we should lay aside
from the various creeds all that is peculiar to each, and
find that in which they all agree, this common article
of faith would possess the very highest claim to our ac
ceptance. Accordingly he summons the atheist, pan
theist, and theist, in turn, to appear for examination.
Between atheist and theist, it would seem a hope
less task to look for common ground ; something
like harmonizing yes and no in some higher unity.
But great is logic, and Mr. Spencer proves equal to
the task. The result of the examination is the proof34 Review of Herbert Spencer.
that
&quot; not only is no current hypothesis tenable, but
also that no tenable hypothesis can be framed.&quot; The
&quot; soul of truth,&quot; existing in these diverse statements,
turns out to be that none of the parties know any
thing about the matter. This is what they have
always been trying to say, but were never abie lo
enunciate it until Mr. Spencer helped them. An om
nipresent mystery behind the universe, unexplained
and unexplainable, is the ultimate religious truth in
which all conflicting creeds agree.
What now is the reason for involving atheist, pan
theist, and theist, in a common condemnation ? It
is that they all postulate the inconceivable idea of
self-existence. Each view assumes either the crea
tion or the Creator to be self-existent
; and hence all
are equally untenable.
&quot;
Differing so widely as they
seem to do, the atheistic, pantheistic, and theistic
hypotheses contain the same ultimate element. It is
impossible to avoid making the assumption of self-
existence somewhere : and whether that assumption
be made nakedly, or under complicated disguises, it
is equally vicious, equally unthinkable.&quot; P. 36.
I suspect that neither atheist, pantheist, nor theist
would be seriously dismayed by this argument. For
whether it be unthinkable or not, it is one of the
strongest affirmations of the reason that there is
self-existence somewhere
; the question between the
theist and his opponents being, where that existence
is to be found. It is in the material universe, sayof Herbert Spencer. 35
the atheist and pantheist. That cannot be, says the
theist. The visible universe bears every mark of
dependence ; there must be some being apart from





if we admit that there can be something
uncaused there is no reason to assume a cause for
any thing.&quot; P. 37. &quot;Those who cannot conceive a
self-existent universe, and who therefore assume a
creator of the universe, take for granted that they
can conceive a self-existent Creator. The mystery
which they recognize in this great fact surrounding
them on every side, they transfer to an alleged
source of this great fact, and then suppose they
have solved the mystery.&quot; P. 35.
&quot;
Lastly, even
supposing that the genesis of the universe could
Feally be represented in thought as the result of an
external agency, the mystery would be as great as
ever
; for there would arise the question, How came
there to be an external agency?&quot; P. 35. These
statements would have some force if the law of cau
sation committed us to the absurdity of an infinite
series. If every thing must have a cause, then
causes themselves must have causes, and so on in
endless regression. In that case it would be as well
to break the chain in one place as in another
; and
it would be strictly true that
&quot;
if there can be any
thing uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause
for any thing.&quot; But the law of causation commits
us to no such absurdity as an infinite series of causes.36 Review of Herbert Spencer.
It is not existence, as such, that demands a causo,
but a changing existence. Could the universe be
brought to a standstill so that all change should
cease, the demand for a cause would never arise. It
is entrance and exit only that give rise to this de
mand. Whatever manifests them must have its
cause, whatever does not manifest them can dispense
with a cause. Mr. Spencer s claim that
&quot; Did there
exis: nothing but an immeasurable void, explanation
would be needed as much as now,&quot; is a mistake. It
is change that suggests causation, the changeless is
independent and eternal The dependent suggests
the independent, and when the mind has reached
that, it rests. Mr. Spencer himself believes this. He
cannot rest in the phenomena of the visible universe,
but insists upon a fundamental reality behind them
as their abiding cause. And that, too, after telling
us that,
&quot; If we admit there can be any thing un
caused, there is no reason to assume a cause for
any thing.&quot; Surely this fundamental reality is an
intruder if the dictum be true. One or the other
must leave forthwith. If the dictum goes, Mr.
Spencer s argument against a self-existent Creator
falls to the ground ; if the fundamental reality is dis
carded, the bottom falls out of his philosophy. And
now, since the visible universe is but a vast aggre
gation of events, of entrances into and exits from
existence, let the reader judge whether Mr. Spencer
is justified in dismissing the atheistic, pantheistic,Review of Herbert Spencer. 37
and theistic hypotheses as equally untenable ; or
whether the theist is right in passing behind the
seen and temporal to the unseen and eternal. Sure
ly the suicidal proclivities of Mr. Spencer s test of
knowledge should be restrained. We have before
found it mowing off its own legs, and here it insists
upon biting off its own nose. For Mr. Spencer ap
parently believes that his &quot;fundamental reality&quot; is
self-existent ; which assumption, by his own reason
ing, makes the &quot;fundamental reality&quot; an untenable
hypothesis,&quot; involving
&quot;
symbolic conclusions of the
illegitimate
order.&quot; We surely are in a sad pre
dicament here. We cannot call the
&quot; fundamental
reality&quot; uncaused, for Mr. Spencer says that,
&quot; If we
admit that any thing can be uncaused, there is no
reason to assume a cause for any thing.&quot; But we
cannot call it caused, for then it would not be the
fundamental reality any longer. For the same rea
son we cannot call it dependent ; but we cannot call
it independent, for that involves the idea of self-
existence, which would make it an
&quot; untenable hy
pothesis.&quot; The beauty of the reasoning will perhaps
be better appreciated if we see the arguments side
by side.
Whatever involves the idea Whatever involves the idea
of self-existence, is an untenable of self-existence, is an untenable
hypothesis. hypothesis.
God involves the idea of self- The fundamental reality in-
existence. volves the idea of self-existence.
God is an untenable hypoth- The fundamental reality is not
esis. an untenable hypothesis.38 Review of Herbert Sf^ncer.
The logic is not the best, to be sure, but the gen
eralship is of the very highest order. The only
explanation I can think of is, that Mr. Spencer has
one kind of logic for religious ideas, and another
kind for his own a view which the internal evi
dence seems to support.
As the result of his criticism of scientific and relig
ious ideas, Mr. Spencer concludes that a &quot;fundamental
reality&quot; underlies the universe, and that this is &quot;un
known and unknowable.&quot; Religion ends in mystery,
science ends in mystery ; and our highest knowledge
is to recognize that this mystery is utterly inscrutable.
To prove that this mystery lies utterly without
the limits of knowledge, Mr. Spencer appeals to the




If, when walking through the fields some day in
September, you hear a rustle some yards in advance,
and on observing the ditch side where it occurs, see
the herbage agitated, you will probably turn toward
the spot to learn by what this sound and motion are
produced. As you approach there flutters into the
ditch a partridge, on seeing which your curiosity is
satisfied you have what you call an explanation of
the appearances. The explanation, mark, amounts
to this : that whereas throughout you have had
countless experiences of disturbances among small
stationary bodies, accompanying the movements ofReview of Herbert Spencer. 39
other bodies among them, and have generalized the
relation between such disturbances and such move
ments, you consider this particular disturbance ex
plained on finding it to present an instance of the
like relation. Suppose you catch the partridge, and,
wishing to ascertain why it did not escape, examine
it, and find at one spot a slight trace of blood upon
its feathers. You now understand, as you say, what
has disabled the partridge. It has been wounded by
a sportsman adds another case to the many cases
already seen by you, of birds being killed or injured
by the shot discharged at them from fowling-pieces.
And in assimilating this case to other such cases
consists your understanding of it. But now, on con
sideration, a difficulty suggests itself. Only a single
shot has struck the partridge, and that not in a vital
place ; the wings are uninjured, as are also those
muscles which move them, and the creature proves
by its struggles that it still has abundant strength.
Why, then, you inquire of yourself, does it not fly
?
Occasion favoring, you put the question to an anat
omist, who furnishes you with a solution. He points
out that this solitary shot has passed close to the
place at which the nerve supplying the wing-muscles
of one side diverges from the spine ; and that a
sligh injury to the nerve, extending even to the
rupture of a few fibers, may, by preventing a perfect
co-ordination in the action of the two wings, destroy
the power of flight. You are no longer puzzled. Buf4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
what has happened ? what has changed your state
from one of perplexity to one of comprehension f
Simply the disclosure of a class of previously known
cases along with which you can include this case.
The connection between lesions of the nervous sys
tem and paralysis of limbs has been already many
times brought under your notice
; and here you find
a relation of cause and effect that is essentially sim
ilar.&quot; P. 69. Mr. Spencer claims, justly enough, that
all scientific explanations are of this order
; they are
but classifications of particular facts under one more
general. Thus we explain the sinking of a stone,
the floating of a cork, the fall of heavy bodies, the
rise of a balloon, the flow of the rivers, the swell
of the tides, and the motion of the planets, all, by
referring them to the general fact of gravitation.
This is the nature of all scientific explanations. But
clearly such a process must come to an ultimate fact
at last which cannot be included in any other, and
so remain unexplained and unexplainable.
&quot; For
if the successively deeper interpretations of nature,
which constitute advancing knowledge, are mere
inclusions of special truths in general truths, and
of general truths in truths still more general ; it ob
viously follows that the most general truth, not ad
mitting of inclusion in any other, does not admit of
interpretation. Manifestly, as the most general cog
nition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a
more general one, it cannot be understood. Of ne-Rcviav of Herbert S fencer. 4
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cessity, therefore, explanation must inevitably bring
us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth we
can get at must be unaccountable. Comprehension
must become something other than comprehension
before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.&quot;
-P. 73-
Mr. Spencer s argument proves an unexplainable,
not an unknowable ; for, though we cannot give the
rationale of that final fact, by the supposition, we
know it as a fact. To return to our illustration, the
essential nature of gravitation is a profound mystery ;
but gravitation as a fact, the law of its variation, the
truth that it includes all the particular facts mentioned,
all these things science regards as established be
yond question. Clearly, the incomprehensible may
be known as a fact, and its laws and relations may
also constitute a part of our most assured knowledge.
Mr. Spencer s conclusion is the extremely common
place one, that argument and all explanation post
ulate something as their foundation or support. I
admit most cheerfully that explanation must assume
the unexplainable, or independent ; but I deny that
this unexplainable is the unknowable. Our own ex
istence is wrapped in the profoundest mystery, but
that does not destroy the fact that we have a large
knowledge of human nature. No more can Mr.
Spencer argue from the mystery of the Divine
existence, to our necessary ignorance of the Divine
nature.42 Review of Plerbert Spencer.
Mr. Spencer, however, has great faith in this argu
ment, and advances it again in the following form :
&quot;
Every complete act of consciousness, besides
distinction and relation, also implies likeness. Be
fore it can become an idea, or constitute a piece of
knowledge, a mental state must not only be known
as not only separate in kind from certain foregoing
states to which it is known as related by succession,
but it must be known as of the same kind with cer
tain other foregoing states. ... In brief, a true cog
nition is possible only through an accompanying
recognition. Should it be objected that, if so, there
cannot be a first cognition, and hence no cognition,
the reply is, that cognition proper arises gradually
that during the first stage of incipient intelligence,
before the feelings produced by intercourse with the
world have been put in order, there are no cognitions,
strictly so called ; and that, as every infant shows us,
these slowly emerge out of the confusion of unfolding
consciousness as fast as these experiences are ar
ranged into groups as fast as the most frequently
repeated sensations, and their relations to each other,
become familiar enough to admit of their recognition,
as such or such, whenever they recur. Should it be
further objected, that if cognition presupposes recog
nition there can be no cognition even by an adult, of
an object never before seen, there is still the sufficient
answer, that in so far as it is not assimilated to pre
viously-seen objects it is not known, and it is knownReview of Herbert Spencer. 43
in so far as it is assimilated to them. Of this para
dox the interpretation is, that an objeet is classifiable
in various ways, with various degrees of complete
ness. An animal hitherto unknown (mark the word),
though not referable to any established species or
genus, is yet recognized as belonging to one of the
larger divisions mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes
;
or should it be so anomalous that its alliance with
any of these is not determinate, it may yet be classed
as vertebrate or invertebrate
; or if it be one of those
organisms of which it is doubtful whether the ani
mal or vegetal characteristics predominate, it is still
known as a living body; even should it be ques
tioned whether it is organic, it remains beyond ques
tion that it is a material object, and is cognized by
being recognized as such. Whence it is manifest
that a thing is perfectly known only when it is in all
respects like certain things previously observed
; that
in proportion to the number of respects in which it
is unlike them, is the extent to which it is unknown
;
and that hence, when it has absolutely no attribute in
common with any thing else, it must be absolutely
beyond the bounds of knowledge.&quot; P. 79.
To the objection that if a true cognition implies
recognition, there can be no first cognition, and hence
no cognition, Mr. Spencer s reply that cognition
proper arises gradually, is entirely inadequate. If
all cognition presupposes recognition, then a first
cognition is a manifest impossibility. Recognition,44 Review of Herbert Spencer.
being cognition over again, must of necessity follow
upon cognition ; but cognition must also follow rec
ognition ; that is, each must follow the other, and
hence both are impossible. But Mr. Spencer escapes
from this dilemma by teaching that cognition proper
arises gradually in childhood ; and thus we get the
raw material for future cognitions. But if cognition
proper arises gradually in childhood, why may it not
arise gradually in manhood as well ? Mr. Spencer s
answer to the objection is a good specimen of a
favorite method with the associational psychologists.
Whenever one of their fundamental assumptions is
contradicted by the experience of manhood, it is easy
to say that in infancy a period of which any thing
can be affirmed, since nothing is remembered it
was strictly true. This is certainly making the most
of the early years. The
&quot; small child&quot; is put into the
associational mill, and after a little brisk grinding is
brought out with a complete set of mental furniture.
When the critic reaches the spot he is blandly told
that the work is done, and the machinery put away.
He is further warned that any search on his part will
be useless ; as the traces of manufacture have been
entirely obliterated.
The argument of the quotation just made is the
fallacy we have already examined the confounding
the unexplainable, or unclassifiable, with the un
knowable. Plainly, we can only give the rationale
of classifiable facts, for explanation is only classifica-Review of Herbert Spencer. 45
tion ; but the facts must be known as facts before
they can be classified. A thing in which we detect
no likeness to other things is not an unknowable,
but an unclassified thing. When we are enabled to
classify a body of heterogeneous facts, we get a
knowledge of their relations to each other, but no
new knowledge of them as facts. To say that such
facts can only be cognized by being recognized as
matter, is to deny- them to our perceptive faculties,
and delude ourselves into thinking that this is a fail
ure of the knowing power.
As a philosophical doctrine this relativity theory
is not well-defined. It is, in fact, a combination of
several doctrines, some of which are not only true,
but truisms ; while the rest look marvelously like
something
&quot;
pseud.&quot; We have already had some con
fused illustrations of it, let us examine it further.
Sometimes it means that we can only know things
as related to ourselves, that is, that we have only
such knowledge as our faculties can give us. In one
sense this is axiomatic. All knowledge implies a
thing to be known, and a faculty for knowing it.
Clearly, then, we can know only those things, or
properties of things, which are related or adjusted to
our faculties. An eye could not see sound
; an ear
could not hear vision. It is said that there are
sounds of so high a pitch as to be above the limits
of our hearing, and others again of so low a pitch as
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to be below them. Our knowledge of sound then is
relative we hear only those notes which are properly
related to the ear. It is very conceivable that there
should be organisms which could perceive sounds
that range far above the limits of our hearing, and
perhaps none of those which we hear. Now, in each
case, the knowledge of sound is relative ; but are we
to say in such a case that neither party knows any
thing about sound ? Two men stand on the shore
and look seaward. One has stronger eyesight than
the other, and hence the range of vision is relative
;
but the fact of vision is none the less real. Certainly
it would not be claimed, because one sees farther
than the other, that both see nothing. Plainly,
nescience finds no support from this interpretation
of the doctrine of relativity. Let there be other be
ings than men, and let their faculties far outrun ours,
or be altogether different from ours, the fact casts no
discredit on what knowledge our faculties do give us.
Again, the doctrine sometimes reads : We cannot
know pure being that is, being without attributes
but only the attributes of being.
This, I conceive, is not an exact statement of our
knowledge. It is not true that we know attributes
alone, but rather, we know being as possessing attri
butes. Thus, we do not know redness, hardness,
squareness, but a red, hard, square thing. All our
knowledge begins with a knowledge of things ; and
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in abstract thinking that a knowledge of attributes
becomes possible. But let the doctrine stand as
stated, still nescience derives no support from it.
We cannot know pure being for the sufficient reason,
that there is no such thing to know. All this talk
about pure being arises from a pernicious habit into
which thinkers fall, of thinking that whatever can be
separated in thought, can also be separated in fact.
A beam has an upper and lower side, either of which
can be thought of separately, but no beam can exist
without both sides. Being without attributes, is as
.mpossible as a stick without two ends
; and to argue





supposing such a fiction to exist, we cheerfully ad
mit that we can know nothing about it
; nor need
one be much distressed at the loss. Matter or spirit,
the finite or the infinite, apart from their properties
or powers, excite very little curiosity in our mind.
Imagine a metaphysical engineer who, knowing how
his engine is made, how it works, what it can do, etc.,
should say that this is no knowledge at all, and insist
upon knowing the &quot;absolute&quot; engine, or engine
&quot;in
itself.&quot; But if any one still believes that pure being
is not pure nonsense, and is grieved at his inability
to know it, be it far from me to disturb, or speak
lightly of, so profound a sorrow. For myself, how
ever, if the relativist will allow me to know, not being
in itself, but the powers, the properties of being, I48 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
am content. The attributes of being are its mani
festations ; and this proposition that we cannot know
pure being amounts to the harmless truism, that un-
manifested being must remain unknown.
These forms of the relativity doctrine give no sup
port to nescience, and are but laborious attempts to
establish the truisms, that all knowledge must be re
lated to our faculties, and that whatever is not thus
related cannot come into knowledge ; both of which
might have been admitted beforehand ; but to establish
his theory, Mr. Spencer must deny that our faculties
give us the real properties of being, or the objective
reality of things. This is what he means
; and this
is the tacit assumption of his entire argument.
Mr. Spencer is not an idealist. He insists as
strongly upon the existence of a fundamental reality
as upon our ignorance of its nature.
&quot; It is rigor
ously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a
knowledge of appearances only, without at the same
time conceiving a reality of which they are appear
ances
; for appearance without reality is unthink
able.&quot; P. 88. Now, it seems to me that this know-
nothing position is the most untenable possible ; that





as to push the rout too far, and in
attempting to drive them into the abysses, has himself
tumbled in after them. The claim that all we know is
unreal, and that all we do not know is real, looks veryReview of Herbert Spencer. 49
much like an
&quot; untenable hypothesis.&quot; We have already
seen what cruel contradiction the fundamental reality
suffers from Mr. Spencer s own logic
: I wish now to
show that Mr. Spencer must either go farther, or not
so far
; that he must either adopt absolute idealism,
or admit the objective validity of our knowledge of
things. To deny a thing to thought, and save it to
existence, is impossible ; for to risk a logical para
dox nothing which is said to exist can be declared
unknowable until something is known about it. To
be unknowable it must fulfill certain conditions, and
have certain marks to distinguish it from the know-
able ; and unless one assumes a knowledge of its
nature, he cannot declare it unknowable. In his
present position this modern Samson parallels the
ancient by pulling the temple on his own head.
In the statement that our faculties do not give us
the objective reality of things, we recognize at once
the mental forms of Kant. Let us see the logical
result of such teaching.
Matter is said to have form
; has it really form ?
It has for us, says the know-nothing, but it has no
form in itself. Some higher intelligence might see
it as formless. Then the form which I attribute to
it is a phantom of my own creation.
Matter is said to resist
; has it really any such
power
? Again, the answer is, that matter
&quot; in itself&quot;
has no such power. We must conclude, then, that
the resistance of matter is a fiction of the mind that50 Review of Herbert Spencer.
affirms it
; as ghosts exist only in the eye that sees
them.
The line of argument is evident. We have but to
call up in turn the various attributes of matter, and
win from the know-nothing the confession that all we
think we find in matter is but the shadow of the
mind itself. But how, then, do we know that there is
any &quot;fundamental
reality,&quot; or &quot;thing in itself?&quot; If
all that we do know is imaginary, there seems to be
no good reason for supposing that all we do not know
is real. If mental limits, or mental forms, can create
so much, it is very credible that they can create the -
thing outright.
But it is urged, in reply, the same thing produces
diverse effects upon different organisms ; and as the
reality cannot be like all the reports given of it, it is
most reasonable to suppose it like none of them.
White light falling on different objects has no tend
ency to make them all of the same color, but rather
makes the particular color of each more vivid : the
blue becomes bluer, the green becomes greener, etc.
If we suppose persons to have eyes that see only
blue or green, their judgment would undoubtedly be,
every thing is blue or green. Now here we have an
illustration of the unknown reality (white light) pro
ducing effects altogether diverse from itself and from
each other, (blue light, green light.)
There are a few stock objections of this kind which
are of as much value to the know-nothing as the.Review of Herbert Spencer. 5 *
k&amp;lt; small child
&quot;
is to the associational psychologist, or
as the charges of &quot;fetichism,&quot; &quot;anthropomorphism,&quot;
and &quot;bibliolatry,&quot; are to the theological iconoclast.
But they amount to nothing. Supposing such a
queer lot of eyes to exist, where is the contradiction ?
If light is said to be blue, green, etc., it is only the
truth : light is blue and green. The error would be
in affirming it to be only blue or green. If this error
be avoided, there is no contradiction, and no ground
for nescience. It is only saying that one eye is
adapted to the blue ray, and the other to the green.
The same reasoning applies to the other objections
which the know-nothing is in the habit of urging
against the truth of the senses. His hypothetical
senses, which are to give such different reports of
things, would in no wise impair the credibility of the
faculties which we actually have. As a result of
these considerations, I hold that he must either
advance or retreat. If mental forms can create so
much, they can create all. If the known has no root
in reality, the unknown has surely no better claim.
Between absolute idealism and the admission that
our knowledge of things is real, there is no middle
ground. No mental form, and no relativity of thought,
can bridge the bottomless pit between.
But do you mean to say that you have an
&quot; abso
lute&quot; knowledge of things
? that you know the thing
&quot;in itself?&quot; What an &quot;absolute&quot; knowledge, etc.,
may be, I am not entirely certain. I only mean to5 2 Review of Herbert Spencer.
say that what we seem to find in a thing is really
there
; that we know the thing as it is. There may
be other beings whose faculties may present the
same thing to them under an altogether different
aspect ; but in every case the particular aspect which
the faculties do present represents the thing as it is.
We see a thing as square; there may be beings
whose faculties do not enable them to apprehend
form, but all beings who can appreciate form see
that thing as square. The squareness belongs to
the thing. We measure the speed of the light, and
the distances, and magnitudes of the stars
; possibly
some orders of intelligence might be incapable of ap
preciating these ideas, but, for all who can, they re
main the same. This is what is meant by saying




reality,&quot; etc., in the way in which the terms are
used, is really the very pseudest of pseud-ideas.
Here is a table which has legs, leaves, top, cover, etc.
This is beyond question, this is the thing, and this
is the whole of it. If there be any ghostly, abso-
lute-fundamental-reality-thing-in-itself table lurking
around the real one, I am happy to admit that I
know nothing about it. What do you mean by the
thing
&quot; in
itself,&quot; apart from the thing as it appears ?
How do you know that there is any thing
&quot;in itself,&quot;
as distinguished from the phenomenal thing ? This
&quot; in itself&quot; is simply a word-ghost which has beenReview of Herbert Spencer. 53
allowed to make a great deal of disturbance, but
which vanishes when interrogated. Our claim, then,
is, that what we see in things is really in them, and
that a denial of this truth leads inevitably to what
Mr. Spencer calls the
&quot; insanities of idealism.&quot; His
claim that it is impossible to get rid of the conscious
ness of
&quot; an actuality lying behind appearances,&quot; and
that
&quot; from this impossibility results our indestructi
ble belief in that actuality, (p. 97,) will in no wise
save him from the abysses. We have an irrepressi
ble belief that we see things as they are
; and if we
could get rid of one belief, we could easily get rid of
the other. The law of thought which warrants the
existence of a thing, warrants also the assertion of
something about it. The fundamental reality must
either come into knowledge, or go out of existence.
But in insisting upon the validity of our knowledge
of matter, it is not meant that we know all about it.
As we have seen, all knowledge implies both a thing
to know, and a faculty for knowing it. For sight or
sound, there must be both the external vibration and
the adapted organ. It is very credible that new
senses, or even an intensifying of our present facul
ties, should reveal to us properties now unknown.
An eminent physicist has remarked, that the air still
retains every sound intrusted to it since the begin
ning, and that could our hearing be made more acute
we might recover again every sound and word that
has ever floated out on the airy tides. All about us54 Review of Herbert Spencer.
there may be forms of being and of beauty, and
melodies of unknown harmony, all unseen and un
heard, because they do not come within the range of
our present powers. Matter may have a million as
pects of which we can form no idea
; of these we say
nothing. But whatever sides it may or may not
have, it certainly has those which we see. To be
sure, we know only phenomena or appearances two
words which are saturated with illusion hut then
things appear as they are, and not as they are not.
Indeed, why should it not be so
? Why not perceive
the very thing, instead of some phantom which has
no likeness to it whatever ?
The same general observation is to be made con
cerning the laws of pure thought, to which this same
form of relativity has been applied. We always
think things in certain relations, as one or many, as
substance or attribute, as cause or effect, as necessary
or contingent. These are the categories, the neces
sary affirmations of the human mind. They consti
tute the foundation of our knowledge, and the law of
all our thinking. But the know-nothing says that
these, while true for us, may not be true for other
orders of being. I admit that they may be unknown,
and hence inapplicable to other intelligences, who
may think things in altogether different relations
;
but our categories cannot be false for them unless
they know them. A thing of which one has no
knowledge is neither false nor true for him, butRmicw of Herbert Sfinccr. 55
simply unknown. Philosophy would have been saved
a great deal of confusion on this point had it been
kept in mind that false and true apply only to the
known. The intuitional philosopher, assured of the
essential truth of the categories, affirms with great
earnestness that they are true for all possible intelli
gence. But it is by no means impossible that other
order of intelligence should think things in entirely dif
ferent relations
; and the nescientist, perceiving this,
denies the claim of the intuitionist. Now, the proper
claim is not that our categories are the categories
of all thought, but that they are essentially true. If
these hypothetical beings in whose existence I have
not much faith can understand the meaning of our
categories, it is impossible that they should perceive
them to be false. There may be beings without the
idea of number, and to them the equation 3x2 = 6
would present no idea whatever, and hence would be
neither false nor true, but unintelligible. But for all
who have the idea of number, 3 26 every-where
and always. Mr. Mill gravely suggests that 24-2 = 4
for us, but it is very possible that in some other
world 2 -|- 2 =
5. It is possible that, in such other
world, the equation should be meaningless ; but if the
inhaoitants have a knowledge of numbers, we in
sist that it requires much less faith to believe that
2+ 2 = 4. tnan to believe Mr. Mill s equation.
&quot; What
presumption!&quot; says the know-nothing; &quot;do you
mean to say that the laws of our thought are true for56 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
all intelligence ?
&quot;
In the sense explained, I mean pre
cisely that ; and which, I ask in return, is the greater
presumption, to teach that 3x2-6 every-where and
always, or to stultify one s self by teaching that in
some corner or cranny of the universe, and for some
transcendent intelligence, 3x2 = 77? There may be
beings whose thought-processes compare with ours
as the speed of lightning with the pace of the snail
;
but the conclusions we reach in our slow advance are
as true as theirs, though grasped with the swiftness
of light. We refrain from imposing our categories
upon other beings, but insist that they are, neverthe
less, true. To deny this is to commit intellectual
suicide, to identify light and darkness, cosmos and
chaos, being and blank.
Thus far Mr. Spencer has established nothing which
could not have been admitted beforehand. He has
laboriously proved two truisms: first, that all our
knowledge must be related to our faculties
; and sec
ond, that being, without attribute or power or mani
festation of any kind, is unknowable
; both of which
may be admitted without at all impairing the fact
that what knowledge our faculties do give us is ob
jectively real. If, however, he chooses to deny this,
then, as we have seen, his only landing-place is abso
lute idealism, which Mr. Spencer says is insanity.
As between religion and science, his argument thus
far tells with equal force against both. Religion in
volves unthinkable ideas, which fact Mr. SpencerReview of Herbert Spetncr. S7
looks upon as sufficient warrant for banishing it to
the outer darkness of the unknowable. But science
also involves equally unthinkable ideas, and must,
therefore, go along with religion. God, as self-exist
ent, is an untenable hypothesis. The fundamental
reality must also be conceived as self-existent, and
hence must be set down as an untenable hypothesis.
But Mr. Spencer has other arguments against the
validity of religious knowledge ; and though he has
utterly failed to establish nescience in science, he
may possibly make it out in religion. The peculiar
nature of the problem offers abundant opportunity for
lofty tumbling, and Mr. Spencer avails himself of the
chance to exhibit some of the most astonishing acro
batic feats that philosophy can boast of. The
question is, Is God an object of knowledge? the
fundamental proposition upon which the argument
is based is, That God must be conceived as first
cause, infinite, and absolute
; and the claim is, that
these three conceptions land us in bogs of contra
diction in which the speculative intellect can only
flounder and smother and perish. Mr. Spencer
quotes from Mr. Mansel as follows :
&quot; But these three conceptions, the cause, the abso
lute, and the infinite, all equally indispensable, do
they not imply contradictions to each other, when
viewed in conjunction as attributes of the same be
ing
? A cause cannot, as such, be absolute ; the58 Review of Herbert Spencer.
absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, aa
such, exists only in relation to its effect : the cause
is a cause of the effect
; the effect is an effect of the
cause. On the other hand, the conception of the
absolute implies a possible existence out of all rela
tion. We attempt to escape from this apparent con
tradiction by introducing the idea of succession in
time. The absolute exists first by itself, and after
ward becomes a cause. But here we are checked by
the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the
infinite become that which it was not from the first ?
If causation is a possible mode of existence, that which
exists without causing is not infinite
; that which be
comes a cause has passed beyond its former limits.&quot;
Before continuing the quotation let us ask one or
two questions. If &quot;the conception of the absolute
implies a possible existence out of all relation,&quot; not a
necessary, but a possible existence apart from rela
tion, in what is its absoluteness impaired if it should
become a cause ? Would the possibility of its sep
arate existence be any the less ? Would its inde
pendence, which is its true absoluteness, be at all
impaired ? Certainly not
; and the whole of this con




Supposing the absolute to become a cause, it will
follow that it operates by means of free-will and con
sciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be con
ceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated byReview of Herbert Spencer. 59
something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by
a superior power ; and if necessitated by itself,
it has in its own nature a necessary relation to
its effect. The act of causation must therefore be
voluntary, and volition is only possible in a conscious
being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable
as a relation. There must be a conscious subject,
and an object of which he is conscious. The subject
is a subject to the object ; the object is an object to
the subject ; and neither can exist by itself as the
absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the mo
ment evaded by distinguishing between the absolute
as related to another, and the absolute as related to
itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be
conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But
this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-
destructive than the other. For the object of con
sciousness, whether a mode of the subject s existence
or not, is either created in and by the act of con
sciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In
the former case the object depends upon the sub
ject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In
the latter case the subject depends upon the object,
and the object alone is the true absolute. Or if we
attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each
exists independently of the other, we have no abso
lute at all, but only a pair of relatives
; for co-exist
ence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a
relation.&quot; P. 39.60 Review of Herbert Spencer.
I have often wondered whether Mr. Mansel when
he wrote this, or Mr. Spencer when he quoted it, was
really serious or not. For, with the exception of Mr.
Mill s famous conclusion that matter is an affection
of mind, and mind a product of matter, this is the
finest specimen of amphibious logic I have ever met
with. Mr. Spencer begins by assuming that there is
an absolute, and ends by telling us that there is no
absolute : &quot;for co-existence, whether in consciousness
or not, is itself a relation.&quot; From this, the conclu
sion is irresistible that there is now no absolute in
the universe, and never will be until God has cast all
created being back into nothingness. For we exist
;
God co-exists, and hence is not absolute at present,
but relative. But if this thing which can only exist
alone be the true absolute, Mr. Spencer is very right
in saying that we cannot know it. For it is plain
that the absolute cannot be this absolute, until we
have become non-existent
; and then there would be
very grave obstacles to our pursuit of knowledge.
But the absolute with which Mr. Spencer began
the paragraph is one that can co-exist with the rela
tive, at least we must suppose so
; for it is incredible
that he meant to waste all this argument on a non-
existence. The conception of this absolute, he says,
&quot;
implies a possible existence out of all relation.&quot;
Mark, not a necessary, not even an actual existence
apart from relation, but a possible one
; that is, an
existence dependent on nothing else. This absoluteReview of Herbert Spencer. 61
we cannot know because of the hostility of the idea
of a first cause.
Now why do we affirm absolute being at all ? Only
as the support of contingent or related being. What
kind of an absolute do we affirm ? Not one out of
all relation, but out of necessary or dependent rela
tion. Mr. Spencer recognizes this in his definition,
and forgets it in his application. In the definition it
is what holds no necessary relation.
&quot; Its conception
implies a possible existence apart from all relation.&quot;
In the reasoning it becomes that which must exist
apart from all relation, as in the example quoted
:
&quot;
co-existence, whether in consciousness or not, is it
self a relation.&quot; Now the absence of restriction, not
the absence of relation, is the characteristic of the only
absolute that can be rationally affirmed. The only ab
solute being that we know is found in causal connec
tion with the universe, and is affirmed for the sole
and single purpose of supplying a landing-place for
our thought. We rise to that being by the law of
causation
; but, forsooth, we cannot leave it by the
same law. This absolute of Mr. Spencer s is the
veriest ingrate
: it owes its existence to the law of
causation for we should never affirm an absolute, ex
cept as the support of related being and now, like
some naughty children, it refuses to acknowledge its
parentage. At the bare mention of cause, it begms
to bristle up, puts on airs, and declares that, being
absolute, it knows nothing about causes. The fact62 Review of Herbert Spencer.
is that this absolute, which Hamilton, Mansel, and
Spencer have conjured up, is a myth of their own
imaginations, and has no other existence. Philoso
phy has allowed itself to be browbeaten, and knowl
edge has disowned itself, at the bidding of a non-
existence. All the arguments of these doughty
philosophers about the incompatibility of the con
ceptions of the absolute and the first cause are
reduced to idle words, by the fact that the only abso
lute in which there is the slightest reason for believ
ing, is known as the first cause. Of course, such an
absolute God will be in relation to his universe, and
hence will be knowable, for the relative is conceded
to knowledge.
Hamilton and Mansel taught that our conception
of the absolute is purely negative. Mr. Spencer
seeing that this view must lead to a negation of the
absolute, since a negative conception can represent
nothing positive, sets himself to oppose it. In so
doing he comes very near the true doctrine of the
absolute, but in saving the doctrine he makes sad
work with his philosophy. He says
:
&quot; Our conception of the relative itself disappears
if our conception of the absolute is a pure negation.
... It is admitted, or rather contended, that the
consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness
of both the related members. If we are required to
conceive the relation between the relative and the
non-relative, without being conscious of both, we areReview of Herbert Spencer. 63
in fact required to compare that of which we are con
scious with that of which we are not conscious the
act itself being an act of consciousness, and only
possible through a consciousness of both its objects.
What then becomes of the assertion that the abso
lute is conceived merely by a negation of conceiv-
ability/ or as the mere absence of the conditions
under which thought is possible? If the absolute
is present in thought only as a mere negation, then
the relation between it and the relative becomes un
thinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is
absent from consciouness. And if this relation is
unthinkable, then is the relative itself unthinkable
for want of its antithesis, whence results the disap
pearance of all thought \\hatever.&quot; P. 91.
Mark, we are forever told that we can never be
conscious of the absolute.
&quot;
It is thus manifest that
a consciousness of the absolute is equally self-con
tradictory with that of the infinite.&quot;
&quot;
It is thus
manifest that, even if we could be conscious of the
absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the
absolute ; and as we can be conscious of an object,
as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is
equivalent to an admission that we cannot be con
scious of the absolute at all.&quot;
&quot; As an object of con
sciousness, every thing is necessarily relative.&quot;-
P. 78. In the argument just quoted, however, its
necessary existence in consciousness is insisted
upon. We must have a consciousness of the abso-64 Review of Herbert Spencer.
late, or all thought is impossible. We are told, too,
that the absolute cannot enter into a relation. But
here we learn that, unless it is known in relation and
antithesis to the relative, there is no thinking possi
ble. I yield the point ; the reasoning is too cogent
for resistance. I believe with Mr. Spencer that our
thinking goes in pairs, as finite and infinite, relative
and absolute
; and that these appear and disappear
together. But this makes the absolute a relative,
cancels the alleged nescience, and brings it once
more within the domain of thought and knowledge.
All this is the sheerest jugglery ; it is not argu
ment, but logical thimble-rigging. God is related to
the universe, and in such relation we are not even
forbidden to know him. Of what use, then, to tell us
that, apart from all relation to his creation, we could
not know him ? If there were no other being than
God, we, being non-existent, could not know him. If
God were all alone in a mighty void, without any
manifestation of power, wisdom, or character, no
more a being than a blank, indifferently existent and
non-existent for to deny the absolute the power of
becoming non-existent would be a limitation then
I grant that we could never know him, and would
not care to know him. But what does this amount
to ? It is a labored attempt to prove that in eternal
darkness there would be no light, and no sound in
everlasting silence. This most petty, pitiful, and
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unhappy looker-on, entangled in verbal confusions,
and dazzled with a show of logic and science, is left
to infer that we know nothing of God, or his will con
cerning us. The God who has revealed himselfin the
universe, the author of its glorious beauty, the preserv
er of its eternal order, the infinite purity and holiness,
this God we are permitted to know, and with this
we can be content. The living God of the Bible is
is left us
; the sleeping Brahma of the know-nothing
we cheerfully resign to the worshiper of the absolute.
But, finally, God is infinite, and hence we cannot
know him. Mr. Spencer has some argument on this
head which must be noticed. As in the case of the
absolute we remarked a perpetual shuffling from one
definition to another, so here there is a constant
shifting from the metaphysical infinite, which is the
all, to an infinite which can co-exist with the finite.
In a passage already quoted, Mr. Spencer says,
&quot;If
causation is a possible mode of existence, then that
which exists without causing is not infinite.&quot; There
is no end to the absurdities that could be evolved by
employing the principle of this argument. Thus there
are degrees of activity, and as long as the highest
degree is not maintained, the possibilities of action
are not filled up, and the infinite is not the infinite.
The infinite, then, must always be infinitely active,
upon pain of losing its infinity. Thus, not only
would the infinite have its hands full to keep66 Review of Herbert Spencer.
up with its work, but we are met with another
difficulty
: that which is compelled is in subjection,
and hence cannot be infinite. In spite of its infinite
efforts it would be forced to take a back seat, and
allow the compelling principle to assume the throne.
But, not to repeat the same process with the second
infinite, we are met by still other difficulties
; this
same argument can be used to show that any being
which does not include in itself all other beings, and
all evil, however vile, is not infinite. Envy and
malice, and all the depths of iniquity, are possible
modes of existence. Are we to conclude, then, that
a God who is not envious and malicious is not infi
nite ? At all events, it would be a blessing not to
know such an infinite. Again, if the infinite includes
all being, it includes us also ; in which case, since we
belong to the infinite, there seems to be no reason
why we should not know the infinite. Or, possibly,
the infinite is the only reality, and we are shows and
shadows
; in which case the question disappears into
zero along with us. There is no end, I say again, to
the absurdities that may be evolved by employing
the principle of Mr. Spencer s argument.
When we inquired after the origin of our idea
of the absolute, we found that Hamilton and
his followers had been busying themselves with a
myth of their own fancy, in whose actual existence
there is not even the shadow of a reason for believ
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accessary to inquire what kind of an absolute the
mind really does affirm. So in the case of the in
finite, the argument is altogether about a nonentity.
The metaphysical infinite to which Mr. Spencer s
reasoning only applies is but a fancy of the meta
physicians. All knowledge assumes the reality of
self. If we are not sure of our own existence we are
sure of nothing. We are sure, too, that we are our
selves, and not some other. Now any doctrine which
traverses these certainties breaks down the possi
bility of any knowledge. If we can be deceived in
these things, we can be sure of nothing whatever.
Now the metaphysical infinite about which Mr.
Spencer is reasoning, does just this thing. Either
we lose our personality in the infinite, or we lose it
in zero ; we are merged into the infinite, or we
vanish into the void ; and cither alternative makes
all knowledge impossible. The very affirmation of
such an infinite is suicidal. The moment that it is
made all our beliefs become untrustworthy, and all
argument must cease. And yet we have great phi
losophers, like Hamilton, constructing this elaborate
contradiction, and then parading the thing about as
beyond the scope of knowledge. And philosophy
turns pale, and religion takes its flight, at the bid
ding of this wretched metaphysical abortion. The
only infinite being in whom there is any warrant
whatever for believing, is one whose notice nothing
can escape, and whose power nothing can defy ;68 Review of Herbert Spencer.
whose years are eternal, and whose wisdom compre
hends all being. This is the oniy infinity that can
be rationally attributed to God. I grant, nay, insist,
that God is not metaphysically infinite. If, however,
any one feels aggrieved at this claim, he is at liberty
to go into mourning over his miserable abstraction
as soon as he pleases. Common minds cannot un
derstand, much less sympathize with, so profound
a grief. Now, against the knowledge of such an infi
nite as I have mentioned, there is not a word of valid
argument in all that has been written on this subject.
The God who upholds all things by the word of his
power, and rules in heaven and in earth, is conceded
to our knowledge. All that is made out is that if
God were every thing and we nothing, our pursuit of
knowledge would be very much embarrassed.
However, not to rest too much on my own repre
sentation, I shall allow Mr. Spencer to argue his
own case. Against a knowledge of the infinite, he
urges the following difficulties :
&quot;The very conception of consciousness, in what
ever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies
distinction between one object and another. To be
conscious, we must be conscious of something ; and
that something can only be known as what it is,
by being distinguished from that which it is not.
But distinction is necessarily limitation
; for if one
object is to be distinguished from another, it must
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not, or it must not possess some furm which the
other has. But it is obvious that the infinite
cannot be distinguished from the finite by the
absence of any quality which the finite possesses,
for such absence would be a limitation. Nor
yet can it be distinguished by the presence of an
attribute which the finite has not ; for, as no finite
part can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this
differential characteristic must itself be infinite, and
must at the same time have nothing in common
with the finite. We are thus thrown back upon our
former impossibility ; for this second infinite will be
distinguished from the finite by the absence of qual
ities which the latter possesses. A consciousness
of the infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a
self-contradiction
; for it implies the recognition,
by limitation and difference, of that which can only
be given as unlimited and indifferent.&quot; P. 76.
This argument relates only to that metaphysical
infinite, which we have already seen to be a myth, and
which therefore needs no further notice. One of the
great fallacies of this philosophy, however, appears here
that to know things by distinction and difference is
a mental weakness. Now, I do not like to be presump
tuous
; but, with all deference to the great philoso
phers who have held this view, I must think that the
reason why we know things by difference is that they
are different. If they differed not in attribute, nor
in space, nor in time, they would be the same. This?o Revieiu of Herbert Spencer.
power of knowing things apart is a weakness, is it ?
Are we to suppose, then, that there is some absolute
or transcendent intellect which sees all things alike,
detecting no difference between yes and no, good
and evil, being and blank? Such a thing would
be, not absolute intelligence, but absolute insanity.
Because we are not thus highly gifted, it is held that
we cannot know the infinite !
But, for the sake of progress in the argument, let
us grant that we cannot reach the infinite
; still, before
the impossibility of communion is affirmed, another
question must be considered : Can the infinite reach
us ? This is a question which Mr. Spencer entirely
ignores. Intent only on casting opprobrium upon
the human faculties, he forgets that, at the same
time, he is charging inabilities upon the infinite too.
The moment we read the question in this order, all
Mr. Spencer s arguments turn traitor, and fire into
his own ranks. Inasmuch as the infinite includes
all possibilities, it of course includes the possibility
of self-revelation. Mr. Spencer is often praised for
his
&quot; severe logic,&quot; and I have even seen him styled a
&quot; modern Aristotle
&quot;
by some enthusiastic admirer
;
but I confess that passages like the following stag
ger me :
&quot; But it is obvious that the infinite cannot
be distinguished, as such, from the finite by the
absence of any quality which the finite possesses,
for such absence would be a limitation.&quot; P. 77.
On reading this I took heart
; the infinite is all thatRc-i icu of Herbert Spencer. 71
the finite is, and more. It is their living, conscious
intelligence. It is, too, a free mind like our own.
In it abide all thoughts of beauty, and all love of
good. One phase of the infinite lies over against
our finite nature, and runs parallel with it
; and-
through that phase the finite and the infinite can
commune. All these beliefs I based upon Mr.
Spencer s declaration. But my satisfaction was
short-lived. On page ill, the claim that &quot;the uni
verse is the manifestation and abode of a free mind
like our own,&quot; is given as an illustration of the
&quot;
impiety of the pious.&quot; Is it possible
? Why, have
we not just learned that the infinite must have
all that the finite has ? Is this the
&quot; severe logic
&quot;
of the &quot;modern Aristotle?&quot; I wonder what the
ancient Aristotle would have said to this ! The
infinite must be every thing ; yet, to say that it is
living, conscious intelligence is the vilest fetichism.
It must possess all power and transcend all law, yet
has not the power of revelation. Able to sow space
with suns and systems, to scatter beauty broadcast
like the light, to maintain the whole in everlasting
rhythm ; but utterly unable to reach the human
soul ! Mr. Spencer has much to say about contra
dictions
; let the reader judge whose is the contra
diction here. By his own reasoning he is involved
in the most perfect dilemma possible
: if God be
infinite he can reach us
; if not infinite we can reach
him. In either case communion is possible.72 Review of Herbert Spencer.
But here, as in the case of matter, while insisting
upon a real knowledge of God, I am very far from
claiming a complete one. Religion does not pretend
to give a rationale of the Divine existence any more
than of our own. The mystery of existence is
equally insoluble in both cases
; and some facts,
not some explanations, are all that can possibly
be given.
&quot; Who can search out the Almighty to
perfection ?
&quot;
has been the language of the best re
ligious thinkers from the time of Job until now. As
little, if not less, patience is due to those geog
raphers of the Divine nature who know every thing,
as to the know-nothing who leaves us in total
ignorance. All that is claimed is that we have a
real, though finite, knowledge of the Deity not an
infinite thought, but a finite thought about the infi
nite, which, like the infinite series of the mathe
matician, is true as far as it goes, though car
ried to only a limited number of terms. All our
science and all our theology are but the slightest
surface-play on the bosom of fathomless mystery;
but this is a very different thing from saying that
what we do know is untrustworthy. Measureless
mystery wraps us round, and gulfs of nescience yawn
on every side, but what we do know is sure. The
little island of knowledge, though washed on every
side by the boundless ocean of the unknown, is still
anchored in reality, and is not a cloud-bank which
may at any moment disappear into the void. ThisReview of Herbert Spencer. 73
is our claim, and its denial can only result in &quot;the
insanities of idealism.&quot;
But it is time to bring this discussion to a close.
We have met with laborious proofs of truisms, and
have wandered through mazes of paralogisms which
have disappeared upon accurate definition. Nothing
has been made out that could not have been admitted




of words either without
meaning, or with a totally false one. The terms ab
solute and infinite, upon which so much reliance is
placed, are found upon examination to totally repu
diate the meaning put upon them. I shall give one
more quotation from Mr. Spencer s discussion of the
unknowable, and it is a fit companion to the con
fusions already noticed. There is an old satire often
urged against religion ; so old, indeed, that what little
point it ever had has been lost for ages. It runs back
to the time of Xenophanes, and has been repeated in
various ways ever since. Xenophanes used oxen and
lions for comparison. Mr. Theodore Parker improved
on this, and introduced the novelty of a buffalo. He
supposes that a buffalo, arguing as the natural theo
logians do, would conclude that God has horns and
hoofs. I have even known a mole to be used to
illustrate this powerful irony. Of course the inge
nious and witty conclusion was that a mole could
only argue to a God with fur and paws. Mr. Spencer74 Review of Herbert Spencer.
believes that &quot;volumes might be written on the im
piety of the pious,&quot; and he accordingly proceeds to
lash said impiety by dressing up the old satire in
this form :
&quot; The attitude thus assumed can be fitly repre
sented only by developing a simile long current in
theological controversies the simile of the watch.
If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition
that the tickings and other movements of a watch
constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a
watch possessed of such consciousness insisted upon
regarding the watchmaker s actions as determined,
like its own, by springs and escapements, we should
only complete a parallel of which religious teachers
think much. And were we to suppose that a watch,
not only formulated the cause of its existence in
these mechanical terms, but held that watches were
bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause,
and even vituperated as atheistic watches any that
did not so venture to formulate it, we should merely
illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying
their own arguments a step further.&quot; P. no.
This is extremely severe, no doubt
; and if theo
logians taught that God has legs and arms, parts and
passions, the satire might have some point ; but
since they expressly forbid such an assumption, it
is difficult to tell where the force of the &quot;grotesque
supposition
&quot;
lies. For if that philosophical buffalo,
that ingenious mole, and that &quot;grotesque&quot; watch,Review of Herbert Spencer. 75
should argue, not to horns and hoofs, fur and paws,
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springs and escapements,&quot; but to intelligence in
their maker, they would not be very far astray. If
this thinking, conscious watch should infer that it
had a thinking, conscious maker, it would be on the
right track. Only remember that religion does not
attribute organs and form to God, and the logical
value of the
&quot;
grotesque supposition&quot; is all gone;
though, to be sure, the wit remains to please us.
And now that Mr. Spencer has kindly developed the
simile, I know not that his own attitude can be
more fitly represented than by its further develop
ment. Suppose that this grotesque watch should turn
know-nothing, and insist that a belief in a thinking,





all watches who were stupid and
superstitious enough to believe in a watchmaker,
instead of adopting the higher and truer view that
watches evolve themselves from the unknowable by
changing
&quot; from an indefinite, incoherent homoge
neity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through
continuous differentiations and integrations ;
&quot;
why





at any great length. And
all this but illustrates Mr. Spencer s presumption by
carrying his own argument a step further. I mean
no disrespect to Aristotle, either the ancient or the
modern
; but I must think that, until this metaphor
ical watch turned know-nothing, and began to vitu-76 Review of Herbert Spencer.
perate its simpler neighbors, it ticked off better logic
than Mr. Spencer has done.
My excuse for this long and dry discussion is the
religious importance of the question. The only im
portant bearing of the nescience doctrine is a religious
one. Science would go on in just the same way
as at present, collecting and coordinating its facts,
though the facts were proved to be phantoms. Com
mon life would experience no change. The most
thorough-going know-nothing would be as eager to
get bread as the realist ; he would be as careful to
keep out of a relative fire or a relative river, as out
of an absolute one. In all these cases the practical
necessity would override the speculative error.
But it is not so in morals and religion. There we
are not forced to act
; there we are constantly seek
ing some excuse for inaction. Even the suspicion
that our religious ideas are delusions leads to a
speedy relaxation of moral effort ; as they know too
well who have at any time made nescience their the
ology. To declare our knowledge imperfect and
inadequate, is admissible ; but to declare it utterly
false, is fatal to religion. It is useless to leave us our
religious ideas as regulative truths that is, things
good for us to believe, but without foundation in fact.
A regulative truth will regulate until one discovers
the fraud
; but he must have very little knowledge
of human nature who imagines that it will have any
authority after the trick has been found out. TheseReview of Herbert Spencer. 77
gleams of good that sometimes visit us, these occa
sional intimations of a solemn beauty and a perfect
purity, these undying suspicions of conscience which
we have fancied are tokens of a will and holiness
more august than our own all these things, which
we thought point upward to God, are found to point
nowhere, and are but magnificent will-o -the-wisps.
Why pursue them ? It might be safe to follow them,
but it might also be dangerous. Who can tell into
what bogs they may lead and leave one ? The only
rational thing to do is to ignore them. Proved to be
phantoms, they shall delude us no longer. No, out
of this blank abyss of total darkness, neutral alike
to good and evil, no inspiration of the soul can come.
Religion cannot live on nescience, and reverence is
impossible toward a blank. Though, to be sure, we
now see through a glass darkly, yet the image there
discerned must not be wholly distorted. As we
think of the infinite past and the infinite to come, it
becomes plain that there is much in the Infinite One
which we can never hope to understand, but upon
which we can only gaze ; yet must not all be wrapped
in shadow ; something must pierce through to the
sunlight and the clear blue. In contemplating Him
we shall ever be as men watching in the darkness
of early dawn, with a deep sense of awe and mystery
pressing upon us
; still there must be some glow upon
the hill-tops and a flush in the upper air. There
must, indeed, be a solemn silence that reverence78 Review of Herbert Spencer.
may bow low and worship ; but there must also be
a voice which we can trust, bidding us be not afraid.
The absence of either of these elements would lead,
I believe, to the decay of all true religion. In the
God who commands our reverence and our loving
worship, there must be mystery, and there must be
manifestation.of Herbert Spencer. 79
CHAPTER III.
LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE.
T^HE
&quot; Laws of the Knowable&quot; constitute Part II
-* of Mr. Spencer s First Principles. Part I has
already been examined, and its principles have been
found to be self-destructive. We have now to in
quire whether Part II is any more worthy of the high
reputation it has acquired.
Part II has a very ambitious aim. It is, in brief,
an attempt to rewrite the book of Genesis on the
a priori plan, and from a scientific stand-point. Hav
ing in Part I safely landed all absolute knowledge,
including the knowledge of God, in the realm of the
unknowable, Mr. Spencer next proceeds to show, by
reasoning on our ideas of matter and force, and by
generalizations from known scientific laws, how the
universe, including both life and mind, has necessa
rily evolved itself from the primitive star-dust, and
that, too, without any guiding intelligence. Assum
ing the existence of a diffused nebulous matter, and
admitting the validity of our ideas of matter and
force, the cosmos must have become what it is. Mr.
Spencer not only attempts to support this proposi
tion, but also to exhibit the method by which the
primal cloud-bank, without any directing mind, has8o Review of Herbert Spencer.
spun and woven itself into a universe which seems a
miracle of design. The scheme is certainly a bold
one, and demands unbounded confidence in logical
architecture. When Mr. Darwin presents his limited
doctrine of the origin of species, we feel that there is
an enormous disproportion between the vast conclu
sion and the scanty evidence
; but when the problem
is to give an a priori recipe for the universe, this
feeling is greatly increased. Nothing but a very
secure set of first principles can justify such a pro
cedure. If these have the slightest parallax with the
truth, the conclusions based upon them will be utterly
untrustworthy at the distances to which he extends
them. But let us judge nothing beforehand.
Mr. Spencer evidently feels relieved at escaping
from the darkness of the unknowable into the day
light of the knowable. His subterranean gropings
fettered his free movement, and it is with a sigh of
relief that he emerges again into the upper air. The
&quot;pseud-ideas&quot; are all safely locked up below, and a
permanent injunction has been placed upon religion.
No more trouble is to be expected from that quarter,
and science has the field to itself at last. But no
sooner does Mr. Spencer begin his scientific discus





in the dungeons below, but has
smuggled a few of them over the borders of the
knowable for his own private use. Or, possibly, he
believes with Emerson, that
&quot; a foolish consistency isReview of Herbert Spencer. 8 1
the bugbear of weak minds.&quot; At all events, in writ
ing Part II he is at no pains to remember the philo
sophical principles established in Part I. In Part I
we learn that a self-existent creator is an untenable
explanation of the universe, because self-existence is
rigorously inconceivable. And why inconceivable ?
Because &quot;self-existence necessarily means existence
without a beginning ; and to form a conception of
self existence is to form a conception of existence
without a beginning. Now, by no mental effort
can we do this. To conceive existence through
infinite past time implies the conception of infinite
past time, which is an impossibility.&quot; P. 31. The
impossibility here affirmed is one insisted upon by
Hamilton, and, before him, by Hobbes
; but I must
confess that, upon a most diligent examination of our
conceptions, I am unable to detect the alleged diffi
culty. The force of the argument lies altogether in
the false assumption that nothing is entitled to the
rank of knowledge, which will not come before the
representative faculty. But, not to insist upon this,
see how Mr. Spencer answers himself. Infinite time
is an impossible conception, and any idea or doc
trine which implies it, must be regarded as something
&quot;
pseud.&quot; Yet as soon as God and religion are com
mitted to prison on the strength of this warrant, he
tells us with undoubting assurance that matter is un-
originated. But if so, then matter must have existed
through infinite past time. The ronception, then, of#2 Review of Herbert Spencer,
unoriginated matter implies tne conception of infinite
past time. &quot;Now, by no mental effort can we do
this. To conceive existence through infinite past time
implies the conception of infinite past time, which is
impossible.&quot; P. 31. I yield to the cogency of the
reasoning, and admit the eternity of matter to be an
untenable hypothesis, a &quot;pseud-idea.&quot; Mr. Spencer
is equally sure that matter and force are indestruct
ible, both
&quot;persist.&quot; These are first principles, and
much space is devoted to their exposition. But if
matter and force are indestructible, they must exist
through infinite future time
; and the conception of
their indestructibility really involves the conception
of infinite future time.
&quot; Now by no mental effort can
we do this,&quot; etc. So then Mr. Spencer s leading doc
trines concerning matter and force are condemned by
his own metaphysics as untenable hypotheses, involv
ing
&quot;
symbolic conclusions of the illegitimate order.&quot;
As a kind of bar to this criticism, he says: &quot;What
ever may be true of matter absolutely, we have learned
that relatively to our own consciousness, matter never
comes into existence nor ceases to exist.&quot; P. 239.
This, however, in no wise assists him, for in his plea
against idealism he assures us that, though we do
not know the absolute reality, the relative reality
which we do know stands in fixed connection with
it. &quot;Thus, then, we may resume with entire confi
dence the realistic conceptions which philosophy at
first sight seems to dissipate. Though reality underReview of Herbert Sfencer. 83
the forms of our consciousness is but a conditioned
effect of the absolute reality, yet this conditioned
effect, standing in indissoluble relation with its un
conditioned cause, and equally persistent with it so
long as the conditions persist, is, to the conscious
ness supplying those conditions, equally real. The
persistent impressions being the persistent results
of a persistent cause are, for practical purposes, the
same as the cause itself, and may be habitually dealt
with as its equivalent.&quot; P. 229. As, then, the con
nection is indissoluble, while the relative reality per
sists the absolute reality must persist also
; and as
the relative reality, matter, never begins nor ceases
to exist, it follows that the absolute reality never be
gins nor ceases to exist. Now a Divine existence is
incredible, because it involves the conception of in
finite time ; this is the very reason alleged for con
demning the belief in a self-existent creator as an
untenable hypothesis. Yet here are doctrines which,
though involving the same impossible idea, are dealt
with as first truths. It is impossible to overestimate
the convenience of a double-faced logic like this. I
submit that Mr. Spencer must either recall his sen
tence of banishment against the Deity, or else con




Mr. Spencer is not only a scientist, he is also a
metaphysician. As a consequence, he is fond of
representing laws which have been discovered only$4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
by long and patient induction, as discoverable by a
priori cogitation. Thus the indestructibility of mat
ter, the continuity of motion, and the persistence of
force, are declared to be a priori truths of the highest
certainty. It is a fashion with him to close a chapter
by pointing out that the contained doctrine is reall)
an a priori truth
; or, at least, a necessary corollary of
some a priori principle. This is, indeed, a necessity
of his system. No possible amount of experiment
and induction would avail to prove these doctrines
for all time and space ; and unless they can get some
a priori support, they must present a sorry figure in
so great a field. Indeed, these doctrines, as Mr.
Spencer points out, are incapable of inductive proof.
Matter can be proved indestructible only by assum
ing the persistence of force, and force can be proved
persistent only by assuming matter to be indestruc
tible. The argument is circular, and hence, worthless
;
one or the other of these doctrines must be based upon
a priori considerations. Throughout this philosophy,
fact is necessarily subordinate to theory. Out of a
universe of phenomena only a few can be placed in the
witness-box, and who knows but that only the most
pliable have been subpoenaed? The panel is very
large, and possibly the jury may be packed. Unless
the metaphysical principles are very secure, such a
suspicion will necessarily attach to a verdict based
upon such scanty evidence. The facts adduced serve
to give a scientific appearance to the work, but theirof Herbert Spencer. 85
argumentative value is extremely small. It is to the
underlying metaphysics that the doctrines must look
for support. Yet I cannot but think Mr. Spencer
singularly unsuccessful in his attempt to unite fact
and philosophy. He does not seem, indeed, to have
any just appreciation of the fact that contradictions
cannot comfortably co-exist. In one place he tells
us that a necessity of thought is no sign of a neces
sity of fact
; and then he offers a necessity of thought
as the best possible proof of an external fact. Ex
amine the following statements :
&quot; Our inability to conceive matter becoming non
existent is immediately consequent upon the nature
of thought itself. Thought consists in the establish
ment of relations. There can be no relation, and,
therefore, no thought framed, when one of the terms
is absent from consciousness. Hence it is impossible
to think of something becoming nothing, for the same
reason that it is impossible to think of nothing be
coming something the reason, namely, that nothing
cannot become an object of consciousness. The an
nihilation of matter is unthinkable for the very same
reason that its creation is unthinkable
; and its inde
structibility thus becomes an a priori cognition of
the highest
order.&quot; P. 241. To the objection, that
most men do believe that matter is destructible, he
replies that most men do not really think, but only
think that they think.
&quot; And if this obliges us to
reject a large part of human thinking as not thinking36 Review of Herbert Spencer.
at all, but merely pseudo-thinking, there is no help for
it.&quot; P. 243. An explanation bordering on the heroic.
This reasoning, which is repeated in proof of the
persistence of force, amounts to this : what we cannot
conceive is impossible. We cannot conceive either
creation or annihilation, hence they are impossible.
Let us ask Mr. Spencer to answer himself again.




a miscellaneous collection of metaphysical
puzzles we learn that inconceivability is no test at
all of truth. That matter is infinitely divisible, we
are told, is an impossible conception. That it is
not infinitely divisible, is declared equally irrational.
Now, as it must be one or the other, it follows that the
inconceivable is not the impossible.
Again, the supposition that matter is absolutely
solid is shown to be inconceivable. The converse
is equally inconceivable. But as one of the supposi
tions must be true, it again appears that inconceiv
ability is no test of truth.




while we are unable either to believe or to conceive
that the duration of consciousness is infinite, we are
equally unable either to believe or to conceive that
the duration of consciousness is finite
; we are equally
unable either to know it as finite, or to conceive it as
infinite.&quot; P. 63. Here is another proof that incon
ceivability is no test of the possible ; for one of these
suppositions must be true.Review of Herbert Spencer. 87
Yet more, not only is the inconceivable shown to
be the possible, it is even the observable and the de
monstrable. The transfer of motion, and the pas
sage from motion to rest or from rest to motion, are
mentioned as inconceivabilities of the first magnitude ;
but they are nevertheless facts of hourly observation.
The sphericity of the earth is another supreme incon
ceivability, and also an undoubted fact. That cen
tral forces should vary as the inverse square of the
distance, is declared to be an inconceivability which
passes all understanding ; it is also a fact of un
doubted demonstration. Dozens of illustrations
might be culled from this chapter, all showing the
worthlessness of inconceivability as a test of truth.
Now who would expect to find the author of this
chapter basing his belief in any thing upon the in
conceivability of the opposite ? Yet no sooner does
Mr. Spencer get clear of the unknowable, than he
finds it the best of proofs. The creation and de
struction of matter and force are impossible because
inconceivable. And this he offers as argument, after
giving us page upon page of proof that inconceiv
ability is no test at all of reality. Evidently Mr.
Spencer, in his hurried flight from the unknowable,
left either his memory or his logic behind him or
both.
As a rendering of the mental test, I cannot but
think the inconceivability, which Mr. Spencer charges
upon the belief in the creation and destruction of mat-88 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ter, to be one of the many psychologic forgeries which
he has substituted for the true reading. Inconceiv
ability is an ambiguous term. Some statements
violate the law of our reason, others transcend our
reason. To the first class belong all contradictions,
such as that a thing can be and not be at the same
time. Here, too, belong denials of the law of causa
tion. To the second class belong inquiries about the
inner nature of things, such as the questions
: How
does matter attract ? what constitutes existence ? The
first class only are strictly inconceivable. Violating,
as they do, the fundamental intuitions of the mind,
as long as we have any faith at all in reason, we must
believe these inconceivables to be impossibles. The
second class is merely incomprehensible. How mat
ter is constituted, how motion is transmitted, how
force is exercised : these are not inconceivable, but
incomprehensible. We have not the data, if we have
the faculties, for such inquiries as these. A denial
based upon an inconceivable of the first class is
founded upon mental power ; one based upon an in
conceivability of the second class is founded upon
mental weakness. Because of what the mind is, we
declare all that denies our mental intuitions to be in
conceivable. Because of what it is not, we declare
all that transcends our intuitions to be inconceivable
;
but the first inconceivable represents an impossible,
the second represents an incomprehensible.
Now if we examine the alleged inconceivability ofReview of Herbert Spencer.
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the creation and destruction of matter, we shall sec
that it is really an incomprehensibility and nothing
more. It does not violate, it transcends the laws of
our thought. For who has such knowledge of the in
most nature of matter, that he can positively deny that
things seen were made from things not appearing.
Who can prove that matter is not the result of a spirit
ual activity in space, which will disappear when the
activity ceases ? Who has so possessed himself of
the central secret of material existence as to be sure
that the world abides forever? We call the hills
everlasting, and speak of the eternal stars
; yet who
can bring any proof whatever that Shakspeare was
not right when he wrote :
&quot; The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a wreck behind ?
&quot;
On the subject of causation, the mind has a very
positive deliverance, but it has none whatever on this
question ; it is simply transcendental to our faculties.
All we can say is, we cannot comprehend how crea
tion or destruction is possible, but that they may be
possible no one can deny. Vet Mr. Spencer uses
this mental impotence as a sufficient test of objective
reality. We cannot explain how a thing can be
;
hence, it cannot be. Part I loads our faculties with
opprobrium
; Part II constitutes them the measure,
nut merely of knowledge, but of existence. Part Igo Review of Plerbert Spencer.
declares inconceivability worthless as a test of real
ity ; Part II makes it the best of proofs.
But, leaving these contradictions to destroy each
other, let us pass to the central point of this system,




the correlation of forces.
This doctrine necessarily holds the first place in
every scheme of evolution ; for if it cannot be main
tained, there must be irreducible breaks in the rea
soning. If the physical forces refuse to correlate
with the vital, there would be no possibility of passing
from the tossing whirlpool of flame, or the waste
theater of rock and mud, which once constituted our
earth, to organic existence. There would be an ab
solute necessity for some external power to introduce
the new creation, or the inorganic would remain in
organic forever. In the same way, if the physical
forces do not correlate with the mental, the evolu
tionist could not pass, by a continuous chain of cause
and effect, from the ancient nebula to mind and its
manifestations. But if, on the other hand, there
should be such correlation, there would be a possi
bility of finding the present order potentially existent
in the primeval mist. The possibility might be very
slight indeed, but it would be sufficient to base an
argument upon. When the earth cooled down to a
temperature compatible with the existence of organ
ization, the physical forces, in their restless and eternalReview of Herbert Spencer. 9
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hide-and-seek, might chance upon organic combina
tions, and thus life, and finally mind, would be started
upon their way ; and when a beginning was once made,
natural selection and time could be offered in expla
nation of all improvement. It is, then, of first impor
tance to a philosophy which aims to educe life, mind,
poetry, science, Milton, Plato, Newton, Raphael, every
body and every thing, from a condensing mist, to make
out this correlation. Let us see how the work is done.
In Mr. Spencer s proof of the correlation of the
physical forces, the same ridiculous confusion of
force and motion is apparent, which is so patent in
all our works on this subject. Heat is a mode of
motion and a mode of force, at the same time.
Motion produces magnetism, magnetism is motion,
magnetism is force, motion is force. The same is
said of light and electricity
: both are motions and
both are forces. Yet the universal definition of force
describes it as the hidden cause of motion or change.
When pressed for a definition, there is no scientist
who would view them in any other relation. To use
cause and effect as interchangeable and identical,
involves a most remarkable confusion of ideas. Yet
Mr. Spencer is not alone in this error. I do not
know a single scientist who has maintained the
proper distinction between force and motion. It
would be easy to fill pages with quotations from the
writings of the most prominent scientists, all illus
trating the same confusion. In truth, the majority92 Review of Herbert Spencer.
of scientific men do not understand the doctrine ot
correlation. Heat, light, electricity, etc., are not
forces, but modes of motion, any one of which can
produce all the rest. This passage of one mode of
motion into another mode, is its correlation ; but this
correlation is a correlation of motions, and not of
forces. Whether the hidden force or forces which
manifest themselves in these several modes be one or
more, is a question which no experiment can decide.
To prove a true correlation of forces, it must be shown
that the powers which maintain the chemical mole
cule and those which bind the members of the solar
system together, are identical. The identity of cohe
sion, chemical affinity, and the force of gravitation,
must be established a thing which no one has done.
For the sake of progress, however, let us admit
the unity of the physical forces. Do these correlate
with the vital forces ? What is the proof that vitality
is a function of material forces ? Mr. Spencer argues
as follows :
&quot; Plant life is all dependent, directly or indirectly,
upon the heat and light of the sun directly depend
ent in the immense majority of plants, and indirectly
dependent in plants which, as the fungi, flourish in the
dark ; since these, growing as they do at the expense
of decaying organic matter, mediately draw their forces
from the same original source. Each plant owes the
carbon and hydrogen, of which it mainly consists, to
the carbonic acid and water in the surrounding airReview of Herbert Spencer. 93
and earth. The carbonic acid and water must, how
ever, be decomposed before their carbon and hydrogen
can be assimilated. To overcome the powerful affin
ities which hold their elements together requires the
expenditure of force, and this force is supplied by
the sun. In what manner the decomposition is ef
fected we do not know. But we know that when,
under fit conditions, plants are exposed to the sun s
rays, they give off oxygen and accumulate carbon and
hydrogen. In darkness this process ceases. It
ceases, too, when the quantities of light and heat re
ceived are greatly reduced, as in winter. Conversely
it is active when the light and heat are great, as in
summer. And the like relation is seen in the fact
that, while plant-life is luxuriant in the tropics, it di
minishes in temperate regions, and disappears as we
approach the poles. Thus the irresistible inference
is that the forces by which plants abstract the ma
terial of their tissues from surrounding inorganic
compounds the forces by which they grow and
carry on their functions are forces that previously
existed as solar radiations.
&quot; That animal life is immediately or mediately de
pendent on vegetal life is a familiar truth
; and that,
in the main, the processes of animal life are opposite
to those of vegetal life, is a truth long current among
men of science. Chemically considered, vegetal life
is chiefly a process of deoxidation, and animal life
chiefly a process of oxidation chiefly, we must say,94 Review of Herbert Spencer.
because in so far as plants are expenders of force for
the purposes of organization they are oxidizers
; and
animals, in some of their minor processes, are prob
able deoxidizers. But, with this qualification, the
general truth is that while the plant, decomposing car
bonic acid and water and liberating hydrogen, builds
up the detained carbon and hydrogen (along with a
little nitrogen and small quantities of other elements
elsewhere obtained) into branches, leaves, and seeds,
the animal consuming these branches, leaves, and
seeds, and absorbing oxygen, recomposes carbonic
acid and water, together with certain nitrogenous
compounds in minor amounts. And while the decom
position effected by the plant is at the expense of
certain forces emanating from the sun, which are
employed in overcoming the affinities of carbon and
hydrogen for the oxygen united with them, the re-
composition effected by the animal is at the profit of
these forces which are liberated during the combina
tion of such elements. Thus the movements, inter
nal and external, of the animal are re-appearances in
new forms of a power absorbed by the plant under
the shape of light and heat. Just as, in the manner
above explained, the solar forces expended in raising
vapor from the sea s surface are given out again in
the fall of rain and rivers to the same level, and in the
accompanying transfer of solid matters, so the solar
forces, that in the plant raise certain chemical ele
ments to a condition of unstable equilibrium, areReview of Herbert Spencer. 95
given out again in the actions of the animal during
the fall of these elements to a condition of stable
equilibrium.&quot; Pp. 271-273.
To this general proof he adds the following illus
tration :
&quot; The transformation of the unorganized
contents of an egg into the organized chick is alto
gether a question of heat. Withhold heat, and the
process does not commence
; supply heat, and it
goes on while the temperature is maintained, but
ceases when the egg is allowed to cool. The devel
opmental changes can be completed only by keeping
the temperature with tolerable constancy at a defi
nite height for a definite time
; that is, only by sup
plying a definite amount of heat.&quot; P. 273.
The gist of Mr. Spencer s argument is this.
Without sunshine there can be no plant or animal
life, hence sunshine and life are one. Without heat
the chicken cannot be hatched, therefore heat and
vitality are identical. Now surely it requires a great
deal of faith to accept this argument as conclusive.
At the most, it only proves the possibility of their
identity, but it by no means establishes the fact.
All that is really made out is that heat and light
are necessary conditions of vital action
; but surely
the conditions of the action, and the power acting,
need not be the same. Bricks and mortar are con
ditions of the builder s activity, but they are not the
builder. The engine is a condition of steam s activ
ity, but the engine is rarely the steam. Now if the96 Review of Herbert Spencer.
believer in vitality should choose to say that there is
a constructive or directive force in the body, which,
while separate from the physical forces, does use
those forces as its agents in construction and func
tion, what is there in Mr. Spencer s argument to
disprove it? There is not one word which makes
against such a hypothesis ; yet he moves on ap
parently without a suspicion that any more proof is
desirable, and tells us on the strength of this fallacy
that
&quot; whoever duly weighs the evidence will see
that nothing short of an overwhelming bias in favor
of a preconceived theory can explain its non-ac
ceptance.&quot; But if this is all the proof that Mr.
Spencer has to offer, it requires no very critical eye





has proved the correlation of the physical and vital
forces, Mr. Spencer has not
; indeed, one who can
thus confound the conditions of activity with the
power acting, has not even understood the meaning
of the problem, to say nothing of solving it.
But has any one proved this correlation ? Is
there, in any of the treatises on this subject, any
thing which establishes the identity of the physical
and vital forces ? There is no end of assertion and
imagination ; but there is nothing which approaches
a proof. Mr. Huxley tells us that protoplasm is the
basis of life, and then says that life is the only
known source of protoplasm ; that is, the
&quot; basis
&quot;
requires a living base. But since there is no lifeRei iew of Herbert S&amp;gt;pence)
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without protoplasm, and no protoplasm without life,
the question of priority becomes the parallel of the
famous inquiry whether the hen produces the egg,
or the egg the hen. If the question be left in this
condition, it might be claimed with equal justice that
life is the basis of protoplasm. It becomes neces
sary, then, to break the circle somewhere
; and,
accordingly, he tells us that, if we could have been
present when the earth manifested extraordinary
conditions, we might have seen protoplasm produced
from the inorganic. This, and the further declara
tion that there is no telling what chemistry may





may-be,&quot; are the sup
port of the great conclusion. Indeed, not even this
much can be allowed him
; for, though the doctrine
is that protoplasm lives by virtue of its chemical
combination, he unluckily admits that protoplasm
may die, and often is found dead. Now, dead-life, is
decidedly good ; but, if we are not prepared to
believe in it, we must conclude that protoplasm is
not life, but something into which life enters, and
from which it may depart. Mr. Huxley s lecture in
which he propounded this logical atrocity, taken
along with the fright it gave some nervous people,
constitutes a most brilliant example of the possibil
ities of
&quot; much ado about nothing.&quot; Pages of similar
assertions might be gathered from the leading works
on this subject, together with not a few contemptu-98 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ous expressions about the believers in vitality. The
odium theologicum is a favorite charge against the
theologians ; but it really seems as if there is an
odittm scientificutn which is not one whit more hon
orable. Dr. Beale, one of the first microscopists of
the day, in an essay on the
&quot;
Mystery of Life,&quot; com
plains as follows :
&quot;
It is indeed significant, if, as
seems to be the case at this time in England, an
investigator cannot be allowed to remark that the
facts, which he has demonstrated, and phenomena,
which he has observed, render it impossible for him
to assent at present to the dogma that life is a mode
of ordinary force, without being held up by some
who entertain opinions at variance with his own, as a
person who desires to stop or retard investigation, who
disbelieves in the correlation of the physical forces,
and in the established truths of physical science.&quot;
Disregarding now all fancies and prophecies, what
is really proved in the premises
? What are the
facts in the case ?
A living organism manifests properties so differ
ent from those of inorganic matter, that, unless some
plausible explanation can be found in the properties
of the latter, we must assume some peculiar power,
some distinct cause, to explain the variation. In the
first place, organic compounds are all in a state of
unstable equilibrium, which chemistry and mechanics
are constantly seeking to overset. So long as life
lasts, this equilibrium is maintained
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ceases, the body is quickly reduced to more stable in
organic compounds. This looks as though life were
not a function of chemical affinity and mechanical
power, as the correlationists assert, but rather a
force which is in direct opposition to them. Again,
inorganic compounds have no identity apart from
the atoms that compose them
; living beings main
tain their identity in the constant change of their
composition. The body of to-day is not the body of
last year, or even of yesterday, but it is the same living
being. This looks as though there were a principle
or power which abides in the organism, and renews
its constant waste by an equally constant repair.
Dead matter, too, grows only by accretion, and what
is added to it gains no new properties ; living matter
grows by selective assimilation. One kind of matter
goes to the muscles, another to bones, another to
brain and nerves ; and what is thus assimilated takes
on new powers of which there was not the slightest
hint before. This selective assimilation looks as
though there were a selective power within.
In the different forms of life, too, we have different
plans of development. The carbon, oxygen, hydro
gen, and nitrogen which a fish assimilates, are built
up into fish, and not into horse. This differentiation
of identical elements into different forms of life, also
looks as though there were something more than
chemistry concerned in the matter.
Another peculiarity is that a living being, ifioo Review of Herbert Spencer.
killed, cannot be made to live again ; dissolution
is destruction. You may have the identical ele
ments, and can mix them as you will
; you can
heat them, or use magnetism or electricity, as long
as you please ; the thing is dead and will not live.
In this respect it differs from the crystal, that stand
ing illustration of the unbelievers, which may be
dissolved and reproduced at pleasure. But, not to
mention other points of difference, the phenomena
of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, where
they appear in the organic world, differ entirely from
their phenomena in the inorganic. Combine and
treat them as we will, they give no hint of their
organic powers. What is it, then, which bestows
upon these elements their high prerogatives ? What
is it which raises them to this upper plane ? Do
they do it themselves ? or is there a mystic and sub
tle chemist in those little cells, who is the author of
these inimitable wonders ?
The standing answer of the correlationists is, that
the peculiar chemical combination explains the facts.
We may not be able to detect the molecular interac
tions
; but if we could, we should undoubtedly find a
complete explanation of vitality in the properties of
the chemical elements. These elements in certain
combinations manifest chemical properties ; in oth
ers they manifest vital properties. This is the sum
of their utterances on this subject.
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difficulty would not be explained. Life comes only
from life. There is no proof at all of any vital passage
from the inorganic to the organic. To the conclusion
derived from Tyndall s experiments upon floating dust
and germs, the theory of spontaneous generation has
not made any effective reply. So far as our present
chemistry is concerned, the organic and inorganic are
separated by an impassable gulf. Mightily as it has
conjured, it knows no incantation which will evoke
the living from the lifeless. Prophecy is not wanting,
but fulfillment has thus far been of the Millerite order.
If, then, the chemical combination explained the phe
nomena, the chemical combination would next have
to be explained. Is the combination the source of
life ? it is no less certain that life is the only known
cause of the combination. The backdoor by which
Mr. Huxley escaped from a similar dilemma about
protoplasm is still open, however ; and the correla-
tionist may escape the difficulty, by suggesting that
under very extraordinary conditions, and in some
time so far out of sight as to be beyond criticism,
that which our highest wisdom cannot now accom
plish, that which it would be folly to think happens
now, happened then of its own accord.
So much for the explanation, even if it were true,
that the chemical combination explains the facts. But
is it true ? We are met by difficulties here again.
If it be true, these identical combinations ought to
result in the same forms of life. It is well known,IO2 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
however, that the germ-cells of many of the higher
and lower animals, and even of plants, are chemically
identical. Yet each of those germs is potential of a
specific type of life, and of no other. Now, if chemi
cal affinity is the only force at work here, how does
it happen that these germs of similar composition
develope into such diverse forms ?
It is said that difference of conditions determines
the difference of result, but the answer to this plea is
obvious. On this supposition the source of impreg
nation is a matter of indifference. A mouse might
become a man, and conversely ; in short, all males
might interchange without affecting the result. Con
dition will, indeed, determine whether a given germ
shall realize its type of development, but the type is
impressed upon the germ itself If the conditions of
development are not met there is no result
; but where
they are met, then the thing develops after its kind.
That the microscope detects no trace of organization,
is no argument against the fact the microscope is not
all-seeing. Professor Tyndall has pointed out that the
most profound and complex changes take place almost
infinitely below the microscope limit. We know, too,
that a human germ may carry with it an evil tend
ency which, in thirty or forty years, shall send a man
to the insane asylum. Now in the same way, only
much more intimately, does the germ bear with it an
organizing, constructive power which, when the fit
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product. The doctrine of the chemical affinity of
germs is just the reason why we cannot look upon
life as a function of affinity, because it leaves the dif
ference of the product entirely unaccounted for. At
this point the correlationist, instead of admitting that
his doctrine is without support, generally suggests
that though known chemical properties do not ex
plain the facts, there may be unknown properties
which do a mode of argument which would disprove
every scientific doctrine.
But what, then, is the function of the physical forces
in the body
? We take food, which certainly does
nourish the system and does produce power ; is not
this a correlation ? Grant that the correlation is a
logical impossibility, is it not, like many other logical
impossibilities, an established fact ? To this the an
swer is, that the physical forces are the working
forces of the system they are expended in labor and
in the performance of function but the preceding
considerations render it impossible to look upon them
as the organizing, constructive, or directive force of
the system. This organizing force emp oys the phys
ical forces as its servants, and cannot dispense with
them ; but there is no proof of correlation.
The only argument of any weight that can be urged
against this has been offered by Mr. Maudsley, and that
does not attack the justice of the reasoning, but rather




Admitting that vital transforming matter isIO4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
at first derived from vital structure, it is evident that
the external force and matter transformed does, in
turn, become transforming force that is, vital. And
if that takes place after the vital process has once com
menced, is it, it may be asked, extravagant to suppose
that a similar transformation might at some period
have commenced the process, and may ever be doing
so ? The fact that in growth and development life is
continually increasing from a transformation of phys
ical and chemical forces is, after all, in favor of the
presumption that it may at first have so originated.
And the advocate of this view may turn upon his op
ponent and demand of him how he, with a due regard
to the axiom that force is not self-generatory, and to
the fact that living matter does increase from the
size of a little cell to the magnitude of a human body,
accounts for the continual production of transforming
power? A definite quantity only could have been
derived from the mother structure, and that must
have been exhausted at an early period of growth.
The obvious refuge of the vitalist is to the facts that,
it is impossible now to evolve life artificially out of
any combination of physical and chemical forces, and
that such a transformation is never witnessed save
under the conditions of
vitality.&quot;
*
This is the best thing the correlationists have said
yet, and it is the best that can be said. The only
thing more satisfactory will be the production of life
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from the inorganic a thing which Mr. Maudsley
prophesies with somewhat of confidence. Dr. Car
penter s famous reductio ad absurdum against the
vitalists is similar to this argument, but, having the
logical merit of self-contradiction, it need not be con
sidered. Now, the sum of Mr. Maudsley s argument
is this vital force is increasing. But either it must
be self-generating or it must be transformed physical
force. The former supposition is absurd, hence the
latter is true. This is his argument ; his soothsay-
ings are beside the question.
It is not quite certain, however, that the first suppo
sition is as absurd as the exigencies of the argument
demand. Scientific men teach that an atom of matter
can propagate its attractive influence along an in
finite number of radii and to an infinite distance, and
do it forever this is the doctrine of gravitation.
Moreover the atoms of a molecule hold each other in
a grasp which giants could not wrench asunder, and
exert this tremendous pull forever this is the doc
trine of chemical affinity. Now one might turn upon
the advocate of these doctrines and &quot;demand how
he, with due regard to the axiom that force is not
self-generating,&quot; can hold such views ? But if these
views are not incredible, why may not the original
spark of vitality have indefinitely extended itself?
But granting the supposition to be as absurd as Mr.
Maudsley thinks it, his alternatives do not exhaust
the possibilities of the case. Vitality might be self-io6 Review of Herbert Spencer,
generating, it might be transformed physical force,
or it might hiave a source unrecognized at present.
Let us grant the absurdity of the first supposition,
the previous considerations show the difficulty of ad
mitting the second
; there is, then, no alternative
but to ascribe it to an unknown source. Indeed, why
not ? There may well be
&quot; more things in heaven
and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy.&quot;
So much for the correlation of the physical and
vital forces. Our interest in the doctrine is chiefly
logical ; true or false, religion would be able to live
and philosophy to catch its breath. But whatever
the future may establish, at present this boasted cor
relation has not a shadow of support, but is in irrecon
cilable opposition to known facts. It is based, in
many cases, upon that desire for unity and simplicity
in science which is at once so attractive and so mis
leading ; in many more, it is based upon a desire to
be irreligious ; and in all, upon monstrously bad logic.
But let us get back to Mr. Spencer. His argu
ment for the identity of physical and vital force, we
saw to be triumphantly worthless
; now, let us see
whether he succeeds any better in proving the iden
tity of the physical and mental forces. It is not at
all probable, after the specimens we have already had
of Mr. Spencer s reasoning, that we shall meet with
any valuable results
; still let us possess our souls in
patience. The proofs adduced are as follows :Review of Herbert Spencer. 107
&quot;All impressions from moment to moment made
on our organs of sense stand in direct correlation
with physical forces existing externally. The modes
of consciousness called pressure, motion, sound, light,
heat, are effects produced in us by agencies which, as
otherwise expended, crush or fracture pieces of mat
ter, generate vibrations in surrounding objects, cause
chemical combinations, and reduce substances from a
solid to a liquid form. Hence, if we regard the
changes of relative position, of aggregation, or of
chemical state thus arising, as being transformed
manifestations of the agencies from which they arise,
so must we regard the sensations which such agencies
produce in us as new forms of the forces producing
them.&quot; . . .
&quot; Besides the correlation and equivalence between
external physical forces and the mental forces gener
ated by them in us under the form of sensations,
there is a correlation and equivalence between sensa
tions and those physical forces which, in the shape
of bodily actions, result from them. The feelings we
distinguish as light, heat, sound, odor, taste, pressure,
etc.. do not die away without immediate results, but
are invariably followed by other manifestations of
force. In addition to the excitements of secreting
organs that are in some cases traceable, there arises
a contraction of the involuntary muscles or of the
voluntary muscles, or of both. Sensations increase
the action of the heart slightly when they are slight,io8 Review of Herbert Spencer.
markedly when they are marked and recent physio
logical inquiries imply not only that contraction of
the heart is excited by every sensation, but also that
the muscular fibers throughout the whole vascular
system are at the same time more or less con
tracted.&quot; . . .
&quot; If we take emotions instead of sensations, we
find the correlation and equivalence equally manifest.
Not only are the modes of consciousness directly
produced in us by physical forces re-transformable
into physical forces under the form of muscular mo
tions, and the changes they initiate, but the like is
true of those modes of consciousness which are not
directly produced in us by the physical forces. Emo
tions of moderate intensity, like sensations of moder
ate intensity, generate little beyond excitement of
the heart and vascular system, joined sometimes with
increased action of glandular organs. But, as the
emotions rise in strength, the muscles of the face,
body, and limbs begin to move. Of examples may
be mentioned the frowns, dilated nostrils, and stamp
ings of anger ; the contracted brows and wrung hands
of grief; the smiles and leaps of joy, and the frantic
struggles of terror and despair. Passing over certain
apparent, but only apparent, exceptions, we see that
whatever be the kind of emotion, there is a manifest
relation between its amount and the amount of mus
cular action induced.&quot; Pp. 275-277.
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stimuli, as whisky or opium, increase mental action,
while unconsciousness follows inaction of the brain,
is the substance of the proof that the physical and
mental forces are one. Disengaged from swelling
statement it reads thus: Physical forces, such as
light or heat, excite sensations ; therefore sensations
are transformed light and heat.
Sensations, being pleasant or painful, are followed
by motion either toward or from the object of sensa
tion. Hence mechanical motion and its equivalents
are the correlates of sensation.
Again, mental action is attended by certain physi
cal conditions ; hence they are one.
Indeed, the whole argument may be summed up
in this : Physical states excite mental states ; hence
each is a form of the other.
Now, looking at this merely with a logician s eye it
must be confessed that it falls far short of proof. It
establishes relation, not identity. One thing may
well be the occasion of another without being that
other. No one can deny that light and heat may
be the physical antecedents of sensation without
being transformed sensations. Surely to prove a re
lation is not to prove a correlation. To the claim of
quantitative relation between mental action and brain
waste there is this reply
: The soul communicates
with the physical world through a material organism,
and its interests are bound up with it. Mental action
is accompanied by nervous action, and this being* I O Review of Herbert Spencer.
so, we should expect such quantitative relation even
if there were no real interchange of power. Besides,
there are many things which seem to indicate that
even this relation is not as constant as the theory
demands
; that the soul can by its own energy main
tain and restore physical vigor. It often happened
during our late war that a stirring national air or
some familiar home-tune inspired a body of dispirited
and worn-out men with new life and vigor. Every
student has known what it is to feel the jar and dis
cord of a nerve cease, and weakness pass into power,
as, in some moment of desponding gloom, a great
thought has kindled within
; under its inspiration
he has achieved the impossible, and without any corre
sponding depression. Whence the new power ? Ordi
narily the connection between mental action and
nervous waste is maintained, but it does not seem to
be always so. Yet if it were, the correlation is not
made out. The experiments made by Professor Bark
er and others, which are said to establish the iden
tity of heat and mental force, really prove only a
correlation between heat and the nervous action
which attends thinking. Nervous action and heat
correlate, but the real point is to prove that nervous
action ai.d mental force correlate. This has never
been done. The whole argument consists in ringing
the changes upon the fact, known and undoubted
from the beginning, that mental and physical states
affect each other which is far enough from provingRcviav of Herbert Spencer.
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an identity. Yet, not only is this all that Mr. Spencer
has to offer, it is all that any one has to offer ; and
rhe conclusion based upon this scanty evidence is
dressed up in a pseudo-science, and trumpeted abroad
as having all the certitude of scientific demonstration.
To ask for more proof is sure proof of
&quot; an over
whelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory.&quot;
Bad as the argument is logically, psychologically it
is a great deal worse. But as I wish to reserve this
discussion for the next chapter, I will merely indicate
the psychological shortcomings of the theory and
pass on. In the first place, the doctrine does not
explain why even sensation is impossible without an
inner activity of the soul. In the next place, it gives
no account of the great majority of our mental states
which have no physical antecedent. It also denies
the possibility of self-determination, which is one of
the most assured facts of consciousness
; and finally,
it contradicts the emphatic distinction which the soul
makes, between itself and the organism which it
inhabits.
But psychology has yet another word to offer to the
&quot; New Philosophy.&quot; It demands the authority for the
belief in force at all. It summons the evolutionist to
tell where he discovered this force with which he con
jures so mightily. And just here every system of
mechanical atheism is speechless. For it is admitted
now by all that force is not a phenomenon, but a mental
datum. Hume did philosophy a good service in show-f J 2 Rcvieiv of Herbert Spencer.
ing that nature presents nothing but sequence, and
this is rigidly true. The keenest eye, looking upon the
armies of phenomena which maneuver in the physical
world, could detect nothing but succession. Regi
ment after regiment might march by us in time-order,
but they could give us no hint of power. This idea is
home-born, and born only of our conscious effort. It
is only as agents that we believe in action
; it is only
as there is causation within, that we get any hint of
causation without. Not gravitation, nor electricity,
nor magnetism, nor chemical affinity, but will, is the
typical idea of force. Self-determination, volition, is
the essence of the only causation we know
; will is
the sum-total of the dynamic idea
; it either stands
for that or nothing. Now science professes itself
unable to interpret nature without this metaphysical
idea of power. Some of the more rigorous Baco
nians, as Comte and Mill, have attempted to exclude
the conception from science as without warrant
; but
the ridiculous contradictions into which they fell, only
served to make more clear its absolute necessity.
Science refers all change to one universal force
;
what is that force ? It is either the activity of
a person, the determination of a will, or nothing. If
external causation is to be affirmed on the warrant
of internal causation, the external must be after the
pattern of the internal
; the existence of one thing is
no reason for affirming the existence of another to
tally unlike it. The mental law which warrants theof Herbert Spencer.
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belief in external power, warrants the interpretation
of that power into the divine activity. If science
like not this alternative, then it has no warrant for
belief in force at all. It must content itself with a
lifeless registration of co-existences and sequences
which have no dynamic connection. Every form of
science which assumes the reality of causation must
disappear ; and Positivism, a thousand-fold more rigid
than M. Comte ever dreamed of, will be all that is
left us. The uncultured mind in all ages has persisted
in referring external phenomena to external wills.
Was there a storm, Neptune was angry, or Eolus had
let slip the winds. Was there a pestilence, some
malignant demon had discovered the fountain of life
and charged it with deadly poison. Every order of
fact had its god, to whose agency it was referred.
The winds were ministers, and the brooks had their
errand. In that early time men saw a divine smile
in the sunshine and the harvest, and detected tokens
of wrath in the flying storm. The quiet lake, which
reflected from its surface the encircling woods and
hills, was the abode of a divine peace ; and each dark
and fearful cave was the dwelling-place of a fury. In
short, nature was alive, and men gazed upon it and
saw there their own image. Absurd as were many
of the beliefs begot of this tendency, it was far truer
to psychology than is the prevailing scientific con
ception of an impersonal force. Nature is the abode
and manifestation of a free mind like our own. WeI T 4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
prune and criticise that ancient belief, and return to
find it, not false, but needing only a transfigured in
terpretation. As for the scientific conception of an
impersonal force, it has no warrant within, nor the
shadow of support without. Will-power, or none, is
the alternative offered by inexorable logic. Besides,
the doctrine of an impersonal force in matter seems
really opposed to the law of inertia. The law assumes
absolute deadness in matter
; the doctrine attributes
to it all kinds of activity. One doctrine is that mat
ter cannot change its state
; the other is that matter
can change its state. It is for the scientists to de
termine which they will give up. If they retain in
ertia, they must give up the force
; and if they retain
the force, they bring matter within the realm of the
self-determining.
M. Comte in a very remarkable passage admits
the justice of this reasoning. He says
:
&quot; If we insist upon penetrating the insoluble mys
tery of the essential cause of phenomena, there is no
hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed
from wills, dwelling in them or outside of them
; an
hypothesis which assimilates them to the effects pro
duced by the desires which exist within ourselves.
Were it not for the pride induced by metaphysical
and scientific studies, it would be inconceivable that
any atheist, ancient or modern, should have believed
that his vague hypotheses on such a subject were
preferable to this direct mode of explanation. AndReview of Herbert Spencer.
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it was the only mode which really satisfied the
reason until men began to see the utter inanity and
inutility of all absolute research. The order of na
ture is doubtless very imperfect in every respect ;
but its production is far more compatible with the
hypothesis of an intelligent will, than with that of a
blind mechanism. Persistent atheists, then, would
seem to be the most illogical of theologians ; for they
occupy themselves with the same questions, yet reject
the only appropriate method of handling them. M
That is, it is nonsense to ask for the cause of the
present order ; but if you are not yet ripe enough to
see the folly of such inquiries, then the only rational
answer is that the order of nature is the work of a
superintending Mind. M. Comte was not, in strict
ness, an atheist ; he was more, he was a positivist.
Mr. Spencer, too, admits the cogency of the rea
soning which reduces external force to a personal
activity, but escapes the conclusion by the following
logical sleight-of-hand
:
&quot; On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard
as equal to that antagonistic force called the weight
of the chair ; and we cannot think of these as equal
without thinking of them as like in kind, since
equality is conceivable only between things that are
connatural. The axiom that action and reaction are
equal, and in opposite directions, commonly exem
plified by this very instance of muscular force versus
* L Ensemble du Positivisme, p. 46.1 1 6 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
weight, cannot be mentally realized on any other
condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible that
the force as existing in the chair really resembles
the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs
to point out that the weight of the chair produces in
us various feelings according as we support it by a
single finger, or the whole hand, or the leg ; and
hence to argue, that as it cannot be like all these
sensations, there is no reason to believe it like any.
It suffices to remark that since the force as known
to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot con
ceive the force existing in the chair under the same
form without endowing the chair with consciousness.
So that it is absurd to think of force as like our
sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it,
if we realize it in consciousness at all.&quot; P. 58.
Mr. Spencer here admits that if we think of ex
ternal force at all it must be viewed as a personal
power like our own
; but as this would land us in
absurdities, we must not conceive it under such a
form. However, the force of his argument against
the conception lies entirely in the assumption that
force is identical with muscular tension and sensa
tion. There is no absurdity in supposing that the
great, coordinating force of matter, whereby not only
this chair and the earth, but all things, are bound
together, is a manifestation of a Divine will ; and in
such case, whenever our wills measure themselves
against it, there would really be a common measureRcviciv of Herbert Spencer. 1 1 7
T]KTC is no need to endow the chair with conscious
ness or the power of sensation, but only to conceive
this universal coordinating power as rooted in a per
sonality in some respects like our own. As for the ten
sion that we feel, it is not force, but the effect of force.
Sensation is not power, but result. Our knowledge
of power is based upon our self-determination, and not
upon our muscular feelings ; all of which might be
removed without in any way affecting our knowledge
of force. There is, to be sure, an absurdity in the
paragraph, but it is the absurdity of identifying cause
and effect, and belongs entirely to Mr. Spencer.
In a recent essay upon Mr. Martineau, Mr. Spen
cer makes some further criticisms upon this doctrine,
that mind is first and rules forever. He orders up
the following re-enforcements :
&quot;
If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused
by an originating Mind, I must conceive this mind
as having attributes akin to those of the only mind
I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind
at all. I will not dwell on the many incongruities
hence resulting by asking how the originating Mind
is to be thought of as having states produced by
things objective to it
; as discriminating among these
states and classing them as like and unlike, and as
preferring one objective result to another. I will
simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the,- orig
inating Mind the character absolutely essential to
the conception of mind, that it consists of a series1 1 8 Review of Herbert Spencer.
of states of consciousness ? Put a series of states
of consciousness as cause and the evolving universe
as effect, and then endeavor to see the last as flow
ing from the first. It is possible to imagine in some
dim kind of way a series of states of consciousness
serving as antecedent to any one of the movements
I see going on, for my own states of consciousness
are often indirectly the antecedents to such move
ments. But how if I attempt to think of such a
series as antecedent to all actions throughout the
universe, to the motions of the multitudinous stars
through space, to the revolutions of all their planets
around them, to the gyration of all these planets on
their axes, to the infinitely multiplied physical proc
esses going on in each of these suns and planets?
I cannot even think of a series of states of conscious
ness as causing the relatively-small group of actions
going on over the earth s surface
; I cannot even
think of it as antecedent to all the winds and dis
solving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the
rivers and the grinding action of all the glaciers ; still
less can I think of it as antecedent to the infinity of
processes simultaneously going on in all the plants
that cover the globe, from tropical palms down to
polar lichens, and in all the animals that roam among
them, and the insects that buzz about them. Even
to a single small set of these multitudinous terrestrial
changes, I cannot conceive as antecedent a series of
states of consciousness cannot, for instance, thinkof Herbert Spencer. 119
of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that
are at this instant curling over the shores of En
gland. How, then, is it possible for me to conceive
an originating Mind/ which I must represent to
myself as a series of states of consciousness, being
antecedent to the infinity of changes simultaneously
going on in worlds too numerous to count, dispersed
throughout a space which baffles imagination ?
&quot;
If the doctrine of an &quot;originating Mind&quot; prove to be
one half as absurd as the doctrine of this paragraph,
it ought to be given up at once. Note first the defini
tion of mind as a
&quot; series of states of consciousness.&quot;
I verily believe with Mr. Spencer, that such a mind
could not originate either the universe or any thing
else ; but the definition looks to me very much like
a
&quot;
symbolic idea of the illegitimate
order.&quot; A state
must be the state of something. Consciousness im
plies a being who is conscious
; motion implies
something moved ; and so a state implies a being
which is in that state. Mind is neither a state nor
a series of states, but a being which experiences
these states. I do not hesitate a moment to class
Mr. Spencer s definition with the
&quot;
pseud-ideas.&quot; I
grant that in many things the Divine Mind must be
altogether different from ours. We gain our knowl
edge from without
; with Him all is self-contained.
Our art is but the faintest copy of what is original
with Him. From our own experience we can gain no
*
&quot;
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clew to very many phases of the Creative Mind.
Pi is ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as
our thoughts. We can predicate nothing of the Divine
Reason save the purest intellection. But the funda
mental conception of mind is that of a self-deter
mining intelligence ; and whenever we meet with a
free intelligence, we call it a mind. It may differ in
many ways from us, but in the underlying freedom
and knowledge we find a common measure.
Now can such a mind, free and intelligent, be the
cause of all things ? Mr. Spencer thinks not
; for
though it is abundantly credible that linear forces in
their blind play should have produced the great har
mony of the universe, a mind, he thinks, would be
come confused and giddy. I defy any one to get out
of Mr. Spencer s argument, apart from the nonsense
about the
&quot; scries of states,&quot; any thing more than the
suggestion that an infinite mind would have more on
hand than it could attend to. He speaks of the infinity
of processes going on upon our earth, multiplies it
by the number of the stars, and asks if it is credible
that one mind should originate and control all this.
Nay, let us obey Mr. Spencer, and think upon the
multitudinous changes which are forever going on.
Let. us begin with the small series of changes which
take place on a day in June, when
&quot;
Every clod feels a stir of might,
An instinct within it, that reaches and towers,
And groping blindly above it, for light,
&quot; Climbs to a soul in grass and flowers,&quot;of Herbert Spencer.
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and remember that all these changes are along lines of
order and of beauty. Think of the universal war
ring of tremendous forces which is forever going on,
and remember that out of this strife is born, not
chaos, void and formless, but a creation of law arid
harmony. Bear in mind, too, that this creation is
filled with the most marvelous mechanisms, with the
most exquisite contrivances, and with forms of the
rarest beauty. Remember, also, that the existence
of these forms for even a minute depends upon the
nicest balance of destructive forces. Abysses of
chaos yawn on every side, and yet creation holds on
its way. Nature s keys need but to be jarred to turn
the tune into unutterable discord, and yet the har
mony is preserved. Bring hither your glasses, and
see that from atomic recess to the farthest depth
there is naught but
&quot;
toil cooperant to an end.&quot; All
these systems move to music
; all these atoms march
in tune. Listen until you catch the strain, and then
say whether it is credible that a blind force should
originate and maintain all this. Mr. Spencer thinks
it is. There is no difficulty in supposing a mechan
ical force to have done it all
; but the hypothesis of
a Creative Mind, which animates nature and realizes
His thought in all its phenomena, is too incredible to
be entertained for a moment
; because, forsooth, such
a mind would have too much to attend to. Surely
science must be asleep, and philosophy at its lowest
ebb, when such sheer nonsense as this is allowed to122 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
usurp, unchallenged, a prominent place in either. Do
you speak of the stars ?
&quot; Lift up your eyes on high,
and behold who hath created these things, that bring-
eth out their host by number : he calleth them all by
names
; by the greatness of his might, for that he is
strong in power, not one faileth.&quot; Does the infinity
of orderly change astonish you
?
&quot; Hast thou not
known ? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting
God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth,
fainteth not, neither is weary
? there is no searching
of his understanding.&quot; The absurd definition of
mind is miserable enough as an argument ; but the
assertion that a mind would be unequal to the situa
tion, is positively ludicrous.
One active force in nature, the scientists say ; and
psychology gives them the choice of making that
force nothing, or else the activity of an ever-living
Will. Yet possibly some may feel that this doctrine
is at variance with known scientific facts. How can
we reconcile this doctrine with the fixedness of na
ture s laws ? The answer is,
&quot; With Him is no vari
ableness, neither shadow of turning.&quot; Why may not
Will adopt for purposes of its own a fixed mode of
working
? Why may not the steady law be made
the expression of the constant thought
?
But is not gravitation an impersonal force ?
Surely, since all the splendid achievements of as
tronomy are based upon this conception, we must
suppose it to represent a fact.Review of Herbert Spencer. 123
Yes, we may suppose it to represent a fact, while
it is not the fact itself. In mechanics, when we
have a single force we can always decompose it
into two or more forces which shall produce the
same effect
; or if we have a number of forces,
we can compound them, and obtain an equivalent
single force. In every such case of resolution and
composition, the reasoning for one member of the
equation holds also for the other
; yet we are not
dealing with the fact itself but with its equivalents
the resultant is the equivalent of the components,
and conversely. By this device the problem is made
amenable to our calculus, and the known equivalence
justifies our confidence in the conclusion.
Now scientific theories I believe to be of this na
ture
; they are equivalents of the fact, and not the fact
itself. Being equivalents, they serve the purposes of
science as well as the fact itself would enabling us to
previse phenomena, and giving unity to our knowl
edge, which are the chief functions of science. Thus
the atomic theory works upon matter as composed of
indivisible atoms. Different elements have atoms
of different sizes, and perhaps of different forms
; but
the size and form for each element are constant. Our
chemical philosophy is based almost entirely upon
this conception. By means of it we are able to co
ordinate many chemical facts, and to form some dim
idea of the method of chemical combination. But
while the theory has a scientific value, it is extremelyi 24 Review of Herbert Spencer.
doubtful whether it represents any fact of the inte
rior constitution of matter
; it is an equivalent, not a
fact. So, too, the vibratory theory of light, and the
classifications of natural history, serve to explain
many facts, to give unity to our knowledge, and to
forecast the future. So far they are equivalents, and
we may safely rely upon the conclusions based upon
them, but there is no proof that they are any thing
more. Indeed, the fact that they all fail to explain
all the phenomena, indicates that they are like those
mathematical calculations which are based upon ap
proximative methods true enough for practical pur
poses, but sure to diverge from the truth if carried
too far. They all have a parallax with reality, imper
ceptible indeed for terrestrial measures, but at the
distance of the fixed stars the sub-tending line is the
diameter of the earth s orbit.
This, then, is what I mean in saying that the
scientific conception of gravitation represents a
fact, while it is not the fact itself. Indeed, this
is the way in which Newton stated the theory;
not that there is a power in the sun by which
the planets move, but that they move as they would
if there were such a power. That the force of grav
ity really resides in the atoms, Newton declared to
be a conception which no philosopher could enter
tain, because it implies that inert matter can act
where it is not
; and that, too, across an absolute
void, and without any media whatever. Mr. Mill feltReview of Herbert Spencer. 125
called upon to rebuke Newton for this statement,
insisting that no one now finds any difficulty what
ever in believing that matter can act across a void,
and without media ; and he further advised that every
philosopher who feels inclined to say what can be,
and what cannot, should hang this statement of New
ton s in his study as a warning against similar rash




&quot; with proofs that there
is no active power in matter, and that even matte i
itself is only an assumption, which is far from being
sure, it would seem that Mr. Mill himself might
with very great propriety have hung this statement
of Newton s in his study, together with some of his
own, and might with advantage have pondered them
well before he uttered his rebuke. The truth is, that
to the empirical intellect, whatever is customary is
clear ; as to the empirical conscience, whatever is
customary is right. Science has the laws of the
planets movements, and that is all that it needs to
know. As to the force by which they move, science
can say nothing ; that is a question for philosophy,
and philosophy repudiates the conception of an im
personal force, as involving irrationalities ; and de
clares this great coordinating force of nature to be
the activity of Him in whom we live, and move, and
have our being.
I look upon this idea of force as the only mediator
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by all thinking men that it is impossible to make any
satisfactory partition of territory between these
rivals. Wherever there are events, whether in mind
or in matter, science will look for a law. Wherever
there are events, whether in mind or matter, religion
will look for God. If science and religion are mu
tually exclusive, there must be constant encroach
ments, with resulting feuds, until one or the other is
destroyed. It may be possible for some men to keep
their religion in one hemisphere of their brain and
their science in the other
; but to most men such a
feat is impossible. Few minds are foggy enough to
have hostile ideas encamping in the same head with
out detecting each other s presence. Nor is it desir
able that it should be otherwise, for such a composite
figure is more suggestive of hypocrisy than any thing
else. If one lobe believes only in immutable law,
the other can have little faith in prayer.
But it seems to me that this idea of force, which is
as much the necessity of science as it is of religion,
makes an honorable reconciliation possible, because it
enforces on the one hand the need of an originating
and controlling mind, and on the other leaves the meth
od of its working undetermined. Science discovers
laws, but is forced to provide an ever-active admin
istrator ; this satisfies religion. Religion proves an
ever-living Will, but is compelled to grant its steady
method
; this satisfies science. Thus each can look
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other. To the claim of religion that mind is not
last but first, and rules forever, science says, Amen.
To the claim of science, that this mind has its steady
method, religion answers,
&quot; God is law, say the wise, O soul, and let us rejoice.
For if he thunder by law, the thunder is still his voice.&quot;
Chastened and purified by needed criticism, relig
ion takes up again the strain of ancient piety, and
sings, with a deeper and more assured knowledge,
that He holdeth the deep in the hollow of his hand,
and causeth the day-spring to know his place. To
religion the cause, to science the method
; to relig
ion the power, to science the path
: this, I believe,
is the only possible basis for an abiding peace.
But as it is desirable to continue this argument a
little further, that we may more clearly see the true
character of Mr. Spencer s system, let us grant
what he assumes, the existence &quot;of a universal im
personal force, and inquire how he accounts for the
intelligence which the universe seems to manifest.
We shall find it to be only the old atheistic system
of chance in a new, and not much improved, edition.
One force of infinite, differentiations, but without in
telligent play, is that able to turn chaos into crea
tion ? is that able to hit upon and maintain organic
forms which are marvels of adaptive skill ? is that
able to construct .the eye with its double lenses to
refract the light, with its chamber darkened that no1 28 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
wandering reflections may disturb the image, with
its optic nerve at the optical focus for the reception
of the picture, and with its telegraphic line of com
munication with the brain ? If life is a resultant of
force, it is not the result of a single form but of many.
Mechanical, chemical, elective, thermal forces enter
into the compound ; and only by the nicest adjust
ment is life maintained. Is this underlying linear
force capable of originating and maintaining the
happy balance ? The old theory that out of a jumble
of atoms organic forms arise, is scouted by every
one
; is it any more credible that they should arise
out of a jumble of forces ? Mr. Spencer sees no di-
ficulty in such a view, and bases his faith upon the
&quot;
Instability of the Homogeneous,&quot; the
&quot;
Multiplica
tion of Effects,&quot; and
&quot; Differentiation and Integra
tion
;&quot; three chapters in which he explains the process
of evolution.
Take any mass of homogeneous matter ; its parts
stand differently related to both internal and external
forces. The exterior will receive light and heat,
while the interior will receive no light and little
heat. The same is true of the action of any of the
forces
; they must affect different parts unequally.
But this unequal action will result in unequal
changes, by which the original homogeneity will be de
stroyed. Heterogeneity, being once established, will
cause a still more varied reaction of the several parts,
and the necessary result will be a still more complexReview of Herbert Spencer. 129
heterogeneity. The increasing differentiation of the
parts will cause the incident forces to split into a
variety of forms light, heat, electricity all of which




Here, then, we have a force constantly at work to
produce diversity. Under its operation the homo
geneous nebula spun itself into orbital rings, and
condensed into solid globes. Its working has pro
duced all the heterogeneity of the earth s crust,
and the complexity of its physical aspects. Now
we cannot, to be sure, trace all its operations, but
here is a force which, in some of its turnings
and twistings, must produce living forms. This







Effects.&quot; It will hardly be credited without a quo
tation.
&quot; Take a mass of unorganized but organizable mat
ter either the body of one of the lowest living forms
or the germs of one of the higher. Consider its cir
cumstances either it is immersed in water or air, or
within a parent organism. Wherever placed, how
ever, its outer and inner parts stand differently re
lated to surrounding agencies nutriment, oxygen,
and the various stimuli. But this is not all. Whether
it lies rr.&amp;lt;iscer.t at the bottom of the water or on the
leaf of the pian ;, whether it moves through the water,
preserving some definite attitudes, or whether it is in
the inside of an adult, it equally results that certain1 30 Review of Herbert Spencer.
parts of its surface arc more exposed to light, heat,
or oxygen, and in others to the material tissues and
their contents. Hence must follow the destruction
of its original equilibrium.&quot; P. 370. The over
turned equilibrium is assumed to take the direction
of the parent form.
But as this assumption in the case of the higher
organisms would task the credulity even of ah evolu
tionist, Mr. Spencer proceeds to mask it as follows :
&quot;Of course in the germs of the higher organisms,
the metamorphoses immediately due to the instability
of the homogeneous are soon masked by those due
to the assumption of the hereditary type. Such
early changes, however, as are common to all classes
of organisms, and so cannot be ascribed to heredity,
entirely conform to the hypothesis.
. . .
&quot; But as already hinted, this principle, understood
in the simple form here presented, supplies no key
to the detailed phenomena of organic development.
It fails entirely to explain generic and specific pecul
iarities
; and indeed leaves us equally in the dark re
specting those more important distinctions by which
families and orders are marked out. Why two ova,
similarly exposed in the same pool, should become
the one a fish and the other a reptile, it cannot tell
us. That from two different eggs placed under the
same hen should respectively come forth a duckling
and a chicken, is a fact not to be accounted for on
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alternative but to fall back upon the unexplained
principle of hereditary transmission. The capacity
possessed by an unorganized germ of unfolding into
a complex adult, which repeats ancestral traits in the
minutest details, and that even when it has been
placed in conditions unlike those of its ancestors, is
a capacity we cannot at present understand. . . .
Should it, however, turn out, as we shall hereafter
find reason for suspecting, that these complex differ
entiations which adults exhibit are themselves the
slowly-accumulated and transmitted results of a proc
ess like that seen in the first changes of the germ,
it will follow that even those embryonic changes due
to hereditary influence are remote consequences of
the alleged law. Should it be shown that the slight
modifications wrought during life on each adult, and
bequeathed to offspring along with all preceding
modifications, are themselves unlikenesses of parts
that are produced by unlikenesses of conditions.
Then it will follow that the modifications displayed
in the course of embryonic development are partly
direct consequences of the instability of the homo
geneous, and partly indirect consequences of it.&quot;-
Pp- 373, 374-
This is admirable strategy, but it does not alter
the argument. It extends the time a little, but after
all every thing comes back, directly or indirectly, to
the instability of the homogeneous. The homoge
neous germ must lapse into heterogeneity. Action1 3 2 Review of Herbert Spencer.







multiplied,&quot; and the re
sult will be more heterogeneity. The direction of
these changes is, to be sure, mainly a matter of guess
work for, as Mr. Spencer well says,
&quot; the actions
going on throughont an organism are so involved
and subtle that we cannot expect to identify the par
ticular forces by which particular integrations are
effected.&quot; The finished result will be, let us suppose,
a baby. Out of the infinite heterogeneities possible,
this unintelligent force will hit each time upon that
particular heterogeneity, a baby. When born, it will
bring with it eyes fitted for the light, ears adapted to
sound, lungs adapted to the air, bones to support the
structure, muscles to move it, a nervous system to
coordinate and control its motions
; yet this marvel
ous adaptation of the parts to each other, and of the
whole to its surroundings, and this astonishing pre
vision of future needs, are the results of the
&quot; Insta
bility of the Homogeneous&quot; and the
&quot;
Multiplication
of Effects.&quot; Two pregnant principles surely. But
grant that the homogeneous is unstable, why should
it not fall into a chaotic heterogeneity ? Why should
not the heterogeneous changes cancel themselves,
that is, why should not the result of one heterogenity
be to cancel a previously existing one ? Why should
there be any progress at all ? Most of all, why
should there be any orderly and intelligent series of
changes such as are here exhibited ? Chaotic heter-Revieiv of Herbert S fairer. 133
ogeneitics arc infinite
; how does it happen tHat this
overturned homogeneity escapes all those, and lights
upon a heterogeneity which is impact of intelligence,
foresight, and purpose ? There is no answer to these
questions in any thing which Mr. Spencer has said.
The
&quot;
Instability of the Homogeneous
&quot;
might pos
sibly account for chaos
; it is totally insufficient to
explain creation.
Mr. Spencer attempts to supplement this reason
ing by the chapter on
&quot; Differentiation and Integra
tion.&quot; The doctrine is that like tends to get with
like under the operation of a uniform force. It is
illustrated by the fact that a smart breeze in October
carries away the dying leaves and allows the green
ones to remain. This is called
&quot;
segregation.&quot; The
sorting action of rivers is another example ; first the
larger stones are deposited, next the smaller, and
finally the mud and sand settle far .out at sea. Some
phenomena of crystallization are also appealed to
;
and in society we find that birds of a feather flock
together. All these are instances of &quot;segregation.&quot;
Mr. Spencei has a way of using the vaguest and
most far-fetched analogies as identities, which often
makes it impossible to get at any defined meaning.
But I suppose he intends by these illustrations to
teach that there is some kind of sorting action in the
body, whereby similar kinds of organic matter get
together. Bone matter unites, nervous matter segre
gates, etc. This is the rea-on why each organ ob-134 Review of Herbert Spencer.
tains its own peculiar nourishment. Omitting to
inquire as to the fact, it suffices to say that even if
true the argument is not improved. Simple aggre
gation would satisfy the law of segregation ; but
something more than aggregation is necessary for
organic systems. Nervous matter must not only be
segregated, but segregated in a very peculiar manner.
The marvelous network of nerves which incloses and
interlaces the body is a remarkable order of segrega
tion, and one which is hardly illustrated by the blow
ing away of dead leaves or the washing of sand out
of gravel. The same remark is true for all the com
ponents of the body. Bones, muscles, veins, sinews,
must be segregated after an exact pattern to serve
the needs of the structure. It is not segregation
alone, but the segregation in such peculiar forms, in
forms so happily adapted to the wants of the organ
ism, and which display such marks of intelligence ;
this it is which is the real wonder
; and this is en
tirely unaccounted for by any thing in the
&quot;
Instability
of the Homogeneous,&quot; the &quot;Multiplication of Effects,&quot;
or the process of
&quot; Differentiation and Integration.&quot;
I avow it
; this is nothing but the Lucretian system
of chance dressed up in a pseudo-scientific jargon.
The atoms, Lucretius says, must in infinite time try
all forms
; and some of these forms will live. The
homogeneous, says the later Lucretius, must fall into
the heterogeneous ; and some of these heterogeneities
will live. Will some one point out the difference be-1 of Herbert Spencer. 135
tvveen them ? An imposing and confusing termin
ology, which is made to take the place of argument,
is the only advantage which the modern has over the
ancient.
The purely hap-hazard character of Mr. Spencer s
system appears more clearly in the volumes on Bi
ology and Psychology, where these principles are
applied at length. I will close this part of the dis
cussion by exhibiting the account of the genesis of
Nerves and Nervous Systems. The thesis is, that
nerves and nervous systems are formed by the pas
sage of motion along lines of least resistance
; and
the argument is as follows :
&quot; When, through undifferentiated tissue, there has
passed for the first time a wave of disturbance from
some place where molecular motion is liberated to
some place where it is absorbed, the line of least
resistance followed must be an indefinite and irreg
ular one. Fully to understand the genesis of nerve,
then, we must understand the physical actions which
change this vague course into a definite channel,
that becomes ever more permeable as it is more
used. . . .
&quot; To aid our conceptions we will, as before, take
the rude analogy furnished by a row of bricks on end,
which overthrow one another in succession. If such
bricks on end have been adjusted so that their faces
are all at right angles to the line of the series, the
changes will be propagated along them with the least136 Review of Herbert Spencer.
hinderance ; or, under certain conditions, with the
greatest multiplication of the original impulse. For
when so placed, the impact each brick gives the next,
being exactly in the line of the series, wil-l be wholly
effective
; but when they are otherwise placed it will
not. If the bricks stand with their faces variously
askew, each in falling will have a motion more or less
diverging from the line of the series, and hence only
a part of its momentum will impel the next in the
required direction. Now, though in the case of a
series of molecules the action can be by no means so
simple, yet the same principle holds. The isomeric
change of a molecule must diffuse a wave which is
greater in some one direction than in all others. If
so, there are certain relative positions of molecules
such that each will receive the greatest amount of
this wave from its predecessor, and will so receive it
as most readily to produce a like change in itself. A
series of molecules thus placed must stand in sym
metrical relations to one another polar relations.
And it is not difficult to see that, as in the case of
the bricks, any deviation from symmetrical or polar
relations will involve a proportionate deduction from
the efficiency of the shock, and a diminution in the
quantity of molecular motion given out at the far
end. But now, what is the indirect result when a
wave of change passes along a line of molecules thus
unsymmetrically placed ? The indirect result is, that
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cally-placed molecules, goes toward placing them
symmetrically. Let us again consider what happens
with our row of bricks. When one of these in fall
ing comes against the next standing askew, its im
pact is given to the nearest angle of this next, and so
tends to give this next a motion round its axis.
Further, when the next thus moved delivers its mo
tion to its successor, it does this not through the
angle on the side that was struck, but through the
diagonally-opposite angle ; and, consequently, the
reaction of its impact on its successor adds to the
rotary motion already received. Hence the amount
of force which it does not pass on is the amount of
force absorbed in turning it toward parallelism with
its neighbors. Similarly with the molecules. Each
in falling into its new isomeric attitude, and passing
on the shock to its successor, gives to its successor
a motion which is all passed on if the successor
stands in polar relations toward it, but which if the
relation is not polar is only partially passed on,
some of it being taken up in moving the successor
toward a polar relation. One more consequence is to
be observed. Every approach of the molecules toward
symmetrical arrangement increases the amount of
molecular motion transferred from one end of the
series to the other. Suppose that the row of bricks,
which were at the first very much out of parallelism,
have fallen, and that part of the motion given by
each to the next has gone toward bringing their138 Review of Herbert Spencer.
faces nearer to parallelism ; and suppose that, with
out further changing the positions of their bases, the
bricks are severally restored to their vertical atti
tudes ; then it will happen that if the serial overthrow
of them is repeated, the actions, though the same as
before in their kinds, will not be the same as before
in their degrees. Each brick, falling as it now does
more in the line of the series, will deliver more of its
momentum to the next
; and less momentum will be
taken up in moving the next toward parallelism with
its neighbors. If, then, the analogy holds, it must
happen that in the series of isornerically-changing
molecules, each transmitted wave of molecular motion
is expended partly in so altering the molecular atti
tudes as to render the series more permeable to future
waves, and partly in setting up changes at the end
of the series ; that in proportion as less of it is ab
sorbed in working this structural change, more of it
is delivered at the far end and greater effect is pro
duced there
; and that the final state is one in which
the initial wave of molecular motion is transmitted
without deduction or rather, with the addition of
the molecular motion given out by the successive
molecules of the series in their isomeric falls.
&quot; From beginning to end, therefore, the develop
ment of nerve results from the passage of motion
along the line of least resistance, and the reduction
of it to a line of less and less resistance continually
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is restored, between a plaee where molecular motion
is in excess and a place where it is in defect, comes
within this formula. The production of a more con
tinuous line of that peculiar colloid best fitted to
transmit the molecular motion also comes within
this formula, as does likewise the making of this
line thicker and more even. And the formula also
covers that final process by which the line, having
been formed, has its molecules brought into the polar
order which least resists, and indeed facilitates, the
transmission of the wave.&quot; *
This entire process, it must be remembered, is be
low the microscopic limit. These facts are seen only
with the mind s eye, and I greatly question whether
they have any objective existence. When Mr. Spen
cer began the paragraph, he was in doubt con
cerning his doctrine
; but after he had imagined the
series of bricks falling down and standing up again
of themselves, and assumed that the analogy was
perfect between the bricks and the unseen molecules,
he waxes bolder, and emerges from his imaginations
with the formula that nerves are formed by the pas
sage of motion along lines of least resistance, and
this formula is said to include every case. Motion
makes the nerve, lays down the line of gray matter
along which the nervous influence travels, and
sheathes it with the white coating which prevents
its dissipation. The argument is the purest imagina-
*
Principles of Psychology, vol. i, pp. 517, 518.140 Review of Herbert Spencer.
tion
; not even the microscope knows any thing about
the process here indicated. But allowing it to pass,
it throws no light whatever on the structure of the
nervous system. For if it were admitted that mo
tion along lines of least resistance can build up
nerves, the lines of least resistance next need expla
nation. Consider the marvelous interlacing of the
nerves, and how necessary that complexity is for the
uses of the structure, and then tell us how it came
to pass that the lines of least resistance arranged
themselves so happily. An eye would be useless
without an optic nerve, and accordingly a line of
least resistance ran down to the eye. An ear would
be worthless without the auditory nerve, but, fortu
nately, a line of least resistance was not wanting.
There is not a muscle in the body which, apart from
nervous connection, is of the slightest use
; and to
guard against this waste, the lines of least resistance
run to every one. The body would be constantly
exposed to injury if its surface were not sensitive,
and so the lines of least resistance establish sentinels
so close to one another that not even the point of a
needle can creep betwen them. The lines of least
resistance, upon Mr. Spencer s theory, are the real
marvel ; and these are left totally unexplained.
Let us now steady ourselves for a moment before
that mass of protoplasm in which no lines of commu
nication are yet set up, and inquire what the result will
be when motion is initiated in any part ? Mr. SpencerReinciv of Herbcit Spencer. 141
says
:
&quot; The isomeric change of a molecule must dif
fuse a wave which is greater in some one direction than
in all others. If so, there are certain relative positions
of molecules, such that each will receive the greatest
amount of this wave from its predecessor, and will
so receive it as most readily to produce a like change
in itself.&quot; Now why should that
&quot; some one direc
tion
&quot;
in which the wave of molecular motion is
&quot;
greater than in all others
&quot; be in any case, not to
say in each case, the one direction which the needs
of the organism make imperative ? Why should it
take the complex direction of the complete nervous
system
? There is no a priori necessity for such an
arrangement ; on the contrary, there is the very
strongest a priori improbability against it. The bare
possibility is a thing of chance, and that of a high
infinitesimal order, while the argument is based
upon as pure fancies as ever entered Don Quixote s
brain. Indeed, Mr. Spencer himself at times has
misgivings that his account is rather fanciful, and he
enters the caveat that he does not insist that the
primitive nervous system was formed in this way ;
he only suggests this as a possible way. He further
says
:
&quot; A critical reader may ask, How can a state
of molecular tension between two places separated
by a great mass of amorphous organic substance
cause transmission along a definite line which divides
and subdivides in the way described ?
&quot; Doubtless such a process is not easy to imagine
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under the conditions we are apt to assume. But the
apparent difficulty disappears when, instead of the
conditions we are apt to assume, we take the condi
tions which actually occur. The error naturally fallen
into is that of supposing these actions to go on in
creatures of considerable bulk
; whereas, observation
warrants us in concluding that they go on in ex
tremely small creatures. . . .
&quot; The structure described having been first formed
on this extremely small scale admits of eventual
enlargement to any scale. Conducing to the growth
and preservation of the individual, inherited by prog
eny capable by the aid it yields of growing still
larger, and bequeathed with its accumulated incre
ments of size and development to successively higher
types that spread into better habitats and adopt
more profitable modes of life, this mere rudiment
may, in course of geologic epochs, evolve into a con
spicuous nervous apparatus possessed by a creature
of large size. And so by this slow indirect method
there may be established lines of nervous communi
cation where direct establishment of them would be
impossible.&quot;
*
Two critical remarks are here to be made :
First. The extension of time which Mr. Spencer
bespeaks explains nothing. An evolved steam-en
gine or loom would be no less the work of intelli
gence than one made in a day. The involved rela-
*
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tions, the adaptation of means to ends, the purpose
which it displays these demand intelligence in the
maker, no matter how far removed he may be from
the work. I repudiate entirely Mr. Spencer s sug
gestion, that the work which it were folly to attribute
to chance to-day, might be very rationally attributed
to it in geologic epochs. Mr. Spencer is clearly not
anxious to make many nervous systems in this fash
ion. He only seeks to get a primitive one started
in some very simple organism ; and, once set agoing,
it can take care of itself and go on in endless im
provement. But appearances are often deceiving ;
the nature of any thing is to be judged by what
comes out of it, and not merely by its size and seem
ing. If that primitive system contained within it
capacities for such astonishing development as
Mr. Spencer claims for it, then it was not the
simple thing he assumes it to be, and the ques
tion comes back again in all its force, What in
volved all these possibilities ? Mr. Spencer has no
answer.
The second criticism is, that Mr. Spencer seems to
have forgotten that he is engaged in proving the doc
trine of evolution, and cannot be allowed to assume
it. The force of his reply lies entirely in the assump
tion that evolution is an established fact. This, how
ever, is not the only time that Mr. Spencer has done
this. Many of his arguments, as we shall hereafter
see, assume the point in dispute, and are worthless144 Review of Herbert Spencer.
without the assumption. It is needless to comment
upon such admirable strategy.
Such is the scientific account of the origin of
nerves and nervous systems. As a piece of ingen
ious imagination it deserves to rank very high. As
an example of nerve, too, it deserves an equally high
rank
; for surely it must require a great deal of nerve
to manufacture nerves in this fanciful fashion, and
then parade the result as having the exactness of
science and the certitude of demonstration. After
these luminous imaginings, and the caveat previously
mentioned, Mr. Spencer goes on his way rejoicing,






tending mind entirely superfluous by these baseless
and inconsistent fancies. The only thing more aston
ishing than the argument itself, is that it should ever
have been believed.
But what need to pursue weakness and folly further ?
Let us sum up this chapter. We have seen that the
philosophical principles of Parts I and II are in abso
lute contradiction to each other
; that if Part I is true,
Part II must be sent to the purgatory of &quot;pseud-ideas ;&quot;
while if Part II is true, the sentence of banishment
against religious ideas must be recalled. We have
seen that the positive proof of the correlation of the
physical with the vital and mental forces is of the
weakest kind, even if there were no opposing evi
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is in the plainest opposition to undoubted facts. We
have seen in addition that the same mental law which
warrants the belief in external power, also warrants
the resolution of that power into a personal activity
Finally, we have seen that, even granting to Mr.
Spencer his impersonal force, the proof that it can
do the work of intelligence is a compound of scien
tific terms and the purest romance. When stripped
of their seeming science, his explanations are those
which atheism has always given chance and time.




a place in the
&quot;
Poetry of Science,&quot; but I am confident that it will
do no more. That such a compound of inconsistent
fancies and palpable contradictions should have held
a prominent position in science for ten years, only
shows how low logical and metaphysical studies have
fallen among us, and is altogether the best example
I can recaH of the
&quot;




come now to the most difficult problem
which evolution has to solve. In the lower
field of life we seem still to be dealing with matter
and force in space relations, and the evolutionists
argument has a superficial plausibility. But when
we rise to the mental plane we meet with a new set
of objects, with sensations, with emotions, and with
thoughts, in all of which we detect no space rela
tions and no mechanical measures. An impassable
gulf seems to separate the world of mind from the
world of matter. If there be any mechanical connec
tion it is an occult one, and the reality of the fact must
be made plain before we can yield our assent. For,
not to mention the difficulty of evolving thought and
feeling from the clashing of inert atoms, before this
doctrine can be proved, the validity of logical laws
and the trustworthiness of all our mental processes
must be established. Otherwise, the results reached
by reasoning will be untrustworthy, and all science
and evolution must disappear together. I expect to
find, upon a psychological examination, that the
metaphysical data of all reasoning transcend the
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ist can take his choice : either he can admit their
validity, which will prove fatal to his system, or he
can deny it, which will be intellectual suicide.
In examining the testimony, let us bear in mind the
points which must be proved
: first, that the physical
forces and sensation correlate ; second, that thought
is only transformed sensation ; third, that the intui
tions of reason, while valid for all space and time, are
the product of experience ; and, fourth, that the soul
has no self-determining power. If any of these
points cannot be made out, the theory breaks down
hopelessly in its application to mind.
In applying his theory to the explanation of men
tal evolution, Mr. Spencer finds a philosophy ready-
made to his hand. The experience-philosophy has
sought, for ages, to prove that all that is in the mind
has been derived from sensation. Beginning with
this, it aims to show how all the laws of thinking
and all our apparently simple beliefs have been gen
erated. The law of causation, the principles of
formal logic, the reality of an external world, the
moral postulates of conscience, and even the belief
in personality, are but elaborated and refined sensa
tions. The astronomer who accepts the nebular
theory teaches that the original mist must condense
and build up solid globes, and determine all their
characteristics. So the experience-philosophy, postu
lating only a mist of sensation, teaches that that mist
must condense, and differentiate, and integrate until148 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the solid frame-work of mind is built up. There
is, indeed, much in the mind, at present, that seems
independent of experience, like the belief in logical
axioms or in causation
; and these beliefs even put
on airs, and repudiate their parentage, and, worst of
all, assume to lord it over experience itself. Such
filial impiety deserves severe rebuke
; and the expe
rience-philosopher proceeds to reduce these pretend
ers to becoming humility by showing them the
baseness of their birth. The fragrance and beauty
of a flower are but transformations of the mold at
its root
; so all that seems independent or noble in
the mind, is but transformed pains and pleasures.
The mind has no powers of its own, but gains them
from without, and its laws are all enacted for it by
experience. Whatever claims to be independent of
this source is an impostor, whose claims must be
met with becoming scorn. This philosophy is
adopted by Mr. Spencer, without any important
modifications, as illustrating the doctrine of evolu
tion. By means of the correlation of forces, he
hooks the beginnings of life to the physical world
;
and the experience-philosophy is offered as the
explanation of mental evolution. In the hands of
all its defenders, this philosophy has always taken
an insane delight in knocking out its own brains
;
and, as habit strengthens with age, we shall find it
performing this interesting feat with unusual gusto,
under the direction of Mr. Spencer.Review of Herbert Spencer. 149
But, before he can avail himself of the assoria-
tionalists teachings, Mr. Spencer must bridge the
gulf which separates thought from motion, mind
from matter. Until this is done, he cannot assume
to explain mental evolution.
His chief argument has already been given in
Chapter III. It amounted, as we said, to this :
Nervous states affect mental states, and conversely ;
therefore, each is a form of the other.
The fact alleged is undoubted, and has been
admitted by all realists since the world began. It
is no new revelation that sickness has a depressing
effect upon the mind
; that the various physical
stimuli affect mental activity ; that powerful emo
tions exalt or depress the functions of the organism ;
that an injured brain entails unconsciousness, or
that a mind diseased can drag the body down into
ruin. None of these facts are recent discoveries ;
and if we grant the truth of the spiritualistic doc
trine, this interdependence of soul and body, upon
which the materialist bases his belief, is precisely
what we should expect. Admit, as we must, that
at present the activity of the soul is conditioned
by the organism, and all these consequences follow.
If the soul communicates with the external world by
means of a material organism, then the interests of
both must be bound up together as long as the part
nership continues. If the external world report itself
through nervous tides, then the condition of the150 Review of Herbert Spencer.
nervous system will be a most important factor of the
resulting knowledge. If, on the other hand, the body
is the mechanism for revealing thoughts and feelings,
it again follows that the state of the instrument must
affect the manifestation. If the appointed pathways
of sensation are broken up, no reports can pass
within. If the dial-plate be defaced and broken,
signals can be made no longer. If the wires be dis
ordered, so that only wild and fitful currents can
flow over them, the result must be mental distrac
tion at one end, and aimless action at the other
;
just as the wandering earth-currents, which interfere
with the Atlantic cable, spell out only illiterate mes
sages and inarticulate cries. To suppose it other
wise would make the connection useless, and our
bodies would be of no more interest to us than our
cast-off clothes.
I think, too, that there is a moral reason for the in
terdependence. If the soul use the body as an instru
ment for sinning, it shall find itself sold into degrad
ing and bitter bondage by its partner in crime. If it
make itself the home of evil, it shall find the body
dragged down into ruin along with it, and turned into
a bulletin for the publication of its shame. If it were
not for this connection, the moral discipline of our
present life would be almost entirely lost. But, not
to rest the argument upon this, I repeat that the in
terdependence of physical and spiritual conditions is
a necessary result of the hypothesis. Mr. Spencer sReview of Herbert Spencer.
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facts are admitted by every psychologist, but there
are insuperable objections against assuming that the
mental state is but a transformation of its physical
antecedent ; a relation undoubtedly exists, but it is
impossible to believe in a correlation.
For the physical antecedent does not explain the
fact, even in the case of sensation the department
in which the argument is most plausible. Let us
follow the in-going nerve-current until it reaches the
center of the brain. Let us note the isomeric changes
of the nerves and the vibrating molecules of the brain.
We do not come upon sensation. On the contrary,
motion, molecular machinery, is all we find. There
is nothing in all this to give any hint of the world
of consciousness beyond. Mr. Spencer himself re
cognizes a difficulty here, and says
:
&quot; How this metamorphosis takes place ; how a
force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a
mode of consciousness
; how it is possible for aerial
vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound,
or for the force liberated by chemical changes in the
brain to give rise to emotion these are mysteries
which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not
profounder mysteries than the transformation of the
physical forces into each other.&quot; *
Mr. Spencer is mistaken. If the received doctrine
about the physical forces be true, there is no mystery
at all in the change of one into another. For we are
* First Principles, p. 280.IS 2 Review of Herbert Spencer.
told that all these forces are motions
; heat, magnet
ism, light, all are modes of motion. The transfor
mation, then, of the physical forces is simply a change
of one kind of motion into another which is not so
rare a thing after all
; and if, as seems probable, the
difference between these motions is only a difference
of faster and slower, the problem becomes simpler
still. Now, with all deference to Mr. Spencer s
dictum, I must say that the change of one kind of
motion into another is one thing, but to change mo
tion into feeling, which is not motion and which can
not by any effort be thought of as motion, is quite
another. If we follow the physical forces in their
transformations with one another, the antecedent ac
counts for the result
; but when we attempt to follow
them into their correlations with consciousness, the
assumed cause gives no explanation whatever of the
effect.
Again, if there be a mechanical correlation of
thought and motion, the relation must be necessary
and constant. Now, if thought and sensation are
only transformed nerve-force, the connection should
be invariable
; and whenever the proper forces present
themselves at the chamber of the mind, the corre
sponding mental state should invariably appear. But
in truth nine tenths of the physical antecedents of
sensation never produce any sensation at all. In the
concentration of thought, the hum of the school-room,
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of nature arc lost, or attract no attention. This is a
fact familiar to every one. The antecedents of sen
sation are there. From drum and retina come up
the nervous tides which are said to correlate with
thought, but they perish without notice. And so
nerve-currents are constantly pouring up from skin,
from muscles, from eye, from ear, but the most of
them pour unnoticed over into the abyss which divides
thought from the subtlest motion and the rarest mat
ter. What do they correlate with ? The sequence of
the physical forces is rigid and unvarying ; but the
sequence of sensation depends entirely upon the at
tention of the mind within. Sensation is impossible
without an inner activity of the soul. Often, indeed,
this activity is only semi-conscious
; but let it be
some faint sound or some dim sight which we are
trying to catch, and our activity rises into conscious
effort at once. We attend, we listen, we concentrate
ourselves upon the particular organ, through which
we look for the report ; and without this attention,
this concentration, this conscious effort, there is no
sensation. This fact itself is sufficient to utterly dis
prove the correlation. There is an inhabitant within,
who is not nerve-currents, but who from nerve-cur
rents reads off the outer world.
Again, if this theory be true, the same physical
antecedent ought to produce the same mental states,
which is far enough from being true. The same
words spoken in the same way may be praise or154 Review of Herbert Spencer.
insult, and the mental state varies accordingly. If
struck by accident we have one feeling ; if struck on
purpose we have quite another. The physical ante
cedents are the same
; why are the results various ?
There are myriad facts of this nature, none of which
can be explained by a mechanical correlation of
thought and motion. A discriminating, judging
mind, back of nerve-currents, is the only possible
explanation.
The theory fails, then, to explain even those mental
states which stand directly related to physical ante
cedents
; but it breaks down completely when it at
tempts to explain those psychical states which have
no direct physical antecedents, and which constitute
by far the greatest part of our conscious experience.
One sits in the twilight and muses. Pictures come
and go. He wanders again through scenes, once
familiar, but which now are many miles and years
away. The friends of his childhood look in upon
him, and tones heard long ago re-vibrate on his ear.
The vast dim halls of memory light up, and from the
niches where stand the images of dead affection,
step forms of life, and fall into his arms once more.
Faithful hearts driven asunder by necessities too
sharp to be resisted meet again, and the living man
tells the dead of his loneliness and longing. What
is the physical antecedent of this, and similar ac
tivity
? It is a world of our own creation in which
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cedents can be shown to be the creator ? That
there are any is pure assumption without the shadow
of proof.
Mr. Spencer does indeed offer the lame and impo
tent suggestion, that this activity, though it does not
correlate directly with the physical forces, does corre
late with the vital, which in turn correlate with the
physical ; and that thus all mental action comes back
ultimately to the physical world. The proof is that
mental action is accompanied by nervous waste, and
hence the two are identical. But, two difficulties
meet us in accepting this reasoning
: first, that nerv
ous waste may be effect instead of cause, and hence
explains nothing ; and, second, that the assumption
that it is the cause, is, first, a bald begging of the
question, and, next, is no explanation in any case.
The combination of a few grains of carbon, nitrogen,
etc., throws no light on mental phenomena.
Again, according to this theory there can be no
such thing as self-determination, and if there is such
a thing the theory is false. Mr. Spencer admits this,
and on the ground that freedom is destructive to his
theory he distinctly denies its possibility. Once, in
deed, for the sake of a fling at an opponent s view,
he objects to that view that it teaches a most rigid
necessity in all thought and action ; but, after he has
fittingly rebuked such teaching, he falls back on the
same doctrine. But we have already seen enough to
make us suspect that Mr. Spencer is not always the156 Review of Herbert Spencer.
most reliable teacher
; let us then appeal from his
decision. Can the soul initiate action or can it
not?
The appeal is to the universal consciousness, and
the answer is undoubted. Whatever theory it may
upset, the soul is self-determinant. It can act, or not.
It can act in this direction, or in that. It avails
nothing to say that it cannot act without a motive
;
motives are reasons for action, not causes, in philo
sophical sense. It is equally useless to say that with
out the physical forces the volition could not be
carried out. The soul manifests itself through ma
terial media, and of course can do so only when the
so-called material forces are present. But what was
it that set the muscles to contracting and forces to
working ? What was it that overturned the original
equilibrium and precipitated effort in this direction
instead of that ? Did the forces set themselves to
work, or was there a controlling cause behind them ?
Which supposition is true ? The latter, the universal
consciousness being witness, and that hidden cause,
as Dean Alford would say,
&quot; that s me.&quot;
There is indeed a simplicity in this doctrine of cor
relation which is very attractive. To begin with only
matter and attraction, and mount by successive steps
through chemistry and physiology, until not only mat
ter and force, but thought and mind also, are under our
feet until love, conscience, and faith fall into line with
the physical sciences, this is certainly an attractiveReview of Herbert Spencer. 157
programme
it offers to do so much with such a small
capital
! Given the raw rudiments of matter and
force, and an unlimited supply of time, and there will
be no difficulty in grinding out an angel. Unfor
tunately, it cannot be done. Mental science cannot
be studied as a continuation of physical science.
There is no doubt a psychological value in physio
logical research, but such research can never blossom
into psychology. As I have previously pointed out,
if it were possible to observe all that passes in the
body, and gaze to the center of the brain, we should
gain no mental facts. We should see motion, not
sensation ; vibration, not thought. Motion in the
spinning of brain molecules, or the passage of nerve
currents, would be all that the sharpest observer
could detect ; nor would there be any thing in this
to suggest the world of thought beyond. This can
be reached only through self-consciousness ; indeed
all fact is reached only through consciousness.
Physiology may boast as it will of the light it has
thrown upon mental problems ; psychology alone
makes physiology possible.
Now the soul clearly and emphatically distinguishes
itself, both from the external world and from the or
ganism which it inhabits. It rules the latter, and
causes it to do its bidding ; and even in those things
in which the soul is subject to the body, it no less
clearly distinguishes itself from the body. It con
sciously resists sleep, weakness, fainting, disease ;
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and even when it is overborne and conquered, it still
testifies to its independent being.
In every act of knowledge, too, the soul implicitly
affirms for itself a separate existence. The mind is
implicitly given in all knowledge, as the eye and ear
are postulated in all seeing and hearing ; but so un
obtrusive is the mental affirmation that men fall into
the folly of supposing that physical science, which
mental science alone makes possible, can displace the
latter. In every act of knowledge two things are
always given the knower and the known and they
are given as distinct from each other. We may
restrict our attention to the subject, and the result
will be mental science
; or we may give it to the
object, and the result will be physical science. But
in every act of knowing both are given, and given, I
think, in exact equipoise. No discredit, then, can be
cast on the one, without also destroying the other.
Hence physical science and mental science are twins,
and, like the Siamese twins, inseparable. The very
nature of the cognitive act renders it impossible to
arrange them in linear order, and the science which
attempts such an arrangement must commit both
logical and psychological suicide. The discredit
cast on the subjective does and must destroy the ob
jective. I submit, then, that the linear arrangement
of the sciences which Mr. Spencer contemplates is
psychologically impossible.
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ting the fact of this antithesis, deny that it is
trustworthy. To be sure the mind does distin
guish itself from the scene, but this distinction
represents no reality in the nature of things. The
so-called object is but a representation which the
mind makes to itself, through the operation of its
own laws. I believe, on the contrary, that an exam
ination would show that this primary distinction
cannot be argued away, but that it is sure beyond all
question. If either member of this antithesis is to
be destroyed, it must be the objective. The subjec
tive element is given beyond all possibility of doubt.
Self as perceiving, is the most fundamental datum of
consciousness. The object can be reached only by
accepting the testimony of the subject ; deny that
testimony, and the universe disappears in a bottom
less pit of nihilism. I insist upon it, the subjective
element must stand, to make any science possible.
The only alternative is to admit the distinction, or to
deny the object ; and either would be fatal to Mr.
Spencer s theory. In the last analysis, materialistic
science is a contradiction.
And, strangely enough, no one insists upon this
distinction more strongly than Mr. Spencer himself.
He says
:
&quot; Where the two modes of being which we dis
tinguish as subject and object have been severally
reduced to their lowest terms, any further compre
hension must be an assimilation of these lowest160 Review of Herbert Spencer.
terms to one another, and, as we have already seen,
this is negatived by the very distinction of subject
and object, which is itself consciousness of a differ
ence transcending all other differences. So far from
helping us to think of them as of one kind, analysis
but serves to render more apparent the impossibility
of finding for them a common concept a thought
under which they can be united.&quot; Vol. i, p. 157.
&quot; That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with
a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest
when we bring the two into juxtaposition.&quot; P. 158.
Again he says
:
&quot; Nevertheless it may be as well to
say here, once for all, that if we were compelled to
choose between the alternatives of translating mental
phenomena into physical phenomena, or translating
physical phenomena into mental phenomena, the
latter alternative would seem the more acceptable
of the two.&quot; P. 162.
If I had not been aware beforehand of Mr,
Spencer s almost supernatural appetite for self-
contradiction, I should have thought on reading
these passages that he intended to take his own
advice, and
&quot; rest content with that duality of them
which our constitution necessitates.&quot; But to do
this would be to destroy his theory, and that is
too much to ask of any one. Accordingly, though
&quot;a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a
unit of motion,&quot; and though
&quot;
analysis but serves to
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them i common concept, and though
&quot; the antithesis
of subject and object is never to be transcended
while consciousness lasts,&quot; Mr. Spencer neverthe
less assures us that &quot;it is one and the same ultimate
reality which is manifested to us subjectively and
objectively.&quot; P. 627. How he found it out I don t
know ; it clearly could not have been while he was
conscious, for the distinction &quot;is never to be tran
scended while consciousness lasts.&quot; Luckily, how
ever, Mr. Spencer gives us a much more concrete
statement as to the way in which subject and object
are united in the following paragraph
:
&quot; For just in the same way the object is the unknown
permanent nexus, which is never itself a phenomenon,
but is that which holds phenomena together ; so is
the subject the unknown permanent nexus, which is
never itself a state of consciousness, but which holds
the states of consciousness together.&quot; This is the
definition of the subject ; and then, though it is
&quot;
unknown,&quot; he proceeds to show what it is : &quot;For, as
shown in the earlier part of this work, an idea is the
psychical side of what on its physical side is an in
volved set of molecular changes propagated through
an involved set of nervous plexuses. That which
makes possible the idea is the pre-existence of these
plexuses so organized that a wave of molecular mo
tion diffused through them will produce, as its psy
chical correlative, the components of the conception
in (Lie order and degree. This idea lasts while the1 62 Review of Herbert Spencer.
waves of molecular motion last ceasing when they
cease
; but that which remains is the set of plexuses.
These constitute the potentiality of the idea, and
make possible future ideas like it. Each such set
of plexuses perpetually modified in detail by per
petual new actions, capable of entering into countless
combinations, and capable of having its several parts
variously excited just as the external object presents
its combined attributes in various ways is thus the
permanent internal nexus for ideas answering to the
permanent external nexus for phenomena.&quot; Vol. ii,
p. 484.
Thus the great distinction of subject and object
vanishes, and self is resolved into the organism.
The distinction disappears ; though Mr. Spencer de
clares it cannot be interpreted away. The assimila
tion is made
; though he says that analysis but serves
to make manifest its impossibility. Units of feeling
are resolved into units of motion, though the two
have nothing in common. Mr. Spencer insists that
the criterion of truth is the impossibility of conceiv
ing the opposite ; and argues this at great length
against the skeptics and idealists. It appears that
he has changed his mind since he wrote
&quot; First
Principles,&quot; for then the inconceivability of the oppo
site was no proof at all at least, in the earlier part of
the work. But since this is the criterion of truth, it
would seem that a distinction which is insisted upon
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ought to be accepted as real. But this would put
mind outside of the physical chain, and accord
ingly Mr. Spencer, in the teeth of all logic, denies
the distinction. When it suits his purpose, he ad
mits the testimony of the mind ; when it does not,
he proceeds to worry and bully it out of countenance.
All that the mind says in his favor is true, all that
it says against him is false this is Mr. Spencer s
position.
To this the associationalists reply that the idea of
subject and object, the distinction of myself from the
world, is of comparatively recent origin ; and, instead
of being simple, is consolidated from millions of expe
riences which stretch back through unknown ages.
There was a time in the history of mental evolution
when this distinction was unknown. These ideas then
are not elementary but highly complex, and nothing
can be built upon them.
This alleged fact is only a fancy, and implicitly
begs the question ; but even if we admit it, the argu
ment is not helped. Indeed, this constant assump
tion of the experience-philosophers, that every thing
must be measured in its beginnings, is a profound
fallacy, if not a gross logical imposition. When we
refer to the laws of thought as valid for all space and
time, and to the law of conscience as binding upon
all moral beings, they seek to throw discredit upon
these ideas by showing how they have been built up.
Do you see that jelly quiver when touched ? that is164 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the raw material of mind. Do you see that cringing
cur ? that is the dawn of the moral sentiment
But, gentlemen, what do you mean ? You, who talk
of development tell us plainly whether we are devel
oping faculty, knowledge, power ; or whether we are
developing illusion, delusion, and baseless dreams.
Give us a plain answer here, and we shall know what
to say. If the former supposition be true, then these
faculties as we have them, and not as they appeared
in some early cell, or even as they manifest them
selves in infancy, but as they are to-day here in their
highest form, in their latest utterances, are the most
trustworthy. If we are indeed developing, we need
not inquire into the belief of the first polyp to reach
the truth; but the last utterances of our faculties, as
they have disengaged themselves from mental chaos,
must be accepted as of the highest authority. The
product must be judged by the finished work, and not
by its raw beginnings.
But if the latter supposition that we are only
growing into illusion be true, then we must seek
truth in the minds of pre-human apes, or rather in
the blind stirrings of some primitive pulp. In that
case we can indeed put away all our science, but we
must put away the great doctrine of evolution along
with it. The experience-philosophy cannot escape
this alternative
; either the positive deliverances of
our mature consciousness must be accepted as they
stand, or all truth must be declared impossible.Revinv of Herbert Spencer. 165
What then, I ask again, will Mr. Spencer do with
this plain distinction which the soul makes between
itself and ail else ? He can admit it, which is real
ism
; he can deny the object, which is idealism ; he
can deny the subject, which must end in nihilism.
But any one of these alternatives would be fatal to
his system.
Once again Mr. Spencer s system breaks down. Not
even the wonderful flying leaps of his peculiar logic
serve to carry him across the gulf which separates
mind and matter. The plainest facts of mental ex
perience, and the most emphatic utterances of con
sciousness, dispute his right of way. If, then, we
were inclined to be severely logical, we might issue
an injunction restraining Mr. Spencer from any fur
ther advance until this pass has been securely bridged.
But inasmuch as our logical clemency has before been
extended, even so far as to wink at a multitude of
logical sins, let us once more exercise our royal
prerogative, and graciously grant to Mr. Spencer the
beginnings of life and sensation
; and, perhaps, with
this capital, he will be able to accomplish something.
His first attempts, however, awaken a fear that this
royal clemency will be abused. Having collected a
multitude of facts concerning nervous structure and
function, and having also
&quot;
grouped together the
inductions drawn from a general survey of mental
states and processes,&quot; Mr. Spencer declares that he
is
&quot;
prepared for a deductive interpretation.&quot; The166 Review of Herbert Spencer.
nature of this deduction is shadowed forth in the fol
lowing quotation
:
&quot; If the doctrine of evolution is true, the inevitable
implication is that mind can be understood only by
observing how mind is evolved. If creatures of the
most elevated kinds have reached those highly inte
grated, very definite, and extremely heterogeneous
organizations they possess through modifications upon
modifications accumulated during an immeasurable
past if the developed nervous systems of such creat
ures have gained their complex structures and func
tions little by little then, necessarily, the involved
forms of consciousness, which are the correlatives of
these complex structures and functions, must have
arisen by degrees. And as it is impossible truly to
comprehend the organization of the body in general,
or of the nervous system in particular, without tracing
its successive stages of complication ; so it must be
impossible to comprehend mental organization with
out similarly tracing its stages. Here, then, we com
mence the study of mind as objectively manifested in
its ascending gradations through the various types of
sentient beings.&quot; Vol. i, p. 291.
This is the key-note of all that follows, and a type
of evolution logic. Mr. Spencer, on the strength of
this paragraph, begins with the yeast plant and red
snow alga, and traces life and mind from these hum
ble beginnings up to man. There are, however,
some objections to the procedure.Review of Herbert Spencer. 167
First, all knowledge begins at home. All that
we know is known in consciousness, and what
ever cannot report itself there must remain for
ever unknown. All that is known of the outer
world, is known only through modifications of con
sciousness
; and all that we know of the mental
operations of others, can be known only by assim
ilating them to our own. How do we know that
the motions of animals have any psychological
meaning at all ? It is only as we infer that like
motions mean the same in them as in us, it is only
as we know our own mind, that we can take the first
step toward a knowledge of mind in the lower orders.
C9
Now, since this is so, since human psychology must
precede all others, and since the psychology of the
yeast plant and the polyps is, to say the least, a matter
of pure conjecture, I submit that it is not wise to
give such inquiries any great weight. To attempt to
use them to throw discredit upon human psychology,
is self-destructive
; for their psychological value de
pends upon the truth of our self-knowledge.
Still another objection arises. This procedure is
warranted only on the assumption that evolution is
an established fact ; whereas I understand that Mr.
Spencer is trying to prove the doctrine. What is the
proof of the doctrine? Why, all these arguments,
running through a thousand pages. But the argu
ments are worthless without the assumption of the
doctrine. The arguments support the doctrine, and168 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the doctrine supports the arguments. Do you object
to this? It is no more than tair play. One good




&quot; Modern Aristotle.&quot; The mutual atti
tude of both teacher and taught, in this
&quot; New Phi




Open your mouth and shut your eyes,
And I ll give you something to make you wise.&quot;
That the conscious ego is a being capable of knowl
edge and thought, and able to direct its own activity
into such channels as it may choose, is a conception
which, to Mr. Spencer, is supremely
&quot;
pseud.&quot; He
denies it in the plainest terms, and insists that mind
is composed throughout of feelings, consolidated or
otherwise. Of course, he recognizes the existence
of self as constantly as any one. In this way he
gives some scanty plausibility to his argument ; but
as soon as he is confronted with self as a witness
against him, he unceremoniously turns the &quot;pseud-
idea&quot; out of doors. Plainly, the best established
facts of consciousness must expect no quarter what
ever from the
&quot; New Philosophy,&quot; if they are so im
prudent as to raise any objections. It would not be





Feelings are all in all. The ultimate units of mat
ter when differently combined build up the chemical
elements, the crust of the earth, and all the varietyReviciv of Herbert Spencer. 169
of organic life ; so feelings, which are the ultimate
mental unit, compose by their different combinations
all that is in the mind, and originate all its powers.
The problem is to show that a string of feelings,
which existed long before there was any one to have
them, at last becomes conscious of itself and of its
constituent parts, apprehends their relations to one
another, reflects upon them, and draws conclusions
from them, and all the while is but a feeling, and
the process is but a feeling. In this way conscious
ness, the belief in self and the outer world, the ab
stract processes of thought, etc., are manufactured.
We should have less difficulty with this theory
if it were clearly shown that a feeling can exist
apart from a subject. A free feeling apart from a
conscious subject, is inconceivable ; just as a free
thought apart from a thinker is inconceivable. Such
a thing might be possible in the depths and deep
night of the unknowable
; but it is not possible
in the realm of rationality. The feelings are intro
duced to create the subject ; but the feelings them
selves are inconceivable except as belonging to a
conscious subject. This may be a weakness of our
thought, but it is an inveterate one ; and until it be
disproved, we shall feel constrained to view it as a
power. Every thing cannot be granted to the needs
of Mr. Spencer s system.
I am ready to learn
; but before I can take the oath
of allegiance to this doctrine, another difficulty must1 70 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
be resolved. Thought, and sensation, are given in
consciousness as very different things. To have a
feeling is one thing, to reflect upon it, to compare it
with others, to draw conclusions from its perceived
relations, etc., these seem to be quite another. What
kinship is there between a sensation, and a purely in
tellectual operation, such as the study of a mathemat
ical problem, or any other of the reflective processes
of thought ? If we are to rely upon our present con
sciousness, they have no common measure. A per
ception of things through sensation is one act
; a
perception of their relations through comparison
and reflection, a generalization of these relations
into laws, and a combination of these laws into a
system, this is an activity of another kind. The
only reason for denying it is found in the exigencies
of a false system a reason which logic does not
recognize.
Besides, too, in all this activity the ego plays an
important part. It is conscious of itself as active and
controlling, and it insists upon saying so. This is
probably an unseemly impertinence, at all events, a
great unkindness, because it stands very much in the
way of the system ; and yet, in opposition to both
courtesy and Mr. Spencer, it insists upon itself as
active and controlling. So emphatic is this self-
assertion that, if it be false, we seem to have no test
of truth whatever, save the unsupported dictum of
Mr. Spencer. These objections would probably notReview of Herbert Spencer.
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but surely a philosophy whose first prin
ciples deny all our primary beliefs, ought to be re
ceived with caution.
But we must not be too scrupulous, and, besides,
a vigorous profession of an obnoxious creed is said
to help one s faith amazingly. The experience-
philosophy has steadily resisted these distinctions,
and has sought to show how thought and reason
and self-determination are only sensations that have
grown proud and forgotten their origin. The great
instrument for the contemplated reduction is the
association of ideas. Sensations and feelings cluster
together, and so pass into thought. The method is
as follows :
&quot; The cardinal fact to be noted as of co-ordinate
importance with the facts above noted is, that while
each vivid feeling is joined to but distinguished
from other vivid feelings, simultaneous or successive,
it is joined to and identified with faint feelings that
have resulted from foregoing similar vivid feelings.
Each particular color, each special sound, each sensa
tion of touch, taste, or smell, is at once known as un
like other sensations that limit it in space or time,
and known as like the faint forms of sensations that
have preceded it in time unites itself with fore
going sensations, from which it does not differ in
quality but only in intensity.
&quot; On this law of composition depends the orderly1/2 Review of Herbert Spencer.
structure of mind. In its absence there could be
nothing but a kaleidoscopic change of feelings an
ever transforming present without past or future. It
is because of this tendency which vivid feelings have
severally to cohere with the faint forms of all preced
ing feelings like themselves that there arise what we
call ideas. A vivid feeling does not by itself consti
tute a unit of that aggregate of ideas entitled knowl
edge. Nor does a single faint feeling constitute such
a unit. But an idea, or unit of knowledge, results
when a vivid feeling is assimilated to, or coheres
with, one or more of the faint feelings left by such
vivid feelings previously experienced. From moment
to moment the feelings that constitute conscious
ness segregate each becoming fused with the whole
series of others like itself that have gone before it
;
and what we call knowing each feeling as such or
such is our name for this act of segregation.
&quot; The process so carried on does not stop with the
union of each feeling, as it occurs, with the faint
forms of all preceding like feelings. Clusters of
feelings are simultaneously joined with the faint
forms of preceding like clusters. An idea of an ob
ject or act is composed ot groups of similar and
similarly related feelings that have arisen in con
sciousness from time to time, and have formed a
consolidated series of which the members have par
tially or completely lost their individualities.&quot; Vol. i,
p. 183.
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the process of composition of mind described in fore
going sections. It is no more than this same process
carried out on higher and higher platforms^ with in
creasing extent and complication. As we have lately
seen, the feelings called sensations cannot of them
selves constitute mind, even when great numbers of
various kinds are present together. Mind is consti
tuted only when each sensation is assimilated to the
faint forms of antecedent-like sensations. The con
solidation of successive units of feeling to form a
sensation is paralleled in a larger way by the con
solidation of successive sensations to form what we
call a knowledge of the sensations as such or such
to form the smallest separable portion of what we
call thought as distinguished from mere confused
sentiency.&quot; Vol. i, p. 185.
We have, in this extract, a complete outline of the
associational doctrine, and an almost complete list of
its errors. The process here described is sufficient
to account for all the mind s beliefs and operations.
Our first criticism upon it is that the language in
which the doctrine is expressed, betrays
it.
&quot; Each
particular color, each special sound, each sensation of
touch, taste, or smell, is at once known as unlike other
sensations that limit it in space or time, and known
as like the faint forms of certain sensations that have
preceded
it.&quot; Who is it that knows these sensations
as like and unlike? Who is it that remembers the
faint forms of past sensation? Who is it that sep-
12174 Review of Herbert Spencer.
arates these various feelings into their appropriate
groups ? The object of these groupings and &quot;segre
gations&quot; is to account for thought, memory, judg
ment, etc., and, lo! a thinking, judging, recognizing
mind is on the spot to attend to its own birth. It
would hardly be surprising if, under such favorable
circumstances, the process proved successful.
Again, Mr. Spencer will not allow us to know sensa
tions until they are
&quot;
segregated,&quot; but insists that a
knowledge of them as like or unlike must precede segre
gation. How, indeed, things can be known as like or
unlike when, first, we know nothing about them, and,
second, when there is no one to know them, does not
very clearly appear. There is also some difficulty in
understanding how memory can be built up by a
process which assumes it at the start
; nor can self-
consciousness be very far away when we begin to
remember these sensations as
&quot;past experiences.&quot;
Yet these are the absurdities into which the associa-
tionalists have always fallen. This association of
ideas implies the very things which it is supposed to
explain away. What associates the ideas ? What dis




&quot; What is it which, in
all perception, so combines tactual, visual, and other
impressions, that the object presents itself as a unit
in consciousness ? At this point the associationalists
have always left a fatal gap in their system. To sup-
pose that the ideas and sensations know each otherReview of Herbert Spencer. 175
as like and unlike, and then enter into combination,
is absurd ; yet they must either do this, or refer the
association to the activity, partly intentional, partly
constitutional, of the soul itself.
To escape this alternative, Mr. Spencer ventures
upon the astounding proposition that the association
takes place primarily, not in the mind, but in the
nervous system. Like nervous states get together,
and difference themselves from others
; and whenever
one of these states comes into consciousness, it drags
all its kindred along with it. He expounds the doc
trine thus :
&quot;
Changes in nerve-vesicles are the objective cor
relatives of what we know subjectively as feelings ; and
the discharge through fibers that connect nerve-vesi
cles, are the objective correlatives of what we know
subjectively as relations between feelings. It follows
that just as the association of a feeling with its class,
order, genus, and species, group within group, an
swers to the localization of the nervous change within
some great mass of nerve-vesicles, within some part
of that mass, within some part of that part, etc.
; so
the association of a relation with its class, order,
gen is, and species, answers to the localization of the
nervous discharge within some great aggregate of
nerve-fibers, within some division of that aggregate,
within some bundle of that division. Moreover, as
we before concluded that the association of each feel
ing, with its exact counterparts in past experience,176 Review of Herbert Spencer.
answers to the re-excitation of the same vesicle 01
vesicles
; so here we conclude that the association
of each relation with its exact counterparts in past
experience answers to the re-excitation of the same
connecting fiber or fibers. And since, on the recog
nition of any object, this re-excitation of the plexus
of fibers and vesicles before jointly excited by it, an
swers to the association of each constituent relation
and each constituent feeling with the like relation
and the like feeling, contained in the previous con
sciousness of the object, it is clear that the whole
process is comprehended under the principle alleged.
If the recognized object, now lacking one of its traits,
arouses in consciousness an ideal feeling answering
to some real feeling which this trait once aroused,
the cause is that, along with the strong discharge
through the whole plexus of fibers and vesicles di
rectly excited, there is apt to go a feeble discharge
to those vesicles which answer to the missing feeling,
through those fibers which answer to its missing re
lations, involving a representation of the feeling and
its relations.&quot; Vol. i, p. 270.
As a work of the creative imagination, this extract
must certainly rank very high ; but as a scientific
statement it can hardly be considered a success
; lor,
in the first place, neither psychology nor physiology
knows any thing about the process here indicated.
When the brain is examined with a microscope, there
are no indications that it is even capable of vibratingReview of Herbert Spencer. 177
in the fashion postulated, to say nothing of exhibiting
all the wonders which Mr. Spencer declares to be
there. Before we can accept this account it must
be shown that there is a nerve-vesicle answering to
every idea
; and next it must be shown that, for
every apprehended relation, there is a fiber connect
ing the vesicles which represent the related terms.
There is, and can be, no proof whatever of these
statements. Imagination, prompted by the necessi
ties of the system, is responsible for the whole ac
count. It is the doctrine which suggests the facts,
and not the facts which suggest the doctrine. The
same beggarly begging of the question, so palpable
throughout the treatise, underlies this whole account.
But suppose we admit that there is a nerve-vesicle
for each idea, still the association of ideas is not ex
plained. What is it which associates the vesicles ?
What separates them into like and unlike ? Has the
nervous system the power of recognizing relations ?
of appreciating difference ? of storing up in an appro
priate place the peculiar nervous combination an
swering to a given state of thought
? That would be
to attribute to the nervous system the very powers
of memory, judgment, etc., which it is expected to
explain. But Mr. Spencer is prepared with an an
swer. This separation of nerve-vesicles is due to the
law of segregation. I have already explained this
law in the last chapter and given Mr. Spencer s illus
trations. The same wind carries off dead leaves and178 Review of Herbert Spencer.
allows the living ones to remain on the tree. A stream
of water washes sand and mud from among stones
and segregates them. Now because dead leaves are
blown away, and sand is washed out of gravel, there
fore the nerve-vesicles answering to like ideas get to
gether, and pull one another back and forth through
consciousness. It seems incredible that Mr. Spencer
should ever have deluded himself with such vague
and unmeaning analogies as this. That he has de
luded others, also, is the highest possible proof of his
statement that &quot;most men do not think, but only
think that they think.&quot; Surely it is a sublime and
touching faith in the great doctrine of evolution,
which enabled one to accept as science, such puerili
ties as these.
But Mr. Spencer attempts another explanation of
association.
&quot; As the plexuses in these highest nerv
ous centers, by exciting in distinct ways special sets
of plexuses in the inferior centers, call up special
sets of ideal feelings and relations, so by simulta
neously exciting in diffused ways the general sets of
plexuses to which these special sets belong, they call
up in vague forms the accompanying general sets of
ideal feelings and relations the emotional back
ground appropriate to the general conception. In the
language of our illustration, we may say that the
superior nervous centers in playing upon the inferior
ones, bring out not only specific chords and cadences
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echoes of all kindred chords and cadences that have
been struck during an immeasurable past producing
a great volume of indefinite tones harmonizing with
the definite tones.&quot; Vol. i, p. 571.
This statement, which recalls the doctrine of Aris-
toxenus, that mind is the time of the organism, is
the completion of the statement on page 125, that
emotions are only remembered sensations, and are
aroused by wandering currents which, in racing up
and down the nerves, hit upon the vesicles that
belong to the old sensations.
In reply, it is sufficient to say of it, first, that
there is no proof possible in the nature of the
case ; and second, that this view does not explain
why the
&quot;
specific chords and cadences of feelings
should only &quot;arouse reverberating echoes of all kin
dred chords and cadences
;&quot; nor does it explain why
these vagrant nerve-currents should hit upon only
those emotions which harmonize with the specific
conception. The doctrine is that a nerve current
passes upward to the brain and appears in conscious
ness as a vivid feeling, that is, a sensation. But the
same current after producing the sensation proceeds
to
&quot; reverberate ;&quot; it diffuses itself in feebler currents
through the nervous system, and re-excites the ves
icles which answer to similar sensations in the past,
and thus produces faint feelings, that is, emotions.
Wonderful nerve-current to hit upon the proper
vesicles ! It is conceivable that mental chaos mightt So Review of Herbert Spencer.
result from such a process, but certainly mental
order cannot. And thus Mr. Spencer goes on, first,
confusing himself; second, confusing the problem;
and third, and most wonderful confusion of all, he
mistakes this universal confusion for a solution.
The same process is supposed to explain memory.
When any sensation or idea is aroused in conscious
ness, kindred ideas or sensations are brought out of
experience by the process described
; and this is
memory. The explanation misses the chief distinc
tion of memory. To remember a thing, is not to
have the same idea or thought again this might be
accounted for by the laws of association
; but it is to
have it with the consciousness of having had it be
fore. This relation of experience to self is the diffi
cult part of the question, and is entirely ignored in
the explanation. Mr. Mill, with great frankness, con
fessed that the explanation of memory surpassed the
resources of his philosophy. How a string of feel
ings should become conscious of itself as having a
past, he declared to be a great mystery, and one
which he could not fathom. Yet it is a question
which the associationalist must solve, or surrender.
Knowledge is not knowledge until it is related to
self. It is only the enduring and identical ego which
gives unity to experience, and makes memory pos
sible. It is not until the conception of an abiding
self is thrown among the ever-shifting shades of feel
ing, that any backward glance can be cast upon yes-Review of Herbert Spencer. 181
J:erduv, or any outlook upon to-morrow. Here, in
this fact of memory we have a confirmation of the
universal belief in an enduring self.
But Mr. Spencer recognizes no difficulty whatever.
Indeed, he does not even seem to have understood what
the fact implies. If he had he would probably have
explained it in this way
: Every idea has a nerve-vesi
cle answering to it, and that vesicle constitutes its only
existence. To the idea of self, therefore, there must
be an enormous vesicle, because it is such a great idea.
And, since every mental relation answers to a fiber in
the brain which connects the vesicles representing the
ideas between which the relation is perceived, we must
conclude that the reason why self appears in all
memory is that there is an indefinite number of
fibers connecting the vesicle which stands for self,
with the other vesicles which represent all our
various experiences. Whenever, then, one of these
vesicles is excited, a discharge must pass along the
connecting fiber to the vesicle which stands for
self, and hence both ideas must appear in con
sciousness together. This explanation is in com
plete harmony with the hypothesis of evolution
in general ; and whoever will duly weigh the evi
dence must see that nothing short of an over
whelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory can
explain its non-acceptance. This account is as good
as any that Mr. Spencer has given. It has just as
much support from physiology or psychology as his1 82 Review of Herbert Spencer.
own explanations have. Hartley s doctrine, of vibra
tions and vibratiuncles, is no more baseless than this
so-called science
; and, indeed, they do not differ
materially, except in terms.
But if all these absurdities came to pass, the prob
lem is only confused, not solved. Sensation is
sensation, and nothing more. A cluster of sensa
tions is sensation still, and in whatever way sensa
tion may be massed, it acquires no new character.
Even if it were possible to conceive of a feeling
which is not the feeling of a conscious subject,
there is no warrant except the desperate extrem
ities of a false system, for believing that feelings
change their nature by being massed. Conscious
ness makes the clearest and sharpest distinctions
between feeling and thinking ; but consciousness
has not any claim to respect from a philosopher
of the
&quot; New School.&quot;
In short, the explanations of this philosophy con
sist entirely in calling the most diverse powers and
operations of the mind sensations, and then call
ing sensations nerve-currents. Mr. Spencer, when
he meets with a difficulty, simply re-names it, and
the work is done. If ideas associate, he explains
it by the magic word
&quot;
segregation.&quot; If they unite
to form a unit of knowledge, it is a case of &quot;in
tegration.&quot; If knowledge becomes more definite,
it is called
&quot;
differentiation.&quot; And after he has
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meaning terms, and has worked himself into a
fit state of mental confusion in the process, he
seems to think that he has explained something.
To explain any grouping by segregation, is only to
offer the very fact to be explained as an explana
tion ; and the same is true for the other cant words
of the scheme which are made to cover such a mul
titude of logical sins : they all involve the very
problem they pretend to solve. Now, I hold that
the only value of psychology lies in its speaking
clearly and directly to self-consciousness ; but the
associational philosophy does not even pretend to do
that. Every&quot; one of its characteristic explanations
flies right in the face of our present consciousness,
and when we complain of that, an appeal is made to
the unknown. Mr. Mill requires us to look in upon
the mind of the infant as it lies in the nurse s arms
;
and, as we cannot do this, there is nothing for us to
do but to accept Mr. Mill s statements or fancies
about the matter. Mr. Spencer will have us go back
through
&quot; countless ages ;
&quot; and tells us that, if we
could have been there, we should have seen all that
he claims. This is a great beauty of this philos
ophy. It works its wonders before the critic comes,
and when he appears he is blandly told that it is too
late. The wonders which have been wrought for
him, and in him, are such as to render self-knowledge
impossible. All its ingenuity is expended, not in
explaining our present consciousness, but in explain-1 84 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ing it away. There is nothing left for us now, but
to accept the equivalents which these philosophers
choose to give ; and if the butchered members of
our knowledge have no resemblance to the living
f
orm, they are, at least, as life-like as could be
expected after the process. We must be content to
walk by f|ith hereafter, and must no longer hope to
walk by sight. If at any time the suspicion should
cross our minds that this philosophy is a forgery, we
cannot indeed appeal to consciousness or experience
for support ; but we have the assurance of the philos
ophers that this is the only genuine autobiography
of mental evolution. This is, to be sure, the only
warrant it has
; but, except for those who have an
&quot;
overwhelming bias,&quot; this is more than enough. As
was to be expected, the difficulties thus removed
from criticism are precisely those which this philos
ophy finds it most difficult to answer. When Mr.
Spencer sought to establish the identity of thought
and motion, it was done
&quot; in a superior nerve-center
in a mysterious way;&quot; but the belief in causation




Whenever a critical point is reached, Mr. Spencer, in
common with all others of this school, retreats into
the unknown, and, with the aid of an obliging
&quot;
mys
tery,&quot; works out his system secure from all molesta
tion. The strategy
! the generalship
! The very least
that should be decreed to such masterly tactics is an
ovation, if indeed they do not deserve a triumph.Review of Herbert Spencer. 185
I utterly distrust this doctrine which begins
with sensations, and builds knowledge by combining
them. The subjective unity of self must be given
before knowledge of any kind is possible ; but, even
as applied to external things, the doctrine seems to
me to invert the order of experience. According to
this teaching, we have a knowledge of sensations
long before we have a knowledge of things, and it is
only an extended experience of feelings that sug
gests external things. On the contrary, I believe
that our knowledge postulates being at the very
start. Our first knowledge is of things, and the
knowledge of sensations and qualities is a later
birth, and is impossible until considerable advance
in abstraction has been made. There is a primitive
and constitutional synthetic action of the soul, which
gives us qualities always in combination
; and it is
only by a later analysis that we come to a knowledge
of attributes, etc. Mr. Spencer has all along been
arguing against this view
; but, to our great pleasure,
it appears that he also holds the same opinion a
very happy example of his belief that there is a soul
of truth in all things false. He says
:
&quot;The postulate with which metaphysical reason
ing sets out is that we are primarily conscious only
of our sensations, that we certainly know we have
these, and that if there be any thing beyond these,
serving as cause for them, it can be known only by
inference from them.1 86 Revinv of Herbert Spencer.
&quot;I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical
reader if I call in question this postulate, and the
surprise will rise into astonishment if I distinctly
deny
it. Yet I must do this. Limiting the prop
osition to those epiperipheral feelings produced in
us by external objects, (for these alone are in ques
tion,) I see no alternative but to affirm that the
thing, primarily known, is not that a sensation has
been experienced, but that there exists an outer
object. Instead of admitting that the primordial
and unquestionable knowledge is the existence of a
sensation, I assert, contrariwise, that the existence
of a sensation is an hypothesis that cannot be
framed until external existence is known. This
entire inversion of his conception, which to the
metaphysician will seem so absurd, is one that inev
itably takes place when we inspect the phenomena
of consciousness in their order of genesis using,
for our erecting glass, the mental biography of a
child, or the developed conception of things held in
common by the savage and the rustic.&quot; Vol. ii,
p. 369.
Mr. Spencer then goes on to show that with chil
dren, and rustics, and all who have not been dis
turbed by metaphysical reasonings, the certain
knowledge is that there exist external things, and
that these are directly known
; while sensations,
attributes, etc., etc., are utterly unknown. With
some qualifications, this statement may be acceptedReview of Herbert Spencer. 187
as true
; but if it is true, then mental evolution takes
place in a way directly opposite to that which this
philosophy assumes, and the doctrine falls to the
ground. If the account is not true, the argu
ment for an external world, which Mr. Spencer
bases upon it, vanishes. In either case his system
suffers.
But, before passing on to other difficult questions,
let us rest and amuse ourselves by the following bit
of pleasantry. Mr. Spencer s account of nerves and
nervous systems we found extremely luminous
; but
even that cannot compare with the following sun-
clear explanation of frowning. To appreciate it
fully, we must remember that Mr. Spencer s philos
ophy assumes to prove the doctrine of evolution
;
and that it is one of the first principles of logic that
to assume the point in dispute is inadmissible.
Now for the explanation
:
&quot; If you want to see a distant object in bright sun
shine, you are aided by putting your hand above your
eyes ; and in the tropics, this shading of the eyes to
gain distinctness of vision is far more needful than
here. In the absence of shade yielded by the hand or
by a hat, the effort to see clearly in broad sunshine
is always accompanied by a contraction of those
muscles of the forehead which cause the eyebrows to
be lowered and protruded ; so, making them serve as
much as possible the same purpose that the hand
serves. The use of a sliding hood to a telescope, to1 88 Review of Herbert Spencer.
shield the object-glass from lateral sight, and espe
cially from the rays of the sun, illustrates the use of
the contracted eyebrows when vision is impeded by
a glare. Now, if we bear in mind that, during the
combats of superior animals which have various
movements of attack and defense, success largely
depends on quickness and clearness of vision if we
remember that the skill of a fencer is shown partly
in his power of instantly detecting the sign of a
movement about to be made, so that he may be pre
pared to guard against it or to take advantage of it,
and that in animals, as, for example, in cocks fight
ing, the intentness with which they watch each other
shows how much depends on promptly anticipating
one another s motions, it will be manifest that a
slight improvement of vision, obtained by keeping
the sun s rays out of the eyes, may often be of great
importance, and where the combatants are nearly
equal, may determine the victory. Here is, indeed,
no need to infer this a priori, for we have a posteriori
proof: in prize-fights it is a recognized disadvantage
to have the sun in front. Hence we may infer that
during the evolution of those types from which man
more immediately inherits, it must have happened
that individuals in whom the nervous discharge ac
companying the excitement of combat, caused an
unusual contraction of those corrugating muscles of
the forehead, would, other things being equal, be the
most likely to conquer, and to leave posterity sur-Rei iew of Herbert Spencer. 189
vival of the fittest tending in their posterity to estab-
.ish and increase this peculiarity.&quot; Vol. ii, p. 546.
This account, Mr. Spencer says,
&quot;
is not obvious,
and yet when found is satisfactory.&quot; Yes, about as
satisfactory as the doctrine that hens set because the
pressure of the eggs serve to relieve a supposed pain
in the birds abdomen ; as satisfactory, perhaps, as the
earlier doctrine of appetencies they all deserve to
be put upon the same shelf, for all have about equal
support in fact. 1 have quoted the paragraph because
it brings so clearly into view the point to which I
have so often referred the everlasting assumption
of the point to be proved, which underlies the entire
discussion. Evolution is true hence matter and mind
must be one. Evolution is true hence when it is
necessary to explain fhe nervous system, he begins
to romance on what might have been. Evolution is
true hence to account for emotions, he tells us of
vagabond currents which, in their aimless wandering
along the nerves, hit upon the vesicles which repre
sent ancient sensations. Evolution is true hence
nerve-vesicles which represent kindred ideas must
cling together and coalesce to form compound ideas.
Evolution is true hence to interpret human phe
nomena we are referred to the quarrels of the early
apes. Evolution is true hence the axioms and forms
of thought must be formed by the consolidated expe
riences of lower forms through an
&quot; interminable past.&quot;
Whatever facts do not harmonize with the theory are
13Review of Herbert Spencer.
stigmatized as ex parte, and their testimony is dis
credited. There is no fancy or guess too wild or too
absurd to be greedily swallowed, if only it support
the great doctrine. And on the other hand, there is
no fact of nature, no matter how well ascertained
;
there is no deliverance of consciousness, no matter
how universal, which has any rights which the phi
losopher is bound to respect if it is opposed to his
belief. And all this is warranted, because evolution
is true. The evidence brought to prove the theory
gets all its force as evidence from the assumption
that the theory is true. It is the most fraternal* ar
rangement possible the evidence proves the theory,
and the theory gives weight to the evidence. Truly,
all things to him that believeth. A mob of atoms, if
they should fall to reasoning, could scarcely do better
than this.
But, to return to more serious discussion, the great
est difficulty of the experience-philosophy has yet to
be mentioned. To turn sensation into thought, re
flection, and consciousness is difficult, but to turn it
into action is harder still. How to turn passivity
into activity, how to extract from mere sentiency the
various forms of conscious effort, has always been a
great problem. Why should inactive receptivity
transform itself into the idea and fact of conscious
power ?
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his system for the purpose of answering these ques
tions. He postulates a spontaneous activity of th
muscles as part of the original outfit of the organ
ism
; and this spontaneity, reduced to shape by ex
perience, explains the difficulty. To this it is suffi
cient to say that if this activity is strictly spontane
ous, it lies without the physical forces
; and if it does
not lie without them, it is not spontaneous. In
either case, Mr. Bain has not thrown much light upon
the subject.
Mr. Spencer, however, cuts the knot. There is
no such thing as spontaneity ; because, if there
is, his theory fails. This alternative is not to be
thought of; and hence there is nothing left us but
to accept Mr. Spencer s statement, that our con
sciousness of freedom, of being the causes of our
actions, is an utter delusion. In reality, every thing
which we do is done for us
; the sequence of cause
and effect is as rigid here as it is in physics, and the
belief that we have any thing to do with our volitions
is a superstition that deserves no quarter whatever.
It has long been evident that the psychology of con
sciousness, and that of Mr. Spencer, have nothing in




is bound to re
spect, we can only look tearfully on as one after an
other of our primary beliefs is ruthlessly turned out
of doors. Remonstrance would clearly be useless,
and might even provoke further indignity. OneReview of Herbert Spencer.
knows not what extremes of violence might be re





concealed about our person, to
;-ay nothing of holding a belief in what Mr. Spencer
calls
&quot; the Hebrew
myth.&quot; We hold our peace, then,
while Mr. Spencer explains how the illusion con
cerning freedom has arisen :
&quot; Considered as an internal perception, the illusion
consists in supposing that at each moment the ego
is something more than the aggregate of feelings and
ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists. A man
who, after being subject to an impulse consisting of
a group of psychical states, real and ideal, performs
a certain action, usually asserts that he determined
to perform the action
; and by speaking of his con
scious self as having been something separate from
the group of psychical states constituting the im
pulse, is led into the error of supposing that it was
not the impulse alone which determined the action.
But the entire group of psychical states which con
stituted the antecedent of the action, also constituted
himself at that moment constituted his psychical
self, that is, as distinguished from his physical self.
It is alike true that he determined the action, and
that the aggregate of his feelings and ideas deter
mined it
; since, during its existence this aggregate
constituted his then state of consciousness, that is,
himself. Either the ego which is supposed to deter
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&amp;gt;r it is not. If it is nut present in consciousness, it
is something of which we are unconscious some
thing, therefore, of whose existence we neither have
nor can have any evidence. If it is present in con
sciousness, then, as it is ever present, it can be at
each moment nothing else than the state of con
sciousness, simple or compound, passing at that mo
ment. It follows inevitably that when an impression
received from without makes nascent certain appro
priate motor changes, and various, of the feelings and
ideas which must accompany and follow them
; and
when, under the stimulus of this composite psychical
state, the nascent motor changes pass into actual
motor changes, this composite psychical state which
excites the action is at the same time the ego which
is said to will the action.&quot; Vol. i, p. 500.
This description shows us how the illusion has
arisen, and on the next page we learn how it has been
strengthened
:
&quot;This subjective illusion in which the notion of
free-will commonly originates is strengthened by a
corresponding objective illusion. The actions of
other individuals, lacking as they do that uniformity
characterizing phenomena of which the laws are
known, appear to be lawless appear to be under no
necessity of following any particular order, and are
hence supposed to be determined by the unknown
independent something called the will. But this
seeming indeterminateness in the mental succession194 Review of Herbert Spencer.
is consequent on the extreme complication of the
forces in action. The composition of causes is so
intricate, and from moment to moment so varied,
that the effects are not calculable. These effects,
however, are as conformable to law as the simplest
reflex-actions. The irregularity and apparent free
dom are inevitable results of the complexity, and
equally arise in the inorganic world under parallel
conditions. To amplify an illustration before used :
A body in space subject to the attraction of a single
other body moves in a direction that can be accu
rately predicted. If subject to the attractions of two
bodies, its course is but approximately calculable.
If subject to the attractions of three bodies, its course
can be calculated with still less precision. And if it
is surrounded by bodies of all sizes, at all distances,
its motion will be apparently uninfluenced by any of
them : it will move in some indefinable varying line
that appears to be self-determined
; it will seem to be
freer
Passing over for the present the boundless nihilism
in the preceding paragraphs, I remark that this doc
trine of necessity is here put into far more explicit
statement than we commonly find in Mr. Spencer.
As a rule, his views are rarely expressed in definite
form, so much so that I know of no other author
whom it is more difficult to criticise. Leading doc
trines are suggested rather than stated, and assumed
rather than proved ; and the critic is forced to wadeReview of Herbert Spencer. 195
through a sea of vague and meaningless analogies, in
order to reach any precise meaning. But there can
be no doubt of the meaning of this quotation. Spon
taneity, freedom, is a delusion ; and all our effort is
the result of complex reflex-action.
It it were needful, it would be easy to criticise Mr.
Spencer s account of reflex-action ; and to show that,
in concluding it to be the reality in all seeming self-
determination, he has once more mistaken the confu
sion of a problem for its solution. The truth is, that
men are automata running about on two legs, with
the added absurdity of supposing themselves free. A
book lies before me on the table. I think I can draw it
toward me or push it from me, or let it alone. I feel
conscious that I can determine to do or not to do ; to
do this or to do that. But I am mistaken. If I draw
that book toward me, it is because I cannot help it.
If I push it from me, the fact is proof that I could
not do otherwise. If I let it alone, it is because an
invincible necessity prevents me from touching it.
The manner in which the conflict is decided is as
follows : The idea of a book to be drawn arouses a
&quot;
group of nascent motor changes,&quot; the idea of a book
to be pushed arouses another and opposing &quot;group
of nascent motor changes,&quot; and these two groups
proceed to fight it out. If the first group wins, the
book is drawn ; if the second group wins, the book
is pushed ; if they are equally matched, then, like
the ass between the bundles of hay, I let the bookReview of Herbert Spencer.
alone. An insulting word is spoken to a man. The
physical antecedent is aerial vibrations. These cor
relate with nerve-currents, which at once start for some
superior nerve-center, where an immense amount of
molecular motion is disengaged. This, in turn, starts
for the muscles of the arm, taking care &quot;to blow up
the magazines&quot; of force in the ganglia on its way
down. The molecular motion on reaching the mus
cles quickly becomes mechanical motion
; the mus
cles are violently extended in such a way as to reach
the offender, who is forthwith collared and cuffed,
and, if the nascent motor changes have so settled the
matter among themselves, he is also kicked. This is
the true account of this matter, and of all seeming
self-determination. One would never have thought
it if he had not been told
; wherefore for this exten
sion of our knowledge, great thanks are due to Mr.
Spencer. Consciousness, of course, contradicts the
philosopher ; but so much the worse for consciousness.
And lest any one should think that I have mis
represented Mr. Spencer for the sake of ridicule, I
commend to him the following paragraph
:
&quot; When the automatic actions become so involved,
so varied in kind, and severally so infrequent, as no
longer to be performed with unhesitating precision
when, after the reception of one of the more complex
impressions, the appropriate motor changes become
nascent, but are prevented from passing into imme
diate action by the antagonism of certain other nas-Review of Herbert Spencer. 197
cent motor changes appropriate to some nearly-allied
impression, there is constituted a state of conscious
ness which, when it finally issues in action, we call
volition. Each set of nascent motor changes arising
in the course of this conflict is a weak revival of the
state of consciousness which accompanies such motor
changes when actually performed ; is a representa
tion of such motor changes as were before executed
under like circumstances
; is an idea of such motor
changes. We have, therefore, a conflict between two
sets of ideal motor changes which severally tend to
become real, and one of which eventually does be
come real
; and this passing of an ideal motor change
into a real one we distinguish as volition.&quot; Vol. i,
p. 496.
There is warrant enough for all that I have said.
Consciousness has no voice in this matter
; observa
tion has no voice in the matter
; fact has no voice in
the matter only unproved and unprovable fancies,
and the sore needs of Mr. Spencer s system, have
any claim to be heard. This is the logic of the
cuttle-fish
; this is intellectual soothsaying, and, like
all soothsaying, can only be received by faith.
Compare also the following account of reason and
reasoning
:
&quot; For though when the confusion of a complex
impression with some allied one causes a confusion
among the nascent motor excitations, there is en
tailed a certain hesitation
; and though this hesitation198 Review of Herbert Spencer.
continues as long as those nascent motor excitations
or ideas of the correlative actions go on superseding
one another
; yet, ultimately, some one set of motor
excitations will prevail over the rest. As the groups
of antagonistic tendencies aroused will scarcely e^
rer
be exactly balanced, the strongest group will at
length pass into action
; and as this sequence will
usually be the one that has recurred oftenest in ex
perience, the action will on the average of cases be
the one best adapted to the circumstances. But an
action thus produced is nothing else than a rational
action.&quot; Vol. i, p. 455.
I had intended to end the quotation at this point,
but Mr. Spencer gives such a lucid and convincing
illustration of this kind of reasoning that we shall
probably understand it much better if we study the
example given
:
&quot;A snarling dog commonly turns tail when a stone
is thrown at him, or even when he sees the stooping
motion required for picking up a stone. Suppose
that, having often experienced this sequence, I am
again attacked by such a dog, what are the resulting
psychical processes
? The combined impressions
produced on my senses, and the state of conscious
ness which they arouse, have before been followed
by those motor changes required for picking up and
throwing a stone, and by those visual changes result
ing from the dog s retreat. As these psychical states
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they have acquired some cohesion there is a tend
ency for the psychical states excited in me by the
snarling dog, to be followed by those other psychical
states that have before followed them. In other
we ds, there is a nascent excitation of the motor
apparatus concerned in picking up and throwing ;
there is a nascent excitation of all the sensory nerves
affected during such acts
; and through these there
is a nascent excitation of the visual nerves, which on
previous occasions received the impression of a flying
dog. That is, I have the ideas of picking up and
throwing a stone, and of seeing a dog run away for
these that we call ideas are nothing else than weak
repetitions of the psychical states caused by actual im
pressions and motions. But what happens further ?
If there is no antagonist impulse, if no other ideas
or partial excitations arise, and if the dog s aggressive
demonstrations produce in me feelings of adequate
vividness, these partial excitations pass into complete
excitations. I go through the previously-imagined
actions. The nascent motor changes become real
motor changes, and the adjustment of inner to outer
relations is completed.&quot; Vol. i, p. 455.
Such is the account of reason
; and it is supposed
to be a reasonable account. It is one of the boasts
of this philosophy that it dispenses with scholastic
doctrine of separate faculties in the soul, and reduces
instinct, reason, will, etc., to modifications produced
by the single principle of association. We have just2OO Review of Herbert Spencer.
seen how it is done. To reason, is to be dragged off
by the strongest of several sets of opposing
&quot; nascent
motor changes ;&quot; and to will, is to suffer similar treat
ment. To suppose that I have any voice in the
matter, that I can compare the claims of the oppos
ing
&quot; nascent motor changes
&quot; and decide for myself,
is an
&quot; untenable hypothesis.&quot; The nascent motor




adjustment of inner to outer relations
is completed.&quot; They settle the question, too, much
better than I could ; for Mr. Spencer closes his dis
cussion of this topic by saying,
&quot;
I will only further
say, freedom of the will, did it exist, would be at vari
ance with the beneficence recently displayed in the
evolution of the correspondence between the organ
ism and its environment. . . . There would be a
retardation of that grand progress which is bearing
humanity onward to a higher intelligence and a
nobler character.&quot;
This mechanical way of settling all disputed ques
tions recalls the old problem of the ass and the bun
dles of hay. If while lying down the nascent motor
excitations should happen to balance themselves,
one might lie there forever. If they should do
this when one is walking, he might go on forever.
These disastrous consequences are averted, however,
b) two circumstances : first, an exact balance of exci
tations is only infinitesimally probable ; and, second,
the homogeneous is unstable. If, then, the excita-Review of Herbert Spencer. 2OI
tions ever should be in exact balance, the instability
of the homogeneous would soon bring about a differ
entiation of the homogeneous groups of the nascent
motor excitations, whereby the inequality of power,
resulting from the heterogeneity necessarily produced,
would forthwith settle the difficulty in favor of that
set of nascent motor changes which would be best
calculated to produce an adjustment of inner to outer
relations, or to maintain the necessary equilibrium
between the organic and its environment. It would,
indeed, be far easier to allow the man to start and
stop himself, but it would not be half so scientific
;
and, besides, there would be an interference with
&quot; that grand progress which is bearing humanity
onward toward a higher intelligence and a nobler
character.&quot;
How Mr. Spencer would apply this formula
to the abstract reasonings of the mathematician,
scientist, or philosopher, does not appear. What
kind of nascent motor excitation precedes the con
clusion that the square on the hypothenuse is equal
to the sum of the squares on the other two sides ? or
that central forces vary inversely as the square of
the distance ? What nascent motor excitations fight
over the nominalistic controversy
? What nascent
motor excitations discuss the nature of magnetism,
and the polarization of light
? We cannot hope for
an answer to any of these questions from either
consciousness or observation
; doubtless, however.2O2 Review of Herbert Spencer.
Mr Spencer s prolific imagination is fully equal to
the occasion. For the present, we must rest content
with knowing that all the abstractions of science
and philosophy, and all our voluntary actions, are
the necessary resultants of conflicting nascent motor
excitations.
A very few words will suffice to show the utter
inconsistency of this necessitarian system. Even if
it were not emphatically denied by every man s con
sciousness, even if it were not totally unsupported by
a single fact, still this scheme of necessity is utterly
self-destructive. Mr. Spencer believes in a universal
and ever-active force
; where does he get the idea ?
The veriest tyro in metaphysics now admits that force
is not an observed fact, but a mental datum. It is
only as we ourselves put forth effort, that a belief in
external power arises. Our own effort, our own con
scious self-determination, stands for the type of all
power. We have no other knowledge nor hint of
force than that derived from our own free volitions.
If they play us false, all that is built upon them
is baseless. Deny internal causation, and external
causation disappears along with it, and a universe
of unconnected phenomena is all that is left us. Yet
Mr. Spencer, after obtaining the belief in external
causation from the fact of internal causation, next
proceeds to deny the fact on which the belief rests,
and asks us still to accept the belief. It is hard to
resist this appeal ; for if the belief is not accepted,Review of Herbert Spencer. 203
Mr. Spencer s system has no power to work with
;
and if the internal fact is not rejected, the system
breaks down. And this is science
; this is logic ;
this is evolution. It is hard to believe that Mr. Spen
cer is really serious. Is it not possible that this work
is meant only as an elaborate satire upon the loose
reasoning and baseless assumptions of much that calls
itself science ? The internal evidence in favor of
this view is complete ; while the opposing theory, that
it is meant as a sober exposition of fact, is beset with in
surmountable difficulties it is positively incredible.
We wait for Mr. Spencer s announcement that all
this time he has been perpetrating a tremendous
sarcasm. The air of gravity and reality with which
the work has been invested, the pains with which it
has been elaborated, the wide range of illustration, all
will serve to raise it at once to the foremost place in
the realm of satirical literature. It is to be hoped,
for the sake of his own reputation, that Mr. Spencer
will not keep the secret much longer.
Sensational philosophy has never been able to
escape nihilism. I have already shown that Mr.
Spencer s doctrine of the unknowable can logic
ally result only in idealism
; it remains to show
that the logical necessity of the experience-phi
losophy is nihilism. In its zeal to deny the existence
of a knowing power which takes direct cognizance
of external being, it has been forced to build up both2O4 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the mind and the external world, from the raw mate
rial of sensation. There is sensation, according to
this doctrine, long before there is knowledge ; and
the final recognition of self and of an external world,
is the residuum of countless sensations. But if this
be so, then the deposit which is named self, has at
least as good claim to substantial being as the deposit
which represents the outer world. It is logically im
possible to accept one and reject the other
; and, in
the attempt to do this, materialism has always tum
bled into the bottomless pit of nothingness. Mr. Mill
makes matter an affection of mind, and mind a prod
uct of matter. Both are denied substantial exist
ence, and both go off into the void. Mr. Bain reduces
mind to nerve-currents, and then says that nerve-
currents and the outer world generally have only a
hypothetical existence indeed, are but &quot;abstract
names for our sensations and exist only in the mind
that frames them.&quot;* But inasmuch as nerve-currents
are abstractions, the mind, which is the product of
nerve-currents, is doubly an abstraction ; and substan
tial existence disappears in the abysses. Mr. Spencer
is in the true succession. He makes a desperate at
tempt, indeed, to save the world ; but in his execution
of self, or the ego, he handles the ax so awkwardly as
to dispatch subject and object together. This is the
historical stone which kills the two birds :
&quot; Either
this ego, which is supposed to determine or will the
*
&quot; Science and Intellect,&quot; p. 376.Review of Herbert Spencer. 205
act, is present in consciousness or it is not. If it is
not present in consciousness, it is something of which
we are unconscious something, therefore, of whose
existence we neither have nor can have any evidence.
If it is present in consciousness, then, as it is ever
present, it can be at each moment nothing else than
the state of consciousness, simple or compound, pass
ing at the moment.&quot; Vol. i, p. 500.
Whenever Mr. Spencer becomes epigrammatic, he
is apt to use arguments which cut both ways. I
have always had some secret doubts about the pecul
iar feats of the Australian boomerang ; and have
quietly determined if I ever got hold of one, to prac
tice a little with it, before yielding implicit credence
to the stories one hears. But here is the clearest
proof that boomerang arguments are possible. Let
us apply this argument to the existence of the un
knowable, and see how it lights on Mr. Spencer s own
head. I manage the reasoning in this way
: Either
this unknowable,which is said to underlie phenomena,
is present in consciousness or it is not. If it is not
present, then it is something of which we are uncon
scious something, therefore, of whose existence we
neither have nor can have any evidence. If it is
present in consciousness, it clearly cannot be unknow
able, for that would involve the contradiction of sup
posing that a thing can be at the same time known
and unknowable. In either case we must conclude
that the unknowable is something of whose exist-
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ence we neither have nor can have any evidence.
My reasoning is as good as Mr. Spencer s. If he
insists that we cannot think of phenomena without a
substantial support, I reply that it is equally impos
sible to think of feelings without a substantial sup
port. If the argument is good for one, it is good for
both, and that, too, in whichever way it is taken.
But, says Mr. Spencer again and again, this argu
ment of mine reduces to nonsense without the postu
late of external existence. Undoubtedly ; and it
reduces to equal nonsense without the postulate of
internal existence. But. he says, the terms used sup
pose objective existence. They do, indeed
; but no
more strongly than feeling and thought and conscious
ness suppose subjective existence. The argument
which reduces mind to a string of feelings, reduces
matter to a bundle of qualities. If subjective exist
ence has no warrant, objective existence has none
also ; and the void and formless nothing is all that is




to his aid. This is, that we cannot help believ
ing in an outer world, and so must accept it whether we
can justify the belief or not. But the
&quot; Postulate
&quot;
is another boomerang. We cannot help believing in
an inner world in the reality and identity of self,
and in our self-determining power ; and on the au
thority of the
&quot;
Postulate,&quot; we must, therefore, con
clude that this belief stands for a fact. It clearly will
not do to be too free with the
&quot;
Postulate.&quot; If it couldReview of Herbert Spencer. 207
be smuggled in at the back door, and be persuaded
to affix the seal of reality to the outer world, and
could then be kicked out before any further claims
could be made upon it, it might do to send for it
; but
if it is to be free to all parties, it will be as likely to
blaspheme as to bless. There is no help for it. Mr.
Spencer s solid-looking sensational ground vanishes
from under his feet, and leaves him in the abysses.
The loftiest tumbling, however, of the experience-
philosophy has probably been done over the intui
tions. All our mental operations proceed upon cer
tain assumptions. All reasoning, even that of the
skeptic, necessarily proceeds in logical forms, and
assumes the validity of logical laws. The argument
brought to overthrow them implicitly assumes them,
and owes all its value to the assumption. It were
easier to escape from one s shadow, or for a bird to
outsoar the supporting air, than for reason to escape
from the dominion of logical laws. The law of
causation, too, is the necessary postulate of all sci
ence, and the one which alone makes science possible.
The transcendental philosopher assumes that these
data are contributed by the mind itself
; that, though
not prior to experience, they do not derive their
validity from it, but are intuitively known to be true.
It is not taught that these are explicitly present, but
only implicitly so, in every mental operation. The
savage, the rustic, or the child, probably knows as lit-208 Review of Herbert Spencer.
tie about intuitions, logical laws, or thought-forms, as
he does about the doctrine of evolution itself ; yet
each one implicitly proceeds upon them.
Now these constant assumptions of all reasoning
the transcendentalist calls the intuitions ; and claims
that they are not generalizations from experience, b .t
are based upon direct mental insight. There must oe,
indeed, a certain amount of experience to make the
terms of the proposition intelligible. If we should
inquire of a child three years old whether two straight
lines can inclose a space, or whether it is not pos
sible that events can happen without a cause, we
should probably get no very satisfactory answer,
because the terms of the propositions would be ut
terly unintelligible to him. But when the terms can
be understood, when the conception of straight lines
and inclosed spaces can be formed, then the mind
needs no further experience to know that two
straight lines can never inclose a space. We are
just as sure of the fact as we would be if we had
followed them to the frontiers of the infinite. When
there is sufficient mental development to follow a
geometrical demonstration, we reach a certainty
which no further experience can confirm or shake.
Indeed, we make the mental conception the regula
tor of experience, and not conversely. So, too,
when the doctrine of causation becomes intelligible,
that moment it is perceived to be real.
This, then, is the doctrine of the intuitions. Theof Herbert Spencer. 209
mind has the power of knowing sonic things to be true,
without any process of verification. These are the
intuitions
; and the claim for them is that, as soon as the
propositions which express them become intelligible,
they are seen to be necessarily and universally true.
For their truth, they are independent of experience ;
while they alone give to experience any form or
meaning. They are the laws which transform the
chaos of unconnected experience into a creation of
orderly thought. This is the only doctrine which
corresponds with our matured consciousness.
This doctrine, however, the experience-philos
opher is, of course, bound to deny. These laws of
thinking are in his view, like every thing else in
the mind, but consolidated sensations
; and, in the
lack of evidence, the philosopher plunges into dark
ness of the unknown, and gropes about for oppos
ing possibilities which can never be brought to
a test. Both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Mill assure
us that the assumed necessity of these beliefs is
only the result of habit. Even the simplest math
ematical axioms are, according to Mr. Mill, the
results of inveterate associations
; and he gravely
suggests that if our training had been different,
we might have looked upon their contradictories
as equally axiomatic. Mr. Spencer tells us that
&quot; where a relation has been perpetually repeated in
our experience with absolute uniformity, we are
entirely disabled from conceiving the negation of2 TO Review of Herbert Spencer.
it.&quot; This is the origin of all our a priori beliefs.
&quot;
Being the constant and infinitely-repeated elements
of thought, they must become the automatic ele
ments of thought the elements of thought which it
is impossible to get rid of the
* forms of intuition.
&quot;
Before pointing out the skeptical consequences of
this teaching, I notice a novelty which Mr. Spencer
has introduced into the discussion. The sensational
doctrine, hitherto, has been greatly pressed for time in
which to work its transformations. It is not claimed
that these wonders have been wrought within the scope
of our present consciousness
; it has been necessary
therefore to do the work in infancy, and to complete
it also before the critical faculties make their ap
pearance. It has always required great sleight-of-
hand to complete and polish a full set of mental
furniture in the limited time allowed. Besides, too,
the slightest observation shows that every individual
brings with him tendencies which determine both
the line, and the measure, of his development ; and
these tendencies, so far as they go, are transcend
ental elements in his mental character. The fact
is undeniable that, both physically and mentally, we
are determined more by our constitution than by
our own experience. The fact of transmitted tend
encies has become so prominent, that the philos
opher who attempts to deduce every thing from
individual experience finds the groand slipping from
under his feet. The transcendental, forces its wayReview of Herbert Spencer. 21 1
into individual experience ; and when once it gets
in, who can tell where it will stop
?
In .this sad strait of the doctrine, Mr. Spencer ap
pears with a saving suggestion, and the eagerness with
which it has been adopted serves to show into what
sore need the philosophy had fallen. Mr. Spencer
suggests that these intuitions are transcendental for
the individual, but empirical for the race. He, too,
would derive every thing from experience, but from a
race-experience. To the experience-hypothesis as
commonly understood, he shows no quarter what
ever.
&quot; If at birth there exists nothing but a passive
receptivity of impressions, why is not a horse as
educable as a man ? Should it be said that language
makes the difference, then why do not the cat and
the dog, reared in the same household, arrive at
equal degrees and kinds of intelligence?&quot; &quot;Those
who contend that knowledge results wholly from the
experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do
the mental development which accompanies the
autogenous development of the nervous system, fall
into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all
bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting
the innate tendency to assume the adult form. . . .
Doubtless, experiences received by the individual fur
nish the concrete materials for all thought. Doubt
less, the organized and semi-organized arrangements
existing among the cerebral nerves can give no
knowledge until there has been a presentation of the212 Review of Herbert Spencer.
external relations to which they correspond. And
doubtless, the child s daily observations and reason
ings aid the formation of those involved nervous
connections that are in process of spontaneous evo
lution, just as its daily gambols aid the development
of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different
thing from saying that its intelligence is wholly
produced by its experiences. That is an utterly
inadmissible doctrine a doctrine which makes the
presence of a brain meaningless ; a doctrine which
makes idiotcy unaccountable.&quot; Vol. i, p. 470.
We have classical authority for believing that it is
lawful to be taught even by an enemy ; wherefore, we
must thank Mr. Spencer for his conclusive showing
that the current form of the experience-hypothesis is
utterly untenable. And now for his own doctrine :
&quot; But these pre-determined internal relations, though
independent of the experiences of the individual, are
not independent of experiences in general ; they
have been determined by the experiences of pre
ceding organisms. The corollary here drawn from
the general argument is, that the human brain is an
organized register of infinitely numerous experiences
received during the evolution of life, or rather during
the evolution of that series of organisms through
which the human organism has been reached. The
effects of the most uniform and frequent of these
experiences have been successively bequeathed, prin
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high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the
infant, which the infant in after-life exercises, and
perhaps strengthens or further complicates, and
which, with minute additions, it bequeaths to future
generations.&quot; Vol. i, p. 470.
It is evident that Mr. Spencer has greatly in
creased the resources of his school by this suggestion.
It greatly extends the time, and, besides, gives fine
opportunities for logical mountebankery. Viewed
through the gloom of the unknown, sleight-of-hand
may pass for a real miracle ; and acrobatic feats
which, upon close examination, betray only the com
mon clown, might, when invested with the haze of
distance, seem like the magic movements of a great
enchanter. But clear as it is that Mr. Spencer has
increased the resources of his school by his sugges
tion, it is not so clear that he has any logical right
to it. For what is it but an admission that unless
evolution be assumed as a fact, it cannot possibly be
proved ? This it is, and nothing more. If the evolu
tionists can get much comfort out of the admission,
they are welcome to it.
Another difficulty meets us. Experience alone,
tan t^ach nothing. It is only as there is a mind
with an outfit of principles to organize experience,
that we can advance a single step. Facts alone, are
dead ; and can tell us nothing of other facts except we
assume the reality of causation, and the validity of
logical laws. Otherwise the syllogism begs the ques-214 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
tion, and the induction concludes from particulars to
a universal. Argument in either form, is illogical,
unless the mind is allowed to contribute its meta
physical data. In this way alone can the dead ma
terials of experience be put in motion, and a living
advance be secured. The fabric of knowledge falls
into indistinguishable chaos, except as supported by
the forms of thought and logic. Whence I submit
that, instead of organizing thought-forms from expe
rience, we must postulate thought-forms at the start
to give experience any form or meaning.
Another consequence must be noticed. If sensa
tion is the raw material out of which mind has been
built up, if it is the only source of knowledge, then
whatever is not in sensation has no claim to reality.
All the higher powers and beliefs of the mind, which
differ in kind from sensation, must be looked upon
as impostors who, having forgotten their ignoble
birth, set up a claim to the throne. The existence
and infinity of space and time, the belief in causation,
the axioms of mathematics, and the universal validity
of logical processes, these doctrines have no claim to
belief whatever. They are not found in sensation,
and bear no resemblance to it
; and as this is the
only legitimate source of knowledge, these pretenders
must be banished from the realm of knowledge. If.
I repeat, this doctrine be strictly true, we know what
we have experienced, and we know absolutely noth
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universal truth, and the so-called intuitions must be
reduced to the scale of experience. As a necessary
result, science disappears ; and the great doctrine of
evolution, which postulates the universal validity of
the laws of thought, disappears along with it. In
deed, not even a limited objective validity can be
attributed to these laws
; for the doctrine is that they
are the result of habit, and derive all their necessity
from inveterate association. They represent, then,
no external facts, but only internal delusions. In the
dissolving chemistry of this doctrine, the subjective
world disappears, the objective world also disappears,
and all that is left is a limitless void
; nay, not even
that is left. All that remains of the universe is a
jumble of qualities which are qualities of nothing,
and a string of feelings which belong to nobody.
To this fatal inference Mr. Spencer has nought
but the following brief reply
:
&quot; In spite of logical
objections we cannot help trusting these intuitions,
and this is our highest warrant for belief in any thing.&quot;
But by his own principles our subjective inability to
get rid of these intuitions, is no proof of their ob
jective validity. The inability results entirely from
habit. If we had formed other habits we should have
thought otherwise. Besides, Mr. Spencer is the last
man who should appeal to our necessary beliefs in
support of any thing, for no one has done them
greater violence. We have already seen how he in
sists upon the duality of subject and object as the2i6 Review of Herbert Spencer.
most fundamental datum of thought, and one /hich
it is impossible for us to transcend
; yet, in spite of
the impossibility, Mr. Spencer declares them one.
He further insists that no effort will enable us to
think of thought and motion as alike
; yet he assumes
as a first principle, that they are identical. We inev
itably believe that personality is more than a bundle
of feelings ; but Mr. Spencer turns this belief out of
doors without ceremony. We cannot help thinking
that we see things as they are, that the qualities we
attribute to them are really in them
; but this belief,
too, Mr. Spencer cannot abide. We cannot help
thinking that we are free, but this also is a
&quot;
pseud-
idea.&quot; There is scarcely a deliverance of our mature
consciousness which Mr. Spencer has not insulted
and denied. However, something must be saved in
the midst of this universal denial, or the universe
would vanish in the abyss of nihilism
; and, accord
ingly, Mr. Spencer asks us to grant him objective
existence, and an infinite force, on the sole testimony
of the same mind which he has loaded with opprobri
um as a false witness. He insists upon these things
because he cannot even start his system without
them
; he denies all the rest, because they are hostile
to his system. Can any thing be more convenient
than this privilege of taking what we like and reject
ing what we like? Who could not build up a sys
tem if we would indulge in this little thing? We
cannot grant it, however. The elementary affirma-Review of Herbert Spencer. 217
tions of the mind must stand or fall together, for no
jne has any better warrant than the rest. Doubt
less, the exigencies of his system may seem sufficient
reason to Mr. Spencer for accepting some and reject
ing others
; but they will hardly seem so to those
whose interest in the great doctrine is less paternal
Now what shall we say of this theory
? Has it not
failed at every point indicated in opening the discus
sion ? Even permitting it to ransack imagination for
its arguments and its facts, it utterly breaks down.
And the purpose of all this subtle misconstruction of
our experience, of this labored denial of what we
know, of these fanciful guesses at the unknown, is
only to escape from the necessity of admitting that,
back of nerves and muscles, there is a knowing, self-
active mind. To accomplish this purpose, incon
ceivabilities are postulated, irrationalities are multi
plied, consciousness is insulted, and logic is outraged.
They have their revenge. Mr. Spencer repudiates
reason and consciousness ; and they repudiate Mr.
Spencer.218 Review if Herbert Spencer.
CHAPTER V.
THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT.
I &quot;HE study of nature has effected, within a few
-&quot;
years, a complete change in our conception of
the physical universe. Whether we consider it as
extended in space and time, or as the subject of law,
as a supreme order, it is equally apparent that the
eailier view had nothing in common with the con
ception of to-day. In space, the blue vault and crys
tal floors have broken up and passed away. We no
longer argue, with Lucretius, that the sun cannot
possibly be more than a foot in diameter
; nor do we
now think of the stars as holes in the floor of heaven,
through which beams the tipper glory. The astron
omer has come back from the depths of infinite space,
with wondrous stories of the suns that glow and
systems that circle there. At his bidding, we have
learned to view those twinkling points of light as
suns, which, though small through distance, do yet
blaze, many of them with the force of thousands of
suns like ours. All terrestrial units, of either size or
distance, fail to measure the quantities with which
he deals. When he attempts to weigh the stars, he
rolls the earth into the scales as his pound-weight ;Review of Herbert Spencer. 2 19
Dut soon he has to roll in so many, to secure a bal
ance, that imagination is outrun. To measure his
distances, he first tries the sun s distance, as a unit,
but quickly finds it inapplicable. Next he tries the
speed of light, as a unit, and measures distances by
the time light spends in crossing them
; but this,
too, soon leaves imagination dizzy and powerless.
The rays which reached our earth last night from
the pole-star, started forty-six years ago. Rays
which started from more distant orbs, when the
Roman empire was young, or when Leonidas and
his Spartans were making history, are still upon
their way. Since light left some of the outlying
pickets of the celestial host, the entire drama
of human history has been enacted. Civilizations
have come and gone. Empires have risen and de
cayed. Homer has sung, Plato has speculated, and
Socrates has nobly died. But the light which left its
distant home when human history was still far down
the future, has not yet accomplished half its way.
The sphere of telescopic vision has a diameter of
seven millions of years as the light flies
; and could
the heavens above us be blotted out to-night, we
should continue to receive light for thousands of
years to come. Swift-footed as the messenger is,
earth would grow old and gray before it learned the
occurrence of the catastrophe. Such are some of the
facts by which the astronomer seeks to illustrate the
extent of the universe in space and time.22O Review jf Herbert Spencer.
If from astronomy we turn to geology, we learn
the same lesson. The idea of a creation instantane
ously perfected is fading from the minds of men
;
much more the thought that it took place but six
thousand years ago. Earth is written all over with
the marks of a more ancient birth. The very pav
ing-stones beneath our feet have in them the rustle
of ancient woods and the wash of primeval seas,
The slow, cyclic changes which have fitted up our
earth for human habitation, demand years by the
million for every day of creation s week, and give a
mushroom air to the oldest human monuments. We
cannot, indeed, assume nature s flowing differential
to be exactly constant
; yet, when all allowance has
been made for its variation, it is still beyond ques
tion that the integrated function cannot be expressed
in years.
Still more clearly is this seen if we listen again
to the astronomer as he tells of a time when our
earth itself, with its granite pillars and everlasting
hills, was but a morning-mist of creation, which
spun and wove until the pattern of creation stood
complete. And hence creation is coming to be
viewed as an evolving rather than an event
; as a
process demanding the roll of indefinite years ; as
being, what the Bible calls it, a genesis, that is, a
birth, with the necessarily accompanying ideas of
long time, and deferred perfection. The conception
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changing for the conception of an orderly and con
stant development from within. Yet this stupen
dous chronometry of geology and astronomy reveals
no trace of a lonely God. Though we go back until
the sky comes down to the hills, and imagination
will go no further, we find nature s forces toiling as
busily as now.
But still more astonishing than its vast extent and
indefinite duration, is the profound order which the
universe displays. The disorderly mob of appear
ances, which formed the content of the earlier con
ception, has disclosed its uniformities, and the won
der grows every day. The whole drove of invisibles
which filled the early imagination, and engineered
the machinery of nature, has been relieved from fur
ther duty ; and their places have been assumed by
the steady laws laws whose control the atom cannot
escape, and the system cannot defy. The belief in
an unbroken chain of cause and effect throughout
all nature, is growing constantly ; and science is dis
closing as never before the continuity of nature, from
the lowest to the highest forms. Many breaks in
the chain have been insisted upon, but one by one
these are filling up, and grassing over. And such
hold has this fact of order and continuity taken upon
the scientific imagination, that very many scientists
profess themselves unable to think that it ever has
been broken, and others will not so much as listen to
a doctrine which involves the supernatural. What-
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ever seems chaotic has a hidden order
; whatever
seems discordant has a secret harmony. Wait a little,
and both the order and harmony will be diso osed.
But, while the effect of scientific study has been to
magnify the extent and wonder of creation, it has
also served to weaken faith in the existence of a
Creator. Never was nature so harmonious to the
conception of a superintending mind
; and, perhaps,
the absence of that mind was never more suspected.
Never was the universe so fit to be a manifestation
of the eternal all-wise God as it is to-day ; and, from
a scientific stand-point, never was faith more weak.
A study of the Creator s methods has awakened
doubts of his existence
; and the discovery that the
work is infinitely more wonderful than we had been
taught to believe, warrants the conclusion that there
is no worker. It would seem, at first sight, as if
theism ought to find its strongest advocates among
the students of science
; but it is a fact that, from
the time of Anaxagoras, scientific study has had a
tendency to embarrass belief. Atheism might seem
excusable in the student of history or social science
;
for to him, as to Macbeth, life must often seem
&quot; A tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.&quot;
But atheism begins not with him. Indeed, belief
and trust are generally strongest among those best
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lory. It is the student of science, the man best
acquainted with nature s calm uniformity, with its
stupendous powers, and the ineffable perfection of
its mechanism ; it is this man who, though sur
rounded by the choicest tokens of a Divine wisdom,
first learns to suspect the absence of the Eternal Mind.
It must be, then, that science has made some new
discovery which renders less imperative the need of
a guiding intelligence. If the argument from the
universe to God were ever true, it must be truer
now than ever. If the narrow heavens upon which
the Psalmist looked out, declared the glory of God,
much more must the boundless cosmos of to-day.
But since the heavens, to use the words of Comte,
no longer declare the glory of God, but the glory of
Newton, La Place, and Lagrange, we must conclude
that the theistic argument was never true
; and that
science has found, in a deeper knowledge of matter
and force, a complete explanation of the universe.
The question, then, which I wish to discuss is, wheth
er there is any thing in the established theories and
observed facts of science to warrant this wide-spread
skepticism ; or whether this revived atheism, so far
as it is not the child of desire, is not due to an in
complete analysis of scientific teaching, and to con
fused and contradictory notions of force and causa
tion. Science, of course, abhors metaphysics; but I
suspect we shall find some bad metaphysics at the
bottom of the atheistic argument.224 Review of Herbert Spencer.
In opening the argument let us get the case clear
ly before us. It is universally admitted that nature
seems to be the work of intelligence. Inductive
science in general proceeds implicitly upon the pos
tulate that the reasonable and the natural are one
;
and without the assumption of this identity, science
would be impossible. No scientific man ever dreams
of proposing a system or hypothesis which is clearly
seen to be unreasonable
; and of two hypotheses we
cannot help preferring the most simple, direct, and
rational. Who could accept the cumbrous Ptolemaic
system, after the simpler and more rational one of
Newton had been discovered? Even if the former
were so aided by cycle and epicycle as to account
for all the motions of the planets, it could not be
held in the presence of its simpler rival. The detec
tion of any theory as cumbrous and needlessly indi
rect, seals its doom. When we make such a dis
covery, we do not, like the Spanish astronomer, think
that we could have given good advice if we had been
consulted at creation ; but we do begin to abandon
the theory.
And yet, why abandon it ? Why should nature be
symmetrical and harmonious to our reason ? Why
should the methods of nature be also the methods
of thought
? Why should not nature be the un
reasonable and discordant ? Why should we take
our feeling of fitness, of simplicity, of harmony, as a
standard by which to judge the external world? ItReview of Herbert Spencer. 22$
.s clear that if we cannot do so, science becomes im
possible ; but why should not science be impossible
?
It is plainly an implicit postulate of all induction
that the natural and the rational are one. Nature
presents us with no laws, but only with disconnected
individuals. The intellect is the crucible in which
the many are fused into one. The order of nature
is 3. thought-order, which was first born in the mind
AS an hypothesis, and afterward verified by experi
ment and observation. And this agreement of the
order of our thought with the procedure of external
nature is utterly unintelligible, unless nature is in
formed with a reason other than ours.
Again, it is admitted that nature cannot be ex
plained, or even described, without assuming the
presence of purpose therein. Even in the inorganic
world, we find a multitude of adaptations which, upon
the assumption of purpose, become luminous and
intelligible, but which are totally unaccounted for
upon any other supposition. Without the law of
chemical equivalence and proportion, nature would
be an irredeemable chaos. With it, through all the
myriad changes which force is constantly working,
the same chemical compounds remain. If they are
resolved into their elements, they return to the orig
inal combination, instead of forming new and strange
compounds. The operation of this law moved Fara
day to profound admiration. He says
:
&quot; There are
different elements with the most manifold powers226 Review of Herbert Spencer.
and the most opposed tendencies. Some are so lazy
and inert, that a superficial observer would take them
for nothing in the grand resultant of powers ; and
others, on the contrary, possess such violent proper
ties that they seem to threaten the stability of the
universe. But upon a deeper examination of the
same, and a consideration of the role which they play,
one finds that they agree with one another in a great
scheme of harmonic adaptation. The power of no
single element could be changed without at once
destroying the harmonious balance, and plunging
the world into ruin.&quot; Except this law had been im
posed upon matter chaos must have remained chaos
forever. If we look upon it as the result of purpose,
the mind rests satisfied; if we do not, there is no
answer except the positivistic utterance : The law
exists, and that is all we can know about it.
The relation of the soil to plant-life, and mediately
to animal-life, is another fact which becomes intelli
gible upon the assumption of purpose in nature, but
is utterly incomprehensible without it. Of this rela
tion Liebig says
:
&quot; There is in chemistry no more wonderful appear
ance, none which more confounds all human wisdom,
than that shown in the adaptation of the soil to plant-
growth. Through the simplest experiments every
one can convince himself that, in filtering rain-water
through soil, it dissolves no trace of potash, ammonia,
silicic acid, phosphoric acid, as it otherwise does
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and that, much more, the earth gives no part of the
plant-food which it contains to the water. The most
continuous rain is unable, except by mechanical
washing, to deprive
it of any of the chief conditions
of its fertility. And the soil not only holds fast what
it possesses, but if rain, or other water which holds
ammonia, potash, phosphoric, and silicic acid in solu
tion, is mixed with earth, they are almost instantly
taken up by it. And only such materials are en
tirely withdrawn from the water as are indispensable
to plant-nutrition
; the others are entirely, or for the
most part,
unaffected.&quot;
Here is another law, and one scarcely less wide-
reaching than that of chemical equivalence.
If we
suppose
it to be the result of purpose,
if we suppose
it to have been imposed upon matter that plants and
animals might live, the mind is satisfied. A suffi
cient reason for the fact has been found, and a suffi
cient explanation has been given. But if we reject
this explanation, as in the case of the chemical law,
no account whatever of the fact is possible
; and we
must fall back once more on positivism, and content
ourselves with the affirmation of the fact, and attempt
no explanation.
The peculiar action of heat with relation to trans
parent media is another fact of even greater impor
tance than, the one just mentioned. Heat of high
tension has vastly greater penetrative power than
* Chem., Brief, vol. ii, p. 261.Rcviciv of Herbert Spencer.
heat of low tension. The result is, that the heat
from the sun passes with little obstruction through
our atmosphere, and delivers its warmth upon the
earth. But in so doing it loses tension, and is en
tirely unable to pass through atmosphere into space
again. The air lets it in, but will not let it out.
Upon this fact alone rests the possibility of maintain
ing the temperature which organic needs make im
perative. The fact is explained if we consider it as
the result of purpose ; otherwise, it remains unex
plained and unexplainable. The same general adap
tation is also seen in the reciprocal action of the
plant and animal kingdoms, and in the relation of the
sea and land. Physical geography proves that a
slight change in the mutual adjustment of land and
water, would be sufficient to destroy the present
harmony of the organic world. Passing to organic
existence, the evidences of plan and purpose accumu
late so rapidly, and are so strong withal, that the
most skeptical as to final causes cannot avoid using
the language of contrivance. Scientific men assume
it as an axiom that every organ has its purpose and
balanced function
; and whole sciences, as compara
tive anatomy, are built upon the assumption. Cuvier
finds a bone, and reasoning upon the principle of
adaptation and fitness, proceeds to construct the
animal to which it belonged. Finally the complete
skeleton itself is found, and the prophecy of the
philosopher accords with the fact of nature.Reviciv of Herbert Spencer. 229
Perhaps no one has used the language of con
trivance more freely than Mr. Darwin himself. He
denies the fact, to be sure
; but he cannot avoid using
ihe language.
Mr. Huxley, too, in speaking of the development
of a salamander from the egg, says
:
&quot; After watching
the process, hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily
possessed by the notion that some more subtle aid
to vision than an achromatic would show the hidden
artist, with his plan before him, striving with skill
ful manipulation to perfect his work.&quot; At every
unguarded minute, the most cautious and skeptical
naturalists fall into the very error they so vigorously
denounce.
Let us now collect the results at which we have
arrived. It is admitted by all it is not even ques
tioned by any that nature is more harmonious to the
conception of a guiding mind than to any other
scientific view. It is admitted, too, that the evidence
of purpose is so strong that not even the most skep
tical can avoid assuming it
; and if he is to speak in
telligibly about nature, he must assume it. It is also
admitted that science, even while denying that nature
is the work of reason, must still assume as a necessary
postulate that nature is reasonable, that its methods
correspond to those of a rational mind. It is further
admitted, that no explanation at all is possible of
many most purpose-like laws and facts of nature, ex
cept upon the assumption that they do indeed repre-230 Review of Herbert Spencer.
sent the fulfillment of a plan or purpose. In short, it
is admitted that, assuming contrivance and purpose
in nature, the universe becomes luminous and har
monious
; and, denying it, the universe remains an
incomprehensible enigma. It is plain, then, that as
a scientific hypothesis the theistic conception has
infinitely the advantage over all others. The uni
versal scientific method is to adopt that theory which
best explains the facts. The vibratory theory of
light and heat explains more phenomena than the
emission theory, and owes its acceptance entirely to
this fact. If any other theory should ever be pro
posed which would better explain the facts, it would
in turn be received.
Now, in offering the hypothesis of intelligent
Creator as the explanation of the universe, we are
not proposing any strange theory. We are only
extending to the working of the world, the law
which we know holds in our own conscious ac
tions
; and there is nothing whatever in such a con
ception which is at variance with just scientific
methods. If, now, we apply the accustomed reason
ing of science to this question, the decision is sure.
The hypothesis of a living God is admitted by every
one to be all-sufficient to explain the universe, while
all others are allowed to be full of breaks which, in
the present state of science, are simply impassable.
If, then, we are to reason scientifically, we must ac
cept the theistic doctrine. To appeal from it on theI\ci icw of Herbert Spencer. 23
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authority of possible future discoveries, is to adopt a
principle of reasoning which would make all scientific
truth impossible. If a disciple of the Ptolemaic as
tronomy should object against the Copernican sys
tem : It is, indeed, much simpler and more rational
than my own
; it gives a far more comprehensive
explanation of the facts than mine does ; I admit all
that. I admit, too, that my system gives no account
at all of very many most important facts
; yet I am
not going to give it up. You cannot tell what may
be found out yet. You cannot show that cycle and
epicycle may not be so combined that my system shall
give a complete account of the observed facts
; and
until you can prove this, I shall not change my faith.
If one should talk in this fashion we should
dismiss him as an idiot
; and yet it is hard to see in
what respect his reasoning would differ from that of
those scientific men who maintain their limping,
atheistic doctrine, solely upon the authority of what
they expect to discover at some unknown time. But
men do this. It is, indeed, true that nature s har
mony outruns our highest reason
; but it is equally
true that this harmony is the product of no reason.
There must be some weighty scientific facts which
warrant such a conclusion
; what they are, we have
now to inquire.
The fact of law, by a most remarkable confusion
of thought, is offered by some scientists as a sum*-232 Review of Herbert Spencer.
cient explanation of the universe. I had supposed
that this transparent delusion had long since ceased
to deceive any one ; but having recently met with
some wretched conjuring with it in the interests of
atheism, I must ask the reader s indulgence, and
venture another explanation of this trite teim.
What, now, is a scientific law ?
Without waiting to explain the method of discov
ery, it is admitted by every one that the laws ot
strictly inductive science are but generalizations
from observed facts
; and that even when correct,
they express nothing but orders of co-existence
and succession. Such a law is nothing but a
summation of the inductions, and gives no new
knowledge. It is only an epitome, a short-hand
expression, of the observed facts. But if this is
the gist of the scientific idea of law, it is needless
to point out how incapable law is of explaining any
thing. For, suppose our statement of the law cor
rect, which it seldom is
; suppose the whole universe
arranged in lines of co-existence and succession
;
then, when science had done its work, nothing would
be explained. It is a matter for the deepest wonder
that any one should have ever been deluded by this
empty gabble about
&quot; creation by law,&quot;
&quot; result of
law,&quot; etc. The tendency of the human mind to
personify its abstractions is indeed remarkable ; but
the whole history of metaphysics cannot furnish a
more striking example of it than this illustrationReviciv of Herbert Sp nccr. 233
given by
&quot; exact science.&quot; The schoolmen have fur
nished many a frightful example of this metaphysical
tendency, wherewith to point a scientific moral or
adorn a scientific tale. But so long as scientists
hold up this most inane conception as the explana
tion of the world, they have little right to rail at any
set of opinions under heaven. The laws of nature
are the methods of nature, and are the very things to
be explained. Why does nature move along lines of
order ? why not along lines of confusion and chaos ?
The latter are infinite, the former are few. How
does it happen that the former are chosen and the
latter avoided ? It is greatly to be desired that such
reasoners would remember that law is method, not
cause. Surely when one begins to offer the very
fact to be explained as its sufficient explanation, he
would not be very far wrong if he should begin to
suspect that his mind is not adapted to logical inves
tigation. He had better turn his attention to poetry,
and leave the cramping rigors of logic to others.
The logical and scientific value of atheism depends
upon the atomic theory and two assumed facts.
Science conceives matter as composed of ultimate
atoms which are endowed with certain powers of
a* traction and repulsion. Now these ultimate atoms
bear no trace of origination, and, in default of proof
that they have been created, we may assume them
to be eternal. We have, then, in this conception,
first, substantial being ; and, second, inherent power ;234 Review of Herbert Spencer.
and in looking for the reason of things we must not
go beyond this until it becomes plainly incompetent
to explain the facts. Causes must not be multiplied
beyond necessity ; and until it can be shown that
the forces actually at work in the world do not
suffice for its explanation, we must decline to postu
late any additional causes. If the various manifesta
tions of the world can be explained by referring them
to the mutual attractions and repulsions of these
atoms, then not only is there no need to postulate
any more causes, but we cannot logically do so.
With this theory as a starting-point, the atheist
next proceeds to show that these atoms are capa
ble of doing the work of intelligence. To accom
plish this, he brings forward the nebular hypothesis
to show how gravitation and inertia are capable
of building up a solar system, which bears many
marks of design ; and for the seeming adaptation of
organic forms, he offers the Darwinian theory. By
means of these two theories, which he assumes to be
established beyond question, he claims to have de
prived the argument from design of a great part of
its force, and to have made it extremely probable
that a deeper knowledge would destroy it altogether.
We shall see the force of the argument more
clearly if we examine the nebular theory. When it
was believed that the members of the solar system
were formed as they now exist, and placed in their
orbits by Divine power, natural theologians sawReview of Herbert Spencer. 235
evidence of purpose and wisdom in the relative
arrangement of the parts. The existence of the sun
in the center of the system ; the small eccentricity
of the planets orbits, whereby any great variation of
light and heat is avoided
; the exact balance of cen
tral and tangential forces, by which the planets arc
kept in their orbits all these things told of an
adapting intelligence. On our own planet they
found marks of mind, in the alternation of the sea
sons, and of day and night. The relative adjust
ment of land and water, and a thousand other things,
told the same story of a superintending mind.
But the nebular theory claims to explain all the
phenomena by simple mechanical laws, and without
the intervention of intelligence. It assumes only
that its atoms were once widely diffused in space,
and from this assumption it mathematically deduces
the whole solar system. The nebulous matter began
to condense by virtue of attraction, and the chances
were infinite that it would not contract accurately
on its center, which must produce revolution. This
revolution called into play the inertia of matter,
and thus produced a centrifugal force. By further
condensation the rate of revolution was necessarily
increased, as can be mathematically demonstrated,
and the centrifugal force increased also. Finally, at
the orbit of Neptune, over the equator of the revolv
ing mass, the centrifugal force became equal to the
attraction, and, upon further contraction, a ring of236 Revieiv of Herbert Spencer.
matter was left behind. Now, unless this ring was
absolutely homogeneous and equally exposed to ex
ternal influences, it must contract unequally, and the
iOsult would be a disruption of the ring into frag
ments, which would at once assume the globular
form. These smaller planets, unless they were of
the same size and were symmetrically disposed
throughout the orbit, must collect into one the
planet Neptune. Formed in this way, the planets
would necessarily have orbits of small eccentricity
the first mark of design. Owing to the greater
velocity of the outer part of the ring over the inner
part, the planets would all revolve upon their axes,
which would produce day and night the second
mark of design. The shock at collecting into one
mass would almost inevitably shift the plane of the
orbit, which would produce seasons the third mark
of design. The sun, too, would be in the center of
the system the fourth mark of design.
Again, in condensation, heat would be produced.
This would call into action magnetic, electric, and
chemical forces ; and these by their interactions
would finally bring the earth to its present form and
condition. It is claimed, for these reasons, that the
present condition of the solar system, together with
all those prominent aspects which once seemed the
work of purpose, are an exact though undetermined
function of gravitation and inertia. How, then, can
they be expressive of intelligence? What need isrc of Herbert Spcuccr. 237
.here to postulate intelligence to account for them ?
Gravitation and inertia give an exhaustive explana
tion of the facts
; why seek further ? We may shrink
from the conclusion, but the reason is satisfied. A
physical explanation of the facts is found, and honor
hinds us to accept it.
Here, then, in a most conspicuous case, matter
seems to be doing the work of mind
; and the radical
scientific position is that, if our faculties were more
acute and our analysis more subtle, we could explain
the most complex organization in the same way ; that
we could begin with the simplest properties of matter,
and mount by an unbroken chain of cause and effect to
the highest forms of life. Already molecular mechan
ics are claiming control of chemistry, chemistry is
pushing its frontiers over into physiology, and physi
ology is heir prospective to the mental and moral
sciences. The nebular theory has made it plain that
the solar system can be built up without intelligence ;
and Darwinism has shown that the most complex and
artificial forms can be developed from forms so
rude and simple that no trouble need be taken to ac
count for them. Upon the strength of these facts it
is claimed that teleology has received its death-blow,
Matter and its inherent forces already explain much,
and are daily explaining more. Besides, since the
origination of matter cannot be proved, every fact
ranged under a physical law is so much wrested from
the government of God. The goal is evident. Nat-
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ural laws are able to administer themselves. God is
only a provisional hypothesis to explain outstand
ing facts, and is sure to be displaced by advancing
knowledge.
Here is the real root of the inveterate quarrel be
tween science and religion ; here is the fundamental
cause of the strange fact, before noticed, that scientific
study has always tended to embarrass belief. It is the
thought, that whatever is the product of physical neces
sity cannot at the same time be expressive of purpose ;
that the realms of nature, and of God, are mutually
exclusive. This has been the claim of science, and
the admission of religion. No wonder, then, that
religion, prompted by an unerring instinct, has always
looked with suspicion upon all attempts to formulate
nature. Not that order is incompatible with will
for the theist has always held that with Him is no
variableness, neither shadow of turning but because
this necessary working of matter seems to exclude
both the action, and the need, of intelligence. Upon
this assumption, science at once puts on a fixed and
fate-like aspect, before which every high faith silently
withers, and every high emotion cries out in mortal
anguish. Having made nature over to science, relig
ion has been forced to look for God outside of nature
;
and, as the proofs of ancient birth have accumulated,
God has been driven farther and farther away. Hence
the pertinacity with which theists liave sought for
breaks in the physical chain
; and hence it is that, asReview of Herbert Spencer.
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chasm after chasm has filled up, they have felt as if
the ground were slipping from under their feet, and
the end of physical inquiry must be to elevate mat
ter to the throne of God. But I must confess that I
iccl rather suspicious of an argument for the Divine
existence which is based upon nature s disorder and
breafcs, rather than upon its order and continuity.
For if the Disorder should ever be reduced, and the
breaks mended, ,vhich is not at all unlikely, what then
would become of the conclusion ?
I believe that I have nere represented the atheistic
argument fairly. The claim is that a cloud of atoms
endowed with definite spheres of attraction and repul
sion is able to work out all the results which seem to
us to manifest intelligence and purpose. As speci
mens of atomic working, they exhibit the solar sys
tem and organic development. Teleology is driven
out of astronomy and biology, and surely it requires
little faith to believe that advancing knowledge will
displace it altogether. Mr. Spencer says that the
atoms and atomic forces are all he needs to build up the
universe, and claims to have shown
&quot; that this trans
formation of an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity
into a definite, coherent heterogeneity, which goes
on every-where until it brings about a reverse trans
formation, is consequent upon certain simple laws of
force.
&quot; Given these universal modes of action which are
from moment to moment illustrated in the common-240 Review of Herbert Spencer.
est changes about us, and it follows that there cannot
but result the observed metamorphosis of an indeter
minate uniformity into a determinate multiformity.&quot;
We have seen some specimens, however, of his argu
ment, and need not vex ourselves with its weakness
and debility any further.
Now I have no purpose of running a muck against
the nebular hypothesis, or of blaspheming the atomic
theory ; but I think it can be easily shown that even
admitting both as facts of nature, they necessarily
postulate an extra-material power to account for their
action.
Let us place ourselves in thought back in the nebu
lous period and see what will happen. The atoms with
their attractive and repulsive forces are sown through
space, constituting a gas almost infinitely rarer than
the most perfect vacuum we can produce with an air-
pump. Out of this void and formless gas, the entire
physical universe has been built up. I say the entire
physical universe, because if this theory leaves any
thing unexplained, the teleological difficulties which
it seeks to escape all come back in full force. It will
hardly be claimed that this gas extended through in
finite space ; and, if the claim were made, it would
paralyze the theory. For in that case no centers of
attraction could be set up, and all parts being equally
drawn in all directions no motion could result . The
atoms would be powerless to initiate motion until
some external force overset the equilibrium and setof Herbert fycnccr. 24
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up centers of attraction. The original nebula, how
ever, is supposed to be finite in extent ; let us see what
will happen on this supposition. It is assumed that
it will contract ; but why should it not expand
?
Gases, so far as we know them, tend to indefinite
expansion. If this gas follow the law of gases in
genera], we should expect it to expand instead of con
tracting. It must do so, indeed, unless the repulsive
force of the gas is satisfied, in which case it will
neither expand nor contract, but remain in equilibrium.
The only possible result of such a warfare of attract
ive and repulsive forces must be a lifeless balance.
There is no more reason why such a gas should con
dense than there is for the condensation of the at
mosphere, or of the light-bearing ether. If such a
gas does contract, it can only be because there is an
other power than attraction and repulsion constantly
at work to overturn the balance into which they con
stantly tend to fall. If the astronomer will not admit
a power outside of the atoms, he must be content to
see his theory perish.
And even supposing contraction to be possible
without the mediation of an external power, it is dif
ficult to see how the revolving mass can throw off
rings in the manner assumed. If an external power
revolves a body, the centrifugal force can be so in
creased as to overcome the cohesion. In this way
water is thrown from the rim of a wheel, and grind
stones often burst. Professor Doremus a few years-4 2 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ago exhibited an experiment illustrating the way in
which rings were formed in the evolution of the solar
system. In all these cases, however, the revolving
power was external to the mass
; but in the assumed
evolution of the planets, the revolving force was in
ternal. The cause of the revolution was the contrac
tion ofthe mass, and hence the cause of the centrifugal
force was also the attraction of the mass. Hence,
as the centrifugal force increased the attraction in
creased
; and no reason can be given why one should
overbalance the other. It follows, then, that they
must remain in constant balance, and a ring could
never be detached unless an external power be sup
posed which overturns the equilibrium. Here, again,
the astronomer is forced to suppose some power be
yond the attractions and repulsions of his atoms.
Indeed, no aggregate of atoms whatever can exist
as a resisting body, by means of simple attractions
and repulsions. For both being central forces, it is
demonstrable that both must vary inversely as the
square of the distance. It follows, then, that the
atoms of a body are in equilibrium at all possible
distances, and can offer no resistance to change of
form. If you halve the distance you double both
attraction and repulsion. If you double the distance,
you halve both attraction and repulsion. It is clear,
then, that the atoms can offer no resistance whatever
to change of form, because at all distances the exist
ing forces are in equilibrium. Mr. Spencer noticesReview of Herbert Spcuccr. 243
this fact, and concludes that we don t know any thing
about it. The true conclusion is, that body under
simple attractions and repulsions is impossible. A
co-ordinating force outside of the atoms, must be
assumed as the possibility of a resisting mass.
But we have further difficulties with this cloud of
atoms which claims to be independent. When we
reach a clear understanding of the conception,
it
seems to involve positive contradictions. We are
distinctly taught that no atom can move itself it
moves only as it is moved. This is the law of in
ertia a law, too, which is at least as well established
as any in all science. In order, then, to conceive of
these atoms as independent workers, we must con
ceive of a series of dependent motions which at the
same time depends on nothing. The motion of each
atom depends entirely upon the motion of an ante
cedent atom
; and unless we can conceive that a thing
should be at the same time dependent and independ
ent, conditioned and unconditioned, we cannot admit
the independence of atomic working.
But cannot the totality of the atoms be independ
ent, though the individual atoms be conditioned ?
This involves the same contradiction ; and is, besides,
in hopeless opposition to the doctrine of the equiva
lence of forces. Working force is constantly falling
into equilibrium, and is lost to the dunamis of the
universe ; hence the totality of atoms could only come
to a stand-still from which they could never emerge.244 Review of Herbert Spencer.
If, then, we grant that the atoms, when once in motion,
can work the machinery of the world, we cannot grant
the sufficiency of the materialistic explanation until
we learn what set them in motion, That first motion,
that initial action, can only be viewed as self-deter
mined, and hence extra-material. Self-motion there
must be. To put it in the atom, removes the atom
from the category of matter and denies the law of
inertia. To put it outside of the atom admits the insuf
ficiency of the atomic explanation. All mechanical
motion implies the self-moved, and thought cannot
stop short of affirming self-motion as the explanation
of all physical activity. Science can choose between
positivism and theism
; its atheistic conjurings must
cease. Once upon the metaphysical road, there is no
stopping at the half-way house of atheism.
&quot; Athe
ists must be viewed as the most inconsequent of
theologians.&quot;
But difficulties thicken as we advance. We can*
not even grant that the atoms can take care of
themselves after they have been set in motion. I
have already pointed out that mere attraction anl
repulsion can only result in a dead balance, but a
still greater difficulty meets us upon nearer examina
tion. The doctrine assumes that no atoms are in con
tact, but are separated by void spaces. It is forced
to this assumption by the facts of expansion and con
traction, and also in order to make the conception of
motion possible. Let us, then, picture one of theseof Herbert Spencer. 245
atoms as it exists, cut off by an absolute void from
all its neighbors. What can it do? What influ
ence can it exert upon any other? Can matter act
where it is not ? across an absolute void ? without
any medium whatever? Are these possible concep
tions? Can a theory which involves such doctrines
as these assume to be rational ? To escape this diffi
culty, some scientists have postulated an ether which
penetrates the interatomic spaces and serves as the
medium of communication. But, if that ether is im
material, this conception is an abandonment of the
atomic theory as a sufficient explanation. If on the
other hand it is material, the difficulty returns when
we inquire into its constitution. It in turn is con
ceived as formed of atoms, and these atoms are either
in contact or not. If in contact we have a plenum,
and motion is impossible. If not in contact we have
the difficulty of action across a void, and where the
actor itself is not. But these are impossible and
contradictory conceptions. For it is plain that the
cause must be where the effect is the force and its
working cannot be conceived as separated. If, then,
the effect of this solitary atom is produced over yon
der, the power, the force of the atom must be over
yonder also
; and the matter of the atom, and its
forces, are divorced by an absolute void. But it is
one of the axioms of science, one too of which we
hear a great deal, that no force can exist apart from
substance. But if such a conception of atomic work-246 Review of Herbert Spencer.
ing does not imply a separate existence, it would be
hard to say what does. Clearly the force is -entirely
separate from the atom and independent of it, when
it wanders off in this fashion. Besides, since force
can exist separately, the atom itself has no further
function, it is only postulated as the base of the
forces
; and since it is useless for this purpose, it
may be allowed to drop out of existence. But as
force cannot exist apart from substance, so the scien
tists say, and since these forces are independent of
the substance of the atom, we must look for some
other foundation for the working powers of nature.
The scientists may solve these contradictions at their
leisure. It would not be difficult to criticise the
atomic conception in general ; but, however just that
conception may be, it is sure that this doctrine of
atomic action is contradictory and self-destructive.
I allow the scientist to look upon his atoms as. cen
ters of attractive and repulsive forces
; and I then
affirm, plainly and distinctly, that these powers are
powerless without an extra-atomic power. I affirm
that all the working forces of nature, from the attrac
tion of gravitation down through light, heat, elec
tricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, cohesion, and
adhesion, are utterly helpless without the existence
of an overruling, immaterial force by which the scat
tered atoms are co-ordinated and controlled, and by
which the atomic forces are enabled to work their
appropriate effects. I say, then, not only that atoms/\( i ic;u of Herbert Spencer. 247
are unable to construct a solar system without the
aid of an immaterial power, not only that they can
not keep out of a dead balance of attraction and
repulsion without an immaterial power ; but I say
firmly that they cannot do any thing at all, cannot
effect even the slightest motion, without the working
of an immaterial power.
To the atheistic objection, that we must not
postulate any supernatural cause until we have
found out all that natural causes can accomplish,
I answer, that natural causes, as such, can do
nothing ; instead of being competent to an indefi
nite amount of work, they are competent to noth
ing whatever. I say, then, science, as well as relig
ion, postulates as its sole possibility, the existence
of a spiritual, universal, ever-active power; and,
by consequence, a spiritual, universal, ever-active
Being. To the objection (weighty only from its
senselessness) that this is metaphysics, I answer,
that it is metaphysics from which there is no escape.
Science must either adopt positivism, and give up all
attempt at explanation, or it must accept this conclu
sion. If we are to think at all on this subject, and
think rationally, we can reach no other. Positivism
or theism
; there is no middle ground. The athe
istic argument is the exact parallel of the renowned
snake which began at his tail and swallowed himself,
leaving zero as the result of the process. The atomic
theory serves well enough as the elephant which up-248 Review of Herbert Spencer.
holds the world, but is in equal need of support itself.
If our faith is sufficiently robust to conceive the
atoms as standing alone, we may as well dispense
with both elephant and tortoise and poise the world
on nothing.
The administration of things being taken out of
the atoms hands, we are prepared to listen with
greater equanimity to the claim that Mr. Darwin
has demonstrated, that purpose is needless to explain
the complexity of organic existence. We have seen
how the nebular theory failed in its attempt to be in-
pendent ; we have now to inquire whether this claim
has any greater weight of evidence.
Considered as a theory, no one will claim that
Darwinism is established. Very many, and at pres
ent unanswerable, objections stand out against it
;
and it is beginning to be apparent that the doctrine,
if true, can only be true in a greatly modified form.
But granting the truth of the theory, the claim that
it removes the need of a guiding intelligence from
the development of organic nature is a most curious
logical inconsequence. There is not much agree
ment among the disciples of the development theory,
and hence it is difficult to say what the precise
teaching is. Lotze, a most able expounder of the
doctrine, declares that the theory cannot be worked
out unless we assume in the original nebula the
seeds of all that afterward appear. Even the seeds
of life and mind must be scattered there to make theReview of Herbert Speticcr. 249
development possible. Mr. Darwin s strange theory
of pan-genesis, which makes the original germ not
only the parent, but the actual possessor of endless
germs which are afterward to be developed, implies
the same assumption. Now surely a view which ex
plains evolution by a previous involution, without
giving any account of that involution, does not throw
any very brilliant light upon the cause of organic
development. Such a doctrine merely removes the
question one step further back, and, so far from ex
plaining nature, rather increases the mystery.
Whether the doctrine implies a necessary progress
of organic forms is also a question. Some teach that
development is necessarily upward, and others will
hear nothing of such a doctrine. The naturalists
may be left to settle this question among themselves ;
but whichever alternative is adopted the denial of
purpose is in no way warranted. If this develop
ment is necessarily upward, the only rational ex
planation would be that such upward movement is
due to the fact that a supreme intelligence is real
izing in such development his own pre-determined
plan and purpose. Mechanism knows nothing of
higher and lower
; and when the blind forces of na
ture (if there be such) are seen holding on an upward
course for untold millions of years, ever climbing to
higher forms and giving birth to growing harmony
and adaptation, the only supposition which at all ac
counts for the fact is that there is a controlling pur-250 Review of Herbert Spencer.
pose at work which guides these powers to a foreseen
goal. No mechanical necessity whatever can be
shown for the steady progress ; and as science in
creases the time during which the toiling forces have
been faithful to what can only be described as a plan,
the mechanical explanation becomes so incredible
that it can only be accepted by one who is deter
mined to believe whatever suits himself, in defiance
of all probability and all fact. Let Darwinism be
true ; if it holds a doctrine of progressive development,
it makes a sorry figure in attempting to deny a con
trolling purpose.
More commonly, however, the theory is held to
imply no such necessity. Mr. Darwin himself, I
think, will not accept progressive development as an
integral part of his theory. At all events, those who
hold it atheistically, expressly repudiate such teach
ing. With them the primitive organism is looked
upon as a variable which develops in all directions,
and those forms live which can live. The principle
of natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, cuts
off all unadapted forms, leaving the others to survive,
and propagate their own peculiarities. Keep up this
sifting process through indefinite time, and it must
be a weak imagination which would be unable to con
ceive that the forms of life must become indefinite!)
various, while their continuous existence would im
ply an adaptation to their circumstances. This prin
ciple of natural selection, too, would constantly tendRcviciu of Herbert Spencer. 25
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to make this adaptation more complete. As the re
sult of such a process we should finally have a world
stocked with the most complex living forms, all dis
playing a most accurate adaptation to their condition,
and yet this adaptation would be entirely unex-
prcssive of purpose. In such case, we should be
compelled to turn the teleologist s argument around
and say, not that organisms are adapted to their sur
roundings in order that they may live, but that they
live because they are adapted to their surroundings.
Mr. Huxley illustrates the argument as follows :
&quot; That which struck the present writer most for
cibly on his first perusal of the Origin of Species
was the conviction that teleology, as commonly un
derstood, had received its death-blow, for the teleolog-
ical argument runs thus : An organ or organism (A) is
precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose (B) ;
therefore it was specially constructed to perform that
function. In Paley s famous illustration, the adapta
tion of all the parts of the watch to the function, or
purpose, of showing the time, is held to be the evi
dence that the watch was specially contrived to that
end, on the ground that the only cause we know of
competent to produce such an effect as a watch
which shall keep time, is a contriving intelligence
adapting the means directly to that end.
&quot;
Suppose, however, that any one had been able to
show that the watch had not been made directly by
any person, but that it was the result of the moclifi-252 Review of Herbert Spencer.
cation of another watch which kept time but poorly,
and that this again had proceeded from a structure
which could hardly be called a watch at all, seeing
that it had no figures on the dial and the hands
were rudimentary ; and that going back and back, in
time we came at last to a revolving barrel as the
earliest traceable rudiment of the whole fabric
; and
imagine that it had been possible to show that all
these changes had resulted, first, from a tendency
of the structure to vary indefinitely; and secondly,
from something in the surrounding world which
helped all variations in the direction of an accurate
time-keeper, and checked all those in other directions
;
then it is obvious that the force of Paley s argument
would be gone, for it would be demonstrated that an
apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular
purpose might be the result of a method of trial and
error worked by unintelligent agents, as well as of
the direct application of the means appropriate to
that end by an intelligent agent.&quot;*
I am not aware that Paley s argument necessitates
any peculiar conception of the method of organic
creation. No natural theologian pretends to any
conception of the mode of the Divine working. He
only insists that when we find a result which is re
plete with relations and adaptations which are unin
telligible without the conception of purpose, we must
conclude that it is the work of purpose. With this
*&quot;Lay Sermons,&quot; p. 301.Review of Herbert Spencer. 2 5 3
fact in mind, consider Mr. Huxley s illustration.
It, of course, leaves the rudimentary watch unex
plained, and also all those purpose-like arrangements
in nature which make the watch possible. The
&quot; method of trial and error&quot; is worked by unintelli
gent agents, but no account whatever is given of
Their origin and action. Yet, granting
all this capital
to the illustration, it does not get along very well.
There is a &quot;something in the surrounding world
which helps all variations in the direction of a good
time-keeper, and checks all those in other direc
tions.&quot; But when this process
is kept up for a long
time, and this variable, indeterminate barrel is held to
the single direction of a good watch, it begins to look
as if some power had the creation of a watch in
view. Surely if we were told that a florist had es
tablished a certain variety of flower by carefully
selecting specimens which tended in that direction,
and by rejecting
all others, we should hardly feel
justified
in concluding that he had no purpose in
such selection. The very indetermination which
this illustration ascribes to the primitive organism, is
the strongest reason for introducing a controlling
plan or purpose, for there is no reason why this
variable should develop up instead of down. There
is no reason why at any point it should not turn
back upon itself and destroy all that it had gained.
If then we put such a germ at the beginning of things,
we are forced to admit that it has developed upward,254 Review of Herbert Spencer.
and along lines of order and purpose. It has been
met and molded by such conditions that the best has
proved also the strongest ; and in this way, out of a
primitive indeterminateness, has been brought a
most intelligent, orderly, and harmonious system
Why
? Before the doctrine can claim to have dis
proved the existence of purpose in nature, it must
answer this question. No mechanical necessity can
be shown. Assume a controlling purpose, and all
becomes luminous and intelligible. Deny it, and all
is incomprehensible.
Mr. Spencer, indeed, claims that he has explained
it, but we must hesitate to give him our confi
dence. His argument, in brief, is that the homo
geneous nebula must do something. It must lapse
into the heterogeneous, and something important









multiplying,&quot; creation is fairly set upon its feet.





grate&quot; themselves into chaos, and
&quot;multiply&quot; eternal
confusion, he does not take the pains to tell. Besides,
all this happened so long ago that criticism is im
possible. He has no confidence in these great prin
ciples in recent times, however; for now organic
development is chiefly controlled by
&quot; the yet unex
plained principle of hereditary transmission.&quot; The
saving suggestion, however, is added that this princi
ple is itself due to the differentiations, etc. He definesReview of Herbert Spencer. 255
evolution as follows :
&quot; Evolution is a change from
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differ
entiations and integrations.&quot; Now I defy any one
to give any reason why such a process should ever
pass out of chaos. But must not something come
out of such a process ? Is not force persistent ?
Certainly, something must happen. A lawless and
eternal confusion must certainly happen, and nothing
more. The argument starts with the nebula, and
postulates that something must happen ; and then,
plunging out of sight in the darkness of the un
known, suddenly re-appears in the daylight of
creation, and without further argument triumphantly
assumes that all this must have happened. To
question this, is to convict one s self of denying the
persistence offeree; even to suggest that force must
have been controlled in its working, is to be guilty
of the same crime
; and as this is the unpardonable,
logical sin, it follows conclusively that the argument
is a demonstration. Whatever has happened must
have happened ; hence the nebula must transform
itself into order and harmony.
Again, until the correlation of physical and vital
force is established, this doctrine of organic develop
ment from low and simple forms is in opposition to
the law of identity and contradiction. The under
lying thought of the atheistic argument is that a
mere speck of organization, such as might well be256 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the product of chance combination of forces, would,
with an infinitesimal increment and infinite time, de
velop into the sum of organic existence. Such a
conception is possible if the vital and physical forces
correlate ; for in that case the power which appears
in organic forms is only a change of mode, and not a
creation. But we have seen that there are insuper
able difficulties in the way of assuming such an
identity, and that hence vital force must be conceived
as something altogether peculiar and unique. Now
the law of identity forces us to conceive a thing as
always identical with itself. We can neither write
A =A+ B nor A =A B, except upon the supposition
B^O. Hence at any point of organic development,
we can only view the actual, as the realization of the
potential. The evolving germ is not creating but un
folding ; the implicit is becoming explicit. Until the
development-man proves that vital force is only trans
formed physical force, he must put into that seed
which he plants at the root of things, all that actually
comes out of it. If he does, he throws no light upofi.
the origin of things. If he don t, his argument re
quires us to accept the equation
: zero=infinity. In
either case he is in a sad plight.
The reasoning by which the fact of purpose in
nature is disproved, is thus seen to be wretched
enough, even if we allow the atheist his atomic forces.
But we have shown, in addition, that these atoms
themselves postulate, as the necessary condition ofAYrvVrt of Herbert Spencer. 257
their working, a universal, ever-active, spiritual power.
The atoms then must drop out of sight in the argu
ment, and the question becomes : What is the nature
of this all-ruling power
? This universal being, in
whom all nature lives and moves, what is it ? By the
previous arguments, we were forced to admit its spir
ituality and freedom. The continuous plan and order
of nature, its countless adaptations, its complex and
exquisite mechanism, its harmonious balance of war
ring powers, are all utterly unintelligible without the
supposition that this being is a self-conscious intelli
gence. The so-called mechanical forces serve a con
trolling purpose. The chemical forces serve a con
trolling purpose. The organic forces seem instinct
with intelligence. Both in the single organ, and in
the wide-reaching law, we mark the presence of
mind. The units and the totality are alike informed
by what is inconceivable except as a guiding reason.
This hypothesis is not unwarranted. It postulates
nothing strange. We refer our own activity to our
conscious will and purpose, and we but extend this
principle when we refer nature s activity to a con
scious will and purpose. Purpose rules in the action
of a rational man
; and, finding nature replete with
marks of purpose, he concludes that it rules in nature
too. And this hypothesis is the only one that ex
plains the facts. There is no scientific discovery
which in the least weakens its force. All the theories
brought against it, at best, are full of impassable258 Review of Herbert Spencer.
breaks
; while a closer examination shows that ever)
one of them is self-destructive. Science, then, is shut
up to positivism or theism. If it chooses to content
itself with a lifeless registration of coexistence and
sequence, it can make the attempt. But if it enters
upon any explanation at all, it cannot stop short of a
personal God. I gather this argument from a con
sideration of the teachings of natural science, with
out touching upon the psychological question. A
study of the existence and nature of the human
mind, would serve to show still more clearly the con
tradictory nature of the atheistic argument. But
that is needless. Theism is the only doctrine that
has any rational or scientific evidence, and both
reason and science bind us to accept it.
It might be claimed, however, that we have estab
lished pantheism instead of theism
; that the previ
ous arguments all tend to merge the world and its
activities into God, and make him the only worker in
the universe. I think it could be dialectically shown
that even the previous arguments necessitate a dis
tinction between God and the world
; but not to vex
the reader with such a metaphysical discussion, the
argument does not establish that comprehensive
pantheism which alone is morally pernicious. As
long as the human will and personality are left intact,
all the conditions of religion are met
; and the external
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jdice to any moral interests whatever. But the fact
of personality and freedom is so emphatically given
in consciousness that it cannot be denied without
discrediting consciousness in general, and wrecking
the whole fabric of knowledge. We have here an
insuperible barrier to that comprehensive pantheism
which swallows up the human will and makes religion
impossible ; and I am not careful to escape panthe
ism in its more restricted meaning. Indeed, I am
persuaded that the piety of our time pines most of
all for a conception of theism which will enable us
to find God in the world, and also make a place for
the world in God. The old deistic conception of God
as prime-mover, and of the world as a machine
which only needs to be set a-going to run on forever,
is scarcely less fatal to religion than atheism itself.
Both science and religion have adopted this concep
tion to a very great degree, and the result has been
the unnatural divorce and strife which have marked
their entire history.
Such a conception was comparatively harmless
while the world was young ; but as the universe
grew in space and time, and marks of an ancient
birth accumulated on every side, religion began
to grow uneasy. The date of the Divine working
was put farther and farther away, and belief in such
working grew more faint. The world had taken
care of itself so long, that it became quite credible
that it might yet make a declaration of independence,Review of Herbert Spencer.
The secondary causes which had managed the affairs
of the empire through so many years, began to act as
if they intended to usurp the throne. By the very
supposition, nature was emptied ofGod, and the divine
presence could be looked for only outside of nature,
To this thought is due the pertinacity with which
religion has insisted upon the fact of miracles
; and
each infraction of nature s order has been a carefully-
treasured proof of a power above the world, and
beyond it. But in general, the ever-widening realm
of law has had a paralyzing effect upon religion ; and
piety has pined and ached for some token of a living
God. A being whose activity is purely historical will
not satisfy its longings. It is not enough to make
him the author of nature
; he must be its adminis
trator as well. If religion is to live, some way must
be found of reaching God, in the movements of the
world about us. And it seems to me that this de
mand is met by the theistic conception which science
now enforces, of a universal, ever-living, ever-active
God, in whom all things live and move and have
their being. Viewed in this way, nature, from being
a dead mechanism, lights up with life, and becomes
instinct with thought and beauty. Instead of being
an impenetrable wall which separates us from the
Eternal, it becomes rather one mode in which he man
ifests himself to us. It is no longer an obscuring vail
which no effort of ours can pierce, but is rather the
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infinite thought are seen to play. Instead of being
rigid, and incompetent to spiritual uses, it becomes
rather the pliant and subtle instrument of expression,
whereby God communicates to us his thought and
purpose.
This conception, too, serves to relieve theism of
a certain hardness which the doctrine of final causes
always tends to produce. That doctrine, assuming
that every thing is done for some purpose beyond
itself, leaves no room for a spontaneous activity which
needs no ulterior justification. The error is similar
to that into which religion falls when it insists that
all the movements of the soul should have a con
scious moral purpose. In this way religion often
brings a hardness and stiffness into life, which is at
once unlovely and unhappy. The free movement of
innocent mirth and feeling is looked upon with sus
picion ; and the unpurposed outflow of sympathy and
affection into acts of tenderness and gentleness is
visited with rebuke, because it can give no moral
account of itself. As if it needed any justification
beyond its own tenderness and beauty
! Now as a too
rigid interpretation of life by a moral standard over
looks its atmosphere, and misses all that is spontane
ous, so, I think, a too rigid interpretation of nature
by a scheme of final causes, misses completely a most
important aspect of creation. Nature no doubt ex
ists for the instruction and development of created
minds
; and its steady laws are the faithful covenant262 Review of Herbert Spencer.
which the Eternal keeps with his children. Think
away nature s uniformity, and it becomes useless as
an instrument of instruction. Think away the minds
which are to be developed by it, and a large aspect
of nature becomes meaningless, a purposeless and
idle stir.
But creation has other uses too. It is not merely
a book of science with its didactic purpose ; it is
also a book of song which seems the spontaneous
utterance of emotion. It exists not only for teach
ing, but also for expression. The beauty of cloud
and sky ; the beauty which lies hidden in the snow-
and-ice crystals which sheet the frozen regions of the
Pole
; the beauty of coral and sponge and shell with
which the ocean s floor is spread ; the beauty of grass
and flower in forest depths, and far out upon the
prairie, and deep beneath the waves of the sea
what is all this for ? For a didactic purpose ? Surely
not. It exists for itself, and is its own justification.
Take away created minds, and order and beauty and
harmony must still exist. It is not to be thought of,
that chaos should forever abide in the presence of the
Eternal. Be it physical or be it moral, chaos must
make way for a new earth. These ask no leave from
man, and need no audience from him. They are in
deed related to man, but do not exist solely for him.
They express not so much the thought, as the medi
tation, of the Eternal
; not so much a purposed
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bear this in mind, we shall be in danger of judging
nature by too narrow a standard, and of erecting
human needs as the sufficient reason why the uni
verse exists.
Yet, after all that can be said about the order and
giandeur of the external world, it must still be held
that sense and external nature are but poor inter
preters of the Eternal. They ask questions which
they cannot answer, and force upon us problems for
which the senses furnish no solution. The clearer
the proof of a supreme intelligence, the darker and
more perplexing does the moral problem of the world
become. The whole creation groaneth and travaileth
together in pain. From the very beginning, nature has
been
&quot; red in tooth and claw with ravin.&quot; On every
side we see the most prodigious waste of faculty, of
happiness, and of life.
&quot; Of fifty seeds she often brings
but one to bear.&quot; Generations and races of men seem
born, only to be beaten and pelted, by want and misery.
A positive malignity, even, seems to exist in nature,
producing contrivances for the production of pain, dis
torting, thwarting, destroying. What does it all mean ?
What purpose does it serve ? If chance controlled all
events, we might expect such things ; but how can they
be reconciled to the control of a supreme wisdom ?
What must be the character of the being who can even
permit such disorder in his empire ? These are ques
tions which nature suggests, but does not answer.
Such hold has this aspect of things taken upon the264 Review of Herbert Spencer.
thought of some, that men like Schopenhauer and
Hartmann have ventured to say that existence is a
huge slough of woe and wretchedness, from which
every rational man will seek to escape. The goal for
which every one must long is annihilation. To fuse
the skirts of being, and sink into the void, is the
bright hope which the future offers
; and for its ful
fillment, we must long as the tired and tossing inhab
itant of the sick-bed waits for the coming of the
morning. Yonder are the frontiers of being, and
quickly we shall reach them. Then the last grand
rush of darkness, the healing wave of annihilation,
and the wicked cease from troubling and the weary
are at rest.
It is clear enough that this is a partial and dis
torted view of life
; and yet, if we were restricted
to the theism of nature alone, we must be left in
painful suspense concerning the moral character
of God. It is only as we consult our own moral
nature, that we are enabled to resist the distressing
suggestions which the world at times forces upon us.
The highest revelation of God is found, not in nature,
but in those rare and noble souls which have been
the pole-stars of the race. We cannot but think
that these most truly represent the Divine character.
We cannot but think that the goodness in us is
a faint type of a goodness more august than our
own. Men may have a narrower vision from the
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private prayer. The repented sin, the grief over the
foul sin render, the renewal of the abandoned strife,
the stirrings of a pure affection, the loyalty to duty,
may teach us more of God than we could learn from
\olumes of natural theology. Given the idea of God,
the study of nature serves for its expansion and veri-
cation
; but nature alone could furnish no adequate
conception. From within we learn that, in spite of
all opposing appearances, there is an essential good
ness at the heart and root of things, which, in time,
will justify itself and make its vindication plain.
Men in general have never been able to believe other
wise. The disorder has been due, not to Divine
malignity, but to an
&quot;adversary&quot; who, in the world s
harvest-field, sowed tares. Nor have they failed to
attribute to the good a final victory. Ormuzd and
Ahriman strive, but the contest shall not last forever.
At the end of the great cycle Ormuzd must con
quer ; and Ahriman is to be thrust into unfathomable
depths, to disturb and distort no longer. Nor is it
otherwise in our own Scriptures. As the curtain of
revelation is about to fall, the river of life, foul from
the taint of human history, is seen to grow clear as
crystal once more. The discord which had vexed
earth s harmony so long, is heard to cease. The un
known depths of an outer darkness swallow up all
that is foul and polluting, and in far perspective ap
pear the new heaven and the new earth. That it
shall be so, is an inextinguishable conviction of the266 Review of Herbert Spencer.
human soul ; and the distressing aspects of nature
are powerless against it.
Meanwhile, too, a deeper knowledge is ever serv
ing to show that all things have their place ;
and, one by one, the dark aspects of nature lose
their gloomy character, and light up with benevo
lent purpose. Nature cannot be judged by the
experience of a day. Brief observation shows that
the moon rolls around the earth. It requires a
longer time to discover that both earth and moon
roll around the sun. But the fact that earth, moon,
and sun are in motion around some point in the con
stellation of Hercules, unfolds itself only to the ob
servation of years. It is the same in our judgment
of nature. There is much which, at first glance,
seems isolated and discordant
; but as our vision
sweeps a wider circle order is more clearly seen.
The direction of nature begins to manifest itself;
and that which we thought a reflux of the current
proves to be only an eddy which in nowise disturbs
the onward flow. Looking at the general course of
things, it is clearly seen to be upward, and prophetic
of a better yet to come. The discordant event be
comes harmonious at last, and the underlying good
ness and righteousness vindicate themselves. It is
no malignant being who has lighted up our hearts
and homes with affection. It is no immoral being
who has planted in the human soul an ineradicable
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has sent nation after nation down into the dust, and
compelled them to drink the cup of a bitter and ter
rible retribution, because they dared to do injustice.
It at any time Belshazzar has committed sacrilege, in
that same hour and hall, invisible hands have written
his doom. Whoever is attentive to history can, in
the very hour in which successful iniquity is crowned,
hear the words, Thou art weighed in the balances,
and art found wanting. That final purpose, in which
all lower cycles of purpose are included, is as yet but
dimly seen
; but nature and history both, more and
more clearly testify to
&quot; One God that ever lives and loves
;
One law, one life, one element
;
And one far-off, divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.&quot;
&quot;What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt
know hereafter,&quot; was the word uttered long ago.
Meanwhile we are content to know that in Him all
things live and move and have their being. His
working is not historical, but eternal. Still he hold-
eth the deep in the hollow of his hand, and calleth
out the host of heaven by number. The Divine
presence is no Jess real in the dome of Newton s sk}
than in that which overhung the garden of Eden.
And I count it a great religious gain that science
has completely discredited the old deistic conception,
and vindicated the existence and the presence of the
living God.268 Review of Herbert Spencer.
When any doctrine, however clear, is disproved,
we intend to give it up. As friends bear their dead
forth to the green fields, and lay the cherished forms
away forever out of sight, so, when science renders it
impossible longer to hold them, will we gather up
our most cherished beliefs and bury them forever.
We seek truth, though it leave us in the world
orphans, and write upon every tombstone,
&quot; Death
is an eternal sleep.&quot; But there need be no fears of
such a result. Again and again has the death of the
Eternal been proclaimed, but in every case it proved
that the wish, not reason, was father to the thought.
Times innumerable has religion been overthrown ;
but still the devout soul kneels and prays. Aye,
more, as in the retreat of the ten thousand, the
weapons cast into our camp have been used to kindle
our fires. We could not have spared the criticism
to which we have been subjected. In its fierce blaze
superstitions have shriveled and perished. Narrow
and unworthy creeds have gone out in flame, and
left the human mind free for a truer and nobler
thought. Nature s calm uniformities overawed the
tendency to find tokens of Divine displeasure in
every untoward event, and taught man that there is
no especial smile in the sunshine, and no peculiar
judgment in the storm. Its vast extent also warned
him against the egotism of supposing that the uni
verse exists for him alone.
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these lessons, we look round to find that we would
not have back the old conceptions, if they could
be had for the wishing. Who would longer care
in the interests of piety to set up the date of crea
tion 4004 B. C. ? or to restore the crystal firma
ment with its points of light? The long times
of geology and astronomy seem sublimest sym
bols of His infinite years. And surely the flash
ing splendors of the skies, the ponderous orbs, the
blazing suns, the measureless distances, the mighty
periods, are infinitely more worthy of the Creator
than the pitiful, peep-show heaven for which the
Church once contended. Never before was the uni
verse so fit a manifestation and abode of the God we
love as it is to-day. Never did the heavens so de
clare the glory of God as they do now. The most
impressive lesson of the past is to fear nothing that
is true, and to despair of nothing that is good. It
bids us lay aside that secret skepticism of our own
teachings, which is at once our weakness and our
disgrace, and fear nothing from the truth, and fear
nothing for it. We listen without dread, or even
fear, for the last and worst word that science can
utter ; and we are confident that when that word
shall have been uttered, the devout soul will still
have the warrant of reason, as well as of faith, for
joining in that ancient ascription of praise to the
&quot; King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise
God.&quot;




only remains to collect the results of our ex
amination, that we may get a connected view
of the principles of the New Philosophy. As be
tween science and religion in general, we found that
Mr. Spencer s arguments were such as to make both
impossible. The ideas involved in religion are, in
the last analysis, no less conceivable than those in
volved in science. If, then, the inconceivability of
these ideas is a sufficient reason for discarding re
ligion, it is also warrant enough for discarding science.
But if the fundamental reality can so manifest itself
as to make a true science possible, there is no reason
why it should not so manifest itself as to make a true
religion possible no reason in the argument, I mean
;
the needs of Mr. Spencer s system are reason enough
for him.
The claim that the limited and conditioned nature
of our faculties renders religious knowledge impossi
ble, tells with equal force against all knowledge.
The limited nature of our faculties does, indeed, con
fine us to a limited knowledge but a limited knowl
edge may be true as far as it goes. If so, we mayRci icw of Herbert Spencer. 271
trust the knowledge we have
; if not, all truth disap
pears. To deny, then, the validity of religious knowl
edge, on the ground of its limitation, can only end in
the denial of all knowledge. It must be borne in
mind that, with Mr. Spencer, the unknowable is one
and identical, though there is nowhere any proof of
this unity. For any argument he offers, there might
be an infinite number of unknowables, all quantita
tively and qualitatively different. His position, then,
is that the limited nature of our faculties utterly pro
hibits us from reaching the unknowable on its relig
ious side, while we are entirely competent to deal
with it on its scientific side. The truth is, that the
unknowable is simply formless, indeterminate, dead
substance, which obeys only mechanical laws, and
has no religious side. Mr. Spencer, however, does
not admit this, and confuses both himself and his
readers with logical jugglery and thimble-rigging
over the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, the
first cause, etc. The following conclusions emerge
at the end of the show :
Religion is impossible, because it involves unthink
able ideas ;
Science is possible, though it involves the same
unthinkable ideas.
God must be conceived as self-existent, and is,
therefore, an untenable hypothesis ;
The fundamental reality must be conceived as self-
existent, and is not an untenable hypothesis.272 Review of Herbert Spencer.
God must be conceived as eternal
; and is, hence,
an untenable hypothesis ;
The fundamental reality must also be conceived as
eternal, and is not an untenable hypothesis.
To affirm the eternity of God, would land us in in
soluble contradictions
;
To affirm the eternity of matter and force, is the
highest necessity of our thought.
God must be conceived as first cause and absolute.
But these conceptions contradict each other a cause
cannot be absolute, since it stands in relation to its
effect
; the absolute cannot be cause, since cause im
plies relation.
Yet the only absolute we know is known as first
cause, is known in causal relation to the universe.
All other absolutes are metaphysical impostors, and
the alleged difficulty vanishes.
God must also be conceived as infinite. &quot;He must
contain all power and transcend all law,&quot; and &quot;can
not be distinguished from the finite by the absence
of any quality which the finite possesses.
God possesses all power, but cannot reveal himself.
God, though possessing all that the finite does, has
no knowledge, no consciousness, no intelligence, no
personality.
Our highest wisdom is to recognize the mystery
of the absolute, and abandon the &quot;carpenter theory&quot;
of creation for the higher view, that
&quot; evolution is a
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to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through con
tinuous differentiations and integrations.&quot;
The discussion which involves all these harmonies
is fitly called the
&quot; Laws of the Unknowable ;
&quot;
at all
events, the ways of this logic are past finding out.
Henceforth the unknowable serves as a kind of
prison-house in which to lock up all troublesome
questions and questioners, and the discussion pro
ceeds to the
&quot; Laws of the Knowable.&quot;
This part comprises Mr. Spencer s attempt to get
rid of the
&quot;
carpenter theory,&quot; by showing that mat
ter and force are able to turn chaos into creation.
He first provides himself with a homogeneous nebula,





Multiplication of Effects,&quot; and
the
&quot;
Integration of Correspondences.&quot; The argu
ment, which has been epitomized already, may be re
stated thus : The homogeneous must lapse into the
heterogeneous, that is, into creation. Three such
formidable principles as those just mentioned, must
do something. The absurdity of the argument has
been sufficiently pointed out already ; attention may
be called, however, to the inner contradiction of these
creative principles.
This instability of the homogeneous depends en
tirely upon the fact that force is constantly at work
producing change. But such force is as powerful
against the heterogeneous as against the homogene
ous
; and there is really no more reason for erecting274 Review of Herbert Spencer.
the instability of the homogeneous into a principle
than for erecting the instability of the heterogeneous
into a principle. From the assumed working of
force, instability in general must result
; and no gain
or advance can be held. All things must flow, and
nothing could stand, under a principle like this.
Even granting, however, that the principle is a fact
instead of a shapeless fancy, all organic stability at
least, would be impossible under its operation. For
even the heterogeneous, in Mr. Spencer s view, is but
a collection of homogeneities ; the heterogeneous body
is an aggregate of homogeneous bone, muscle, nerve,
etc.
; and, since these single homogeneities are all
subject to the law, they must all proceed to differen




ences&quot; is a contradiction of the
&quot;Instability of the
Homogeneous.&quot; The
&quot;Integration,&quot; etc., is trying
to get like with like, that is, to produce the homo
geneous. But the
&quot;
Instability,&quot; etc., resolutely sets
its face against this procedure ; and we must leave
them to settle the matter between themselves. I
will only point out that, whichever wins, the other
must perish ; and, if either perishes, the argument
falls to the ground. But because this folly has been
put into ten-syllabled words it has passed for wis
dom. Polysyllabic nonsense has usurped even the
name of science.
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why are not all homogeneities unstable ? Take
the light-bearing ether, or even our atmosphere ;
and how long would it take to develop them into
any thiiig? They are homogeneous enough to be
unstable, why don t they make something out of
themselves ? Here is a capital chance for the great
principles to work
; but the moment the sugges
tion is made, we see that the so-called principles
are only powerless and baseless fancies. It might
be claimed, however, that the reason for non-develop
ment in these cases is, that &quot;correspondences&quot; are
pretty stoutly
&quot;
integrated.&quot; In truth we are not
dealing with science at all. Mr. Spencer has de
luded himself with a mass of vague and empty anal
ogies, and has actually persuaded himself that he has
proved something. His cumbrous and inflated ter
minology has been taken for science, and under its
cover the profoundest trash has passed for deepest
wisdom. And this is the New Philosophy
! This is
the new, the scientific book of Genesis ! This is the
luminous reasoning by which the need of a guiding
mind is dispensed with ! This is the firm scientific




&quot; Hebrew Myth.&quot; Still, until the new
book is revised and corrected, I must think that it
requires vastly more faith than the old one.
This reasoning was supplemented by the powerful
argument that mind could not control the universe,
and we must therefore adopt the more rational view,276 Review of Herbert Spencer.
that chance alone is competent to create and main
tain the order of creation.
We next passed to the Principles of Psychology.
Here we came upon the crowning absurdity, and
the deepest contradictions, of the system. Before
Mr. Spencer could claim to have entered the psycho
logical territory it was necessary to prove, first, that
life and the physical forces correlate
; and, second,
that mind and the physical forces correlate. Neither
of these points was proved, or even made probable.
To offer, as the explanation of a thought, a mechani
cal motion of brain-molecules, is no explanation what
ever. The question, How comes it that a vibrating
nerve becomes or produces a perception, a thought ?
was slurred over by calling it a mystery a most
convenient method of escaping difficulties. The in
genuity becomes all the more striking, when we
remember that this question is one which this phi
losophy has no means of answering. Once over the
gulf which separates life and mind from mechanically,
acting matter, Mr. Spencer postulated and proved the
following principles
:
A unit of feeling, and a unit of motion, have noth
ing whatever in common, and all attempt to assim
ilate them to each other, but renders the fact more
apparent.
Though they have nothing in common, yet are
they opposite sides of the same thing.
The distirction of subject and object is one whichRmicw of Herbert Spencer. 277
transcends consciousness by underlying it ; and can
by no effort be thought away.
For all that, the subject is only a modification of
the organism ; that is, the subject disappears in the
object.
Mind is composed of units of feeling, and all its
powers and activities are modifications of primitive
sensations. To think is to feel. How we can ration
ally speak of feelings when there is no subject of the
feelings, was not shown.
Feelings cluster together and form new compounds
consciousness, thought, etc. Why feeling should do
so, why a dozen, or a million feelings should take on
any new character, was not made plain the ques
tion, as being a disagreeable one, was not even men
tioned. To work out the system, we must assume
that feelings can become conscious of themselves,
and think about themselves, and compare themselves
with one another
; and surely the needs of the sys
tem are reason enough for any one who has not
&quot; an
overwhelming bias in favor of&quot; sound logic.
There is a nerve-vesicle in the brain which repre
sents every past experience ; and all memory, etc., is
but a re-excitation of those vesicles. A perception
of relation is due to the fact that the related idea.
are connected by nerve-fibers. These statements
can only be received by faith. This wisdom is only
justified of its children.
The association of ideas is the
&quot;
Integration of Cor-278 Review of Herbert Spencer.
respondences
&quot; which relieves the question of all
difficulty.
The test of truth is thought-necessity. What we
must think as real is real.
Thought-necessity is only the result of habit
;
hence, thought-necessity represents no objective fact,
but only a subjective delusion produced by inveter
ate association.
The test is applied in the following instructive
fashion :
We cannot help thinking that we are causes of
our own actions, that we are capable of spontaneous
activity.
Though a thought-necessity compels us to think
so, this thought-necessity deceives us.
We are also forced to believe in the reality and
identity of self; but this thought-necessity is a false
witness.
In short, all the thought-necessities are vile de
ceivers except the one which supports Mr. Spencer.
The belief in an external world he graciously accepts,
upon the warrant of a thought-necessity. All others
are spurned from his presence with contempt and
indignation.
The ground for this distinction between the
thought-necessities lies in the sore needs of Mr.
Spencer s system. These serve as a supreme logical
category, the genuine philosopher s stone for dis
tinguishing the false and the true. Its discovervAV,-YV;c/ of Herbert Speneer. 2/9
certainly entitles Mr. Spencer to rank with the great
creative logicians of the past. The invention of a new
method in logic or philosophy is the highest, the
supreme mark of genius.
But inasmuch as thought-necessities express only
the result of habit, their claim to represent reality is
utterly without foundation. The logical laws them
selves become untrustworthy, the principle ofcausation
has no assured validity ; and, as the necessary result,
science and knowledge, the internal world and the
external world, disappear into the void of a bottom
less and boundless nihilism. All this follows neces
sarily from the attempt to lead all our mental opera
tions back to experience. A closer examination,
however, iwcals the fact that experience itself is im
possible without the presence of the very powers
which it is supposed to create. Out of sensation, as
such, nothing can come. Unless there be a power
which imposes law upon it, it must remain a mean
ingless chaos forever. The science of the doctrine
is complete. If true, both knowledge and experience
are impossible.
Again, though the mind is the product of organ
ization, and has no existence apart from the organism,
my system is not materialistic. It teaches &quot;a grand
progress which is bearing humanity onward to a
higher intelligence and a nobler destiny.&quot; It in no




to know that it ends in annihilation.280 Review of Herbert Spencer.
Finally, after having examined these astonishing
acrobatic feats of logic, and having duly recorded our
admiration of them, we saw that the very terms of
the incantation were secret traitors. Upon a closer
examination into scientific teaching we found that
mechanical forces (if there be such) are utterly help
less without the postulate of an ever-ruling, ever-
active, spiritual power. The atomic bottom fell out
of the atheistic argument, and left science no alterna
tive except positivism or theism. The great medi
cine-man s charm, when brought into the daylight
and examined, lost its magic power ; and when prop
erly disinfected proved entirely harmless. As long
as it was shrouded in the mystery of the unknowable,
the confused noises which saluted the ears of awe
struck listeners passed for the awful flapping of some
Jragon s dreadful wings ; but as soon as it was sum
moned to give an account of itself at the bar of logic,
it folded its tents after the high and far-famed Arabian
fashion, and failed to put in an appearance.
There is no need to delay the verdict longer. I
cannot agree with the popular estimate of Mr. Spencer.
Though this system has been lauded to the skies as
one cf the greatest products of philosophical thought,
I must say, on the contrary, that its principles are a
miracle of confusion and absurdity. Comprehensive
as is Mr. Spencer s scientific knowledge, he seems
utterly unable to take a comprehensive view of the
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contradictions nestle side by side in the most friendly
fashion, constituting a kind of logical
&quot;
happy family.&quot;
LYes and no lay aside their ancient enmity, contra
dictions swear eternal friendship, and the true logical
millennium is ushered in. Mr. Spencer has picked
up the loose and ill-defined notions of popular science
and popular metaphysics, and without stopping to
analyze their content, to say nothing of comparing
them, he has proceeded to build, and the result is
before us. A very little consideration would have suf
ficed to show that his psychology is fatal to rational
science. A thoughtful criticism would have revealed
the contradiction of his creative principles. One
single, steady gaze into the fog of his argument
would have shown the absence of every thing but im
agination. But the mania of system-building proves
too strong for rational judgment, and the system bears
abundant marks of having originated in a mania.T
If it were not that the history of philosophy
abounds in similar absurdities, it would be impossible
to believe that Mr. Spencer is serious. The grandeur
which is claimed for his system is entirely due to
the factors with which it deals. Any discussion of
solar systems, of infinite space, time, and power,
necessarily has an air of vastness about it which
proves attractive. Mr. Spencer has painted a big
picture with a big brush, and the popular imagina
tion, which finds it easier to wonder than to under
stand, will have it that he must be a great painter.282 Review of Herbert Spencer.
Upon a sober survey it cannot be claimed that he
has added much to our stock of knowledge. The
associational doctrine has been expounded with far
greater lucidity and far better logic. The same is
true of cerebral psychology, while the gist of his ar
gument in general is identical with that of Lucretius.
He has merely combined facts which we knew before
into a huge, fantastic, contradictory system, which
hides its nakedness and emptiness, partly under the
vail of an imposing terminology, and partly in the
primeval fog. The doctrine began in a fog, and
never succeeded in getting out of it. An ambitious
attempt, and a dismal failure, is our deliberate verdict
upon the so-called New Philosophy. There are, to
be sure, many ingenious and profound remarks scat
tered through Mr. Spencer s books. There are, too,
faint glimpses of many of the deepest truths of psy
chology, but there is an utter failure to appreciate
their meaning. Philosophy is not to be estimated
by its epigrams and profound remarks, but by its
underlying principles ; and applying this rule of criti
cism to this system, I reiterate my verdict. Apo
thegms and proverbs serve for quotation, but they
are not philosophy.
Science has fallen upon evil days. Every depart
ment is flooded with assertions which can never be
put to a test, and upon the strength of propositions,
which are amenable to neither proof nor intuition,
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quarters, especially in biology and physiology, science
has degenerated altogether from that severe adher
ence to ascertained fact, which has won for it its pres
ent distinction. Contradiction and absurdity go for
nothing so long as they fall in with prevailing tenden
cies. But that such a work as the one in hand, should
pass, at once for the profoundest philosophy and the
most assured science, is discouraging to the last de
gree. It is extremely fashionable the false is apt to
be fashionable to decry metaphysics -as a useless
study; but a small amount of logical culture and
metaphysical knowledge would render such systems
as this impossible, or at least harmless. I have not
much expectation of a speedy revival of metaphysical
study, still I do hope that intellectual buffoonery
may not always pass for profound wisdom, even if it
does call itself science.
THE END.1